Eighth Circuit to Decide Whether Iowa’s Campaign-Finance Laws Survive Constitutional Scrutiny

By: Administrator on March 4th, 2013

By Colin Smith

Just in time for what is sure to be the craziest Iowa election cycle in a generation, Iowa’s campaign-finance laws are under the microscope in a court case that could alter the way corporations get involved in elections.

Under current Iowa law, corporations that make political expenditures supporting or opposing candidates are required to file reports with the Iowa Ethics & Campaign Disclosure Board.  In 2011, Iowa Right to Life—represented by campaign-finance crusader James Bopp Jr.—filed a federal lawsuit challenging those laws as unconstitutional.  Federal District Court Judge Robert Pratt dismissed that lawsuit, but it’s now on appeal.  A three-judge panel of the Eighth Circuit (which included Iowa Judge Michael Melloy) heard oral argument in the case last month.  And based on the judges’ questioning, it appears that at least part of Iowa’s laws might be struck down.  And that, of course, could be significant here in Iowa where both parties are gearing up for what is sure to be a competitive set of 2014 races.


Attorney General Miller Urges U.S. Supreme Court to Strike Down Prop 8 and DOMA

By: Ryan Koopmans on March 1st, 2013

Yesterday, Iowa Attorney General Tom Miller filed a friend-of-the-court brief in Hollingsworth v. Perry, the California “Prop 8″ case about same-sex marriage.  Attorney General Miller, and the attorneys general of 12 other states and the District of Columbia, argue that California’s ban on same-sex marriage is not rationally related to any government interests and is therefore unconstitutional.

Miller is also expected to file a brief today on behalf of Iowa that urges the Supreme Court to strike down the federal Defense of Marriage Act, otherwise known as “DOMA.”  That position puts Miller at odds with Iowa’s Senior Senator, Charles Grassley, who filed a friend-of-the-court brief urging the Supreme Court to uphold  DOMA.  Senator Grassley and nine of his colleagues argue that several federal interests support the statute and that defining marriage in the traditional sense does not amount to unconstitutional animus towards same-sex couples.

On March 26, the Supreme Court will hear argument in Hollingsworth v. Perry; the next day the Court will hear argument in United States v. Windsor (the DOMA case).


Bury Me in Satin, Pretty Please

By: Jay Syverson on February 22nd, 2013

Today, the Iowa Supreme Court ruled that Iowa law does not allow a person to control the final disposition of her remains.  In a split decision, the Court held that Iowa’s Final Disposition Act, Chapter 144C, provides a comprehensive and exclusive scheme for determining a person’s final resting place, and the person’s wishes are not a part of that scheme.  The Act was enacted in 2008, and allows a person to designate a competent adult to have the “sole responsibility and discretion for making decisions concerning the final disposition of the declarant’s remains.”  But the Act does not allow a person to directly control her final disposition, nor does the Act require a designee to follow the wishes of the decedent, even if those wishes are crystal clear.

In today’s case, In re Whalen, the decedent’s wishes to be buried in a specific cemetery in Montana were clearly specified in her will, and also in a letter the decedent wrote to her children and her estranged husband just two months before her death.  That letter was also provided to the director of the funeral home that provided services for the decedent.  The court admitted that the decedent’s wishes were “well established,” but determined that Iowa law makes those wishes irrelevant.  In the absence of a declaration that meets the requirements of the Final Disposition Act, the surviving spouse has the sole power to control a decedent’s final remains.

Chief Justice Cady dissented, joined by Justice Zager.  He argued that the Final Dispositions Act was only intended to be operative when the decedent’s wishes were not clearly expressed, and that the legislature “did not intend to replace the timeless and fundamental ability” of Iowans “to direct for themselves their funeral arrangements and final disposition of their remains.”


Two appellate-jurisdiction issues; two circuit splits. Next year’s moot-court competition?

By: Ryan Koopmans on February 14th, 2013

Yesterday, the Eighth Circuit decided Ruppert v. Principal Life Insurance Company and deepened circuit splits on two separate issues. First, the panel held that if a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses his remaining claim after receiving an unfavorable interlocutory ruling, there is no final appealable order unless the dismissal is with prejudice.  That ruling reinforces Eighth Circuit precedent and strengthens a long-lasting circuit split that most, if not all, federal courts of appeals have addressed.

Second, the court ruled that if a district court denies class certification and the putative class plaintiff voluntarily settles his underlying claim, then the plaintiff does not have standing to appeal the class-certification order.  In so ruling, the Eighth Circuit sided with the Fourth Circuit and split with the D.C. Circuit.  Moot-court boards take note: two issues; two circuit splits.  Sounds like the Eighth Circuit has written next year’s competition.

The case arises out of a  putative class action against Iowa-based Principal Life Insurance Company.  The plaintiff, Joseph Ruppert, alleged that Principal violated ERISA by receiving revenue-sharing payments from mutual funds and failing to disclose those payments to its customers.  A federal district court in Iowa denied class certification, and the Eighth Circuit rejected Ruppert’s request for interlocutory appeal.

Hoping to create a final, appealable order, Ruppert settled and dismissed his underlying claims against Principal, but with two caveats: Ruppert reserved the right to appeal the denial of class certification, and if the Eighth Circuit reversed, then Ruppert reserved the right to refile his claims on remand.  Likely realizing the jurisdictional hurdles that agreement would create, Ruppert and Principal agreed that Principal would not challenge the Eighth Circuit’s jurisdiction to hear Ruppert’s class-certification appeal.

Of course, that could not and did not stop the Eighth Circuit from deciding the jurisdictional issues itself.  And a three-judge panel, Judge Colloton writing, decided them both against Ruppert.

To begin, there was no final judgment because Ruppert dismissed his claims without prejudice.  Under the settlement agreement, the claims would, in Judge Colloton’s words, “spring back to life” if the Eighth Circuit reversed the denial of class certification.  The panel acknowledged the circuit split on the issue, citing several cases that cite several more.  But the panel reinforced the Eighth Circuit rule: “[U]nless the appellant’s claims are unequivocally dismissed with prejudice, there is no final appealable decision.”

But the Eighth Circuit went on, noting that even if it were “wrong about finality,” Ruppert settled his claims against Principal, so he doesn’t have Article III standing to appeal the class-certification ruling.  Under U.S. Supreme Court precedent, a class plaintiff may appeal the denial of class certification even if his individual claims are involuntarily dismissed because the plaintiff maintains an interest in collecting attorney fees and spreading the cost of the litigation throughout the class.  But the Supreme Court has left open the question whether a class-certification appeal becomes moot if the plaintiff settles his underlying claims.

The answer, according to the Eighth Circuit, is yes.  Splitting with the D.C. Circuit, but joining the Fourth Circuit, the court ruled that when a putative class plaintiff settles his claims, he lacks standing  to appeal an adverse class-certification order even if he retained the right to seek attorney fees. Under that scenario, the plaintiff does not maintain “a sufficient personal stake to maintain a case or controversy.”

Expect a cert. petition on both issues–though the presence of both issues might make this case a poor vehicle to address either one.


Beneficiaries of Revocable Trusts Have No Right to Accounting of Trust Activities Prior to Settlor’s Death

By: Jay Syverson on January 25th, 2013

Today, the Iowa Supreme Court ruled that a beneficiary of a revocable trust has no right to obtain an accounting of trust activities that occurred while the trust’s settlor was alive and competent, even when someone other than the settlor is serving as trustee of the trust. Rather, the trustee’s duty to account runs solely to the settlor.

The Court’s opinion emphasized the settlor’s interest in privacy and the lower expenses of trust administration as compared to estate administration, two of the most common reasons people create revocable trusts, and noted that both of those interests would be compromised by a ruling that granted accounting rights to beneficiaries other than the settlor.  The Court also noted that a beneficiary under a will has no right to obtain information about the decedent’s financial transactions prior to death. Since a revocable trust is a common will substitute, the beneficiaries’ rights under a revocable trust should be comparable to those under a will.

Finally, the Court reversed the district court’s ruling that held the trustee personally liable for her attorney fees incurred in defending her refusal to account, as well as the beneficiary’s attorney fees incurred in pursuing the accounting.  Since the trustee’s position was reasonable and she was ultimately the prevailing party on the accounting issue, the court ordered her fees to be paid from the trust.  Meanwhile, the beneficiary was ordered to pay her fees personally.  It surely did not help the beneficiary’s cause that of the sixteen other trust beneficiaries, fourteen sided with the trustee and none with the beneficiary.

The case, which you’ll be shocked to learn was a family dispute “grounded on pre-existing animosity” between the trustee and beneficiary (who are sisters), is In re Trimble.


Eighth Circuit Panel Split Over Whether Statute of Limitations Binds Court’s Sua Sponte Authority

By: Ryan Koopmans on January 22nd, 2013

Last week in United States v. Daily, a majority of a three-judge panel ruled that a district court can resentence a criminal defendant sua sponte even though the statute of limitations has passed for post-conviction relief.

Carlous Daily was convicted of armed robbery, among other crimes, and sentenced to 444 months in prison.  The Eighth Circuit affirmed the conviction, and Daily filed for post-conviction relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 within the one-year limitations period.  Later, and after the limitations period expired, Daily  moved to amend his § 2255 motion to challenge the calculation of his guidelines sentencing range.  Seeing that the amendment was untimely, the district court rejected it.  That wasn’t the end of case, though: On further investigation, the court noticed a different sentencing error and sua sponte reduced Daily’s sentence to 420 months.

The government appealed, arguing that the court had no authority to grant relief  outside of the statute of limitations.  A majority of the Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court, reasoning that it may be “desirable” to put a “time limit on when a district court can notice an error in a habeas,” but ultimately concluding “that is a matter for an appropriate rule-making authority, not this court.”

Judge Colloton dissented:

If Carlous Daily had sought to supplement his pending 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion based on the same ground raised by the district court on the same date that the district court raised it, then the district court would have been required to reject Daily’s request as untimely. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). Under the majority’s approach, however, a district court may deny an untimely movant’s request to supplement but then immediately grant relief sua sponte on the same ground. I disagree that a district court has such authority to circumvent the statute of limitations, and I would reverse the district court’s sua sponte modification of Daily’s sentence.

Assuming the majority opinion stands (the government has already asked for an extension to file a petition for rehearing en banc), judges in the Eighth Circuit will now have discretion to waive the statute of limitations, so long as the defendant has made at least one timely § 2255 argument.  If the defendant raises additional issues after the limitations period expires, the district court must reject the amendment but can still take up the argument sua sponte.   Of course, some judges will be more willing to exercise that discretion than others.


“Pleaded” or “Pled”: Vote Now

By: Ryan Koopmans on January 17th, 2013

Friend and former colleague Brian Boone has co-written a funny little article about the age-old debate: “pleaded” versus “pled.”   I’m a “pled” man myself, but Brian makes a persuasive case for“pleaded.”  Read the competing arguments and vote for your favorite word here.


Eighth Circuit Validates Class Action Waivers in FLSA Cases

By: Administrator on January 9th, 2013

By Tom Cunningham

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit presented employers with a New Year’s victory on Monday when it issued its decision in Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 2013 WL 57874 (8th Cir. Jan. 7, 2013). The Court held that an arbitration agreement that contained a class action waiver provision prohibiting the employee from arbitrating claims on behalf of a class was valid and enforceable. 

Sharon Owen was employed as an administrator at an elderly residential care facility operated by her employer, Bristol Care, Inc., in Cameron, Missouri.  When Owen was hired, she signed an agreement in which the parties agreed to resolve all disputes that might arise between them by binding arbitration.  The agreement expressly included within its scope any claim for violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and state wage and hour laws.  The agreement also contained a waiver that prohibited the parties “from arbitrating claims subject to the agreement as, or on behalf of, a class.”  Finally, the agreement clearly stated the employee did not waive the right to file a complaint with the EEOC or any other federal, state or local agency designated to investigate complaints of harassment, discrimination, and other statutory violations.

A few years later, Owen initiated a lawsuit against Bristol Care alleging on behalf of herself and other similarly situated current and former employees that Bristol Care had misclassified facility administrators like herself as exempt employees for purposes of the overtime provisions of the FLSA and state law.  She sought overtime compensation for herself and the putative class members.  Bristol Care moved to stay the federal court case and compel arbitration in accordance with her agreement and the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).  The district court denied Bristol Care’s motion to compel, holding that the agreement was invalid because it contained a class action waiver.  The district court distinguished the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011), which upheld the enforceability of a class action waiver in a consumer contract, on the grounds that Concepcion was not controlling in the employment context.  Instead, the court relied in part on the decision of the National Labor Relations Board in D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 NLRB No. 184 (2012), appeal pending, No. 12-60031 (5th Cir. filed Jan. 13, 2012).  The district court concluded that class action waivers are invalid in FLSA cases because the FLSA expressly provides the right to bring a class action.  We discussed the D.R. Horton case last year in this blog post.


Iowa Supreme Court to Decide Whether Internal Whistleblowers are Protected from Termination under Public-Policy Doctrine

By: Administrator on January 3rd, 2013

By Ryan Koopmans and Ryan Leemkuil

If the Iowa legislature creates an express exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, may the courts  carve out an even greater exception under the public-policy doctrine?  Late last year, the Iowa Court of Appeals said yes in Dorshkind v. Oak Park Place of Dubuque II, L.L.C. Yesterday, the Iowa Supreme Court announced that it will review that decision.

While working for assisted-living facility Oak Park Place, Karen Dorshkind witnessed  two employees allegedly falsify state-mandated training documents.  Dorshkind reported the suspected wrongdoing to two coworkers and a former supervisor but didn’t take the matter any further.  After Oak Park Place’s investigation failed to substantiate the report, the company  terminated Dorshkind’s employment.

Dorshkin sued for wrongful termination, claiming that her firing violated public policy.  Under Iowa law, an assistant-living facility may not discriminate or retaliate against an employee who complains to the Iowa Department of Inspections and Appeals about the facility’s operations.  Iowa Code §§ 231C.7, .13.  Although Dorshkin didn’t file a complaint with the state agency, she argued that the courts should use the judicially-created public-policy doctrine to expand the statute to cover internal complaints.   The district court and the Iowa Court of Appeals agreed.

The Iowa Supreme Court will likely hear oral argument before April.


Oral Argument Set for Two Iowa Civil Rights Act Appeals in January

By: Debra Hulett on December 28th, 2012

The Iowa Supreme Court’s recent Nelson v. Knight opinion is the first decision this term interpreting the Iowa Civil Rights Act. This term, the Court will likely decide at least two other appeals presenting questions regarding the Iowa Civil Rights Act. Two cases are set for oral argument in January 2013.

First, on January 23, 2013, the Court will hear argument in Stotler v. Delavan, Inc., on a certified question from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. In that case, the plaintiff asserts a disability-discrimination claim under the Iowa Civil Rights Act. Before trial, the federal court certified a question to the Iowa Supreme Court regarding the impact of the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA), Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) on the Iowa Civil Rights Act. More specifically, the certified question is:

In the absence of any applicable amendment to the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA) regarding claims of disability discrimination, will the Iowa courts adopt the structure of the revised federal law enacted by Congress in the 2008 Americans with Disabilities Act Amendment Act (ADAAA), specifically 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 and 12102, and federal regulations promulgated thereunder, when reviewing disability discrimination claims under the ICRA?

[Disclosure: An Iowa medical center represented by the Nyemaster Goode, P.C. law firm filed an amicus brief supporting the employer’s position that the Iowa Civil Rights Act does not incorporate the ADAAA].

Second, on January 24, 2013, the Court will hear argument in Ackelson v. Manley Toy Direct, L.L.C., on an interlocutory appeal. In two cases, the plaintiffs asserted employment-related claims under the Iowa Civil Rights Act and sought remedies to include punitive damages. The defendants moved to strike the plaintiffs’ prayers for punitive damages, arguing that the Iowa Civil Rights Act does not authorize punitive damages for employment-practice claims. The district court granted the motions to strike; then the plaintiffs applied for interlocutory appeal. The defendants did not resist the application and asked the Iowa Supreme Court to grant the interlocutory appeal. In March 2012, the Iowa Supreme Court granted the applications for interlocutory appeal in both cases and later consolidated the two appeals. [Disclosure: The Nyemaster Goode, P.C. law firm represents the defendants in this appeal].


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