UPDATES & ANALYSIS

9.23

April 2025 Opinion Roundup

by Matt McGuire | September 23, 2025

The Iowa Supreme Court entered opinions in seven cases in April 2025. At the links immediately below, you can read On Brief’s analysis of the following opinions:

The remaining opinions from April are summarized below.

 

Wagner v. State of Iowa and William L. Spece, No. 22–1625

Opinion date: April 4, 2025

On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issues:

  • Whether the plaintiff could maintain claims under the Iowa Constitution (Godfrey claims) after the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision in Burnett v. Smith;
  • Whether the plaintiff waived her Iowa common law claims by not resisting summary judgment.

The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the State and Department of Natural Resources officer William Spece, holding that plaintiff Krystal Wagner’s constitutional tort claims were barred under Burnett v. Smith, and that her common law claims had been waived. Wagner, the mother and administrator of the estate of Shane Jensen, filed suit after Jensen, who was suicidal and armed, was fatally shot by Officer Spece during a standoff.

Wagner initially brought parallel suits in federal and state court, asserting federal § 1983 claims, Iowa constitutional claims under Godfrey, and Iowa common law tort claims. The federal court certified questions to the Iowa Supreme Court regarding the viability and procedure for Godfrey claims. The Court responded in 2020 that such claims were subject to procedural rules under the Iowa Tort Claims Act and must be brought in state court.

After the federal court dismissed Wagner’s state claims upon receipt of answers to the certified questions, Wagner amended her state court petition to proceed solely under Iowa law. She did not resist the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to her common law claims, focusing solely on her claims under the Iowa Constitution. The district court found Spece’s use of deadly force objectively reasonable and dismissed all claims. Wagner appealed.

While the appeal was pending, in 2023 the Iowa Supreme Court decided Burnett v. Smith, overruling Godfrey and holding there is no private right of action under the Iowa Constitution. Wagner argued that Burnett should not apply retroactively or, in the alternative, that her claims should be recast as common law torts. The Court rejected both arguments, holding that Burnett applies to pending appeals and that judicially created claims do not create vested rights. The Court further declined to permit Wagner to resurrect her common law claims, finding them to have been waived. The opinion of the Court was delivered per curiam.

 

Hampe v. Charles Gabus Motors, Inc., No. 22–1599

Opinion date: April 11, 2025

On further review from Iowa Court of Appeals

Issues:

  • Whether the employer substantially complied with Iowa Code section 730.5(8)(a)(1)’s requirements for constructing the random drug testing pool.
  • Whether the employee was “aggrieved” by the employer’s failure to comply with section 730.5.
  • Whether summary judgment should have been granted in favor of the employee or the employer on the statutory drug testing claim.

Scott Hampe worked for Charles Gabus Motors, Inc. (Gabus) from 2008 until he was terminated in December 2019 following a random drug testing event. Gabus had contracted with Mid-Iowa Occupational Testing to facilitate the testing process and had supplied a master list of approximately 165 employees. Mid-Iowa randomly selected 15 employees and 8 alternates from that full list, without excluding employees not scheduled to be at work, as required by Iowa Code section 730.5(8)(a)(1). On the test day, Hampe, listed as the last alternate, was present and selected for testing. After providing one urine sample that was too warm and a second that was insufficient, Hampe left the testing site, citing the need to care for a sick child. Gabus then fired him for failing to complete the test.

Hampe filed suit under Iowa Code section 730.5, which regulates workplace drug testing in Iowa. The district court granted summary judgment for Gabus and Mid-Iowa. The court of appeals reversed in part, and the Supreme Court granted further review.

The Supreme Court held that Gabus neither strictly complied with Iowa Code section 730.5(8)(a)(1) nor substantially complied with this statute by not attempting to exclude “employees who [were] not scheduled to be at work.” The court rejected Gabus’s argument that it substantially complied with this requirement by skipping over and not testing anyone whose name appeared on the test list but was not physically present. The Court rejected this argument, holding that section 730.5(8)(a)(1) imposed a requirement relating to the pools of employees to be tested, not the tests themselves.

The Court also found that Hampe was “aggrieved” by the violation: he was selected from a noncompliant pool and fired as a result of a testing process that failed to comply with the statute.

As a result, the Court reversed the district court’s summary judgment ruling and remanded for further proceedings to determine Hampe’s relief under section 730.5(15)(a)(1). The Court also held that Hampe’s related claims concerning supervisor training and disciplinary policy were now moot in light of the ruling in his favor on the pooling issue. Justice May authored the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices McDonald, Oxley, and McDermott.

Justice Mansfield authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Christensen and Justice Waterman. Justice Mansfield viewed the pooling requirement from the perspective of ensuring employees are not singled-out for drug testing. Applying this perspective, Justice Mansfield would have held that Gabus substantially complied with the statute by ensuring that no one who was absent would be selected from drug testing, even if those individuals were included within the initial pool.

 

State of Iowa v. Columbia Insurance Group, No. 23–1308

Opinion filed: April 18, 2025

On further review from Iowa Court of Appeals

Issues:

  • Whether statutory consumer fraud committed by the insured qualifies as a covered “occurrence” under a commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policy.

The case originated from a failed construction project: Tyler Custom Homes, insured by Columbia, entered into a contract in 2017 to build a home for John and Deena Dostart. The project was delayed and ultimately never completed. The Dostarts sued for consumer fraud under Iowa Code chapter 714H, and in April 2022 a jury awarded them $182,408.30 in actual damages and $17,591.70 in exemplary damages. Columbia, having defended Tyler Custom Homes under a reservation of rights, refused to indemnify the judgment.

After failing to collect the judgment from the contractor, the Dostarts sued Columbia under Iowa Code § 516.1, which allows a judgment creditor to bring a direct action against an insurer to the extent the insured could have enforced coverage. Columbia moved for summary judgment, asserting that consumer fraud is not an “occurrence,” that the damages were not for “property damage,” and that the policy excluded exemplary damages and intentional conduct. The district court granted summary judgment only on the exemplary damages and allowed the rest of the case to proceed. The court of appeals affirmed.

On further review, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that summary judgment should be entered in Columbia’s favor in full. It emphasized that the CGL policy defines an “occurrence” as an “accident,” and neither intentional fraud nor defective workmanship involving only the insured’s own work product can be considered accidental or a covered loss. The Court rejected the argument that statutory consumer fraud’s lower mens rea standard distinguished it from common law fraud for coverage purposes. Moreover, the damages awarded—for completing the house and related living costs—were tied directly to the performance of the construction contract and did not qualify as covered “property damage.” Since the judgment did not trigger coverage, the Court found it unnecessary to address the CGL policy’s exclusions. Justice Oxley authored the opinion of a unanimous Court, except for Chief Justice Christensen, who did not participate.

 

 

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