UPDATES & ANALYSIS

6.24

December 2024 Opinion Roundup

by Emma Sillman | June 24, 2025

The Iowa Supreme Court entered opinions in ten cases in December 2024. At the links immediately below, you can read Rox Laird’s analysis of the following opinions:

State of Iowa v. Ashlee Marie Mumford, concerning Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure;

Bryan Singer, et al. v. City of Orange City, concerning the constitutionality of an Iowa city’s ordinance requiring landlords and tenants to admit city officials for building code inspections.

The remaining opinions from December are summarized below.

 

Todd P. Halbur v. Stephen Larson, No. 22-2021

Opinion date: December 8, 2024

On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County

Issue:

• Whether error is preserved by raising an issue in a rule 1.421(1)(f) motion to dismiss.
• Whether Halbur’s conduct of complaining to Larson, his supervisor, about Larson’s conduct regarding matters within Larson’s normal job duties constituted a protected disclosure under Iowa Code § 70A.28.

Todd Halbur worked as comptroller of the Iowa Alcoholic Beverages Division (ABD).  In August 2017, he raised concerns to his supervisor, Stephen Larson, the head of the ABD, that ABD’s purchasing, pricing, and accounting practices violated Iowa law regarding the sale of alcoholic liquor.  After Halbur reported these concerns to Larson, ABD took actions to resolve them.  In 2018, Halbur reported a second alleged violation to Larson related to Iowa public procurement laws after Larson entered into a service contract with Beverage Merchandising, Inc. (BMI) without soliciting other bids.  Halbur refused to sign off on a payment to BMI and shared with Larson that he believed the contract was procured unlawfully. Shortly after Halbur refused to sign off on further payments, Larson transferred Halbur’s supervision to the COO of ABD, Herb Sutton. A few days later, Sutton terminated Halbur’s employment.

In December 2019, Halbur filed a suit including common law claims for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy and a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of Iowa Code § 70A.28.  Iowa Code § 70A.28, known as “the whistleblower statute,” establishes a public policy against retaliatory discharge of public employees and creates a civil action enforcement mechanism. The district court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss Halbur’s common law claims for wrongful discharge reasoning that Halbur’s wrongful discharge claims were covered by § 70A.28.  The district court also dismissed the statutory claims against the State of Iowa and ABD stating § 70A.28 can only be asserted against an individual person.  After discovery, Larson moved for summary judgement arguing that neither incident Halbur complained of—the pricing and BMI contract— qualified as a “disclosure” under § 70A.28 because Larson and ABD already knew of the conduct.  The district court initially granted the motion in part and denied in part, but then granted Halbur’s motion to reconsider and the case proceeded to trial.  At trial, the jury returned a verdict for Halbur and awarded him $1 million in damages.  The district court granted Larson’s motion to reduce damages in accordance with the cap set by § 70A.28 and ultimately entered judgement for Halbur in the amount of $351,000.

The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s holding.  On appeal, Larson argued that § 70A.28 did not apply when an employee makes an internal complaint to their supervisor about that supervisor’s conduct because the wrongdoer would have already known about the allegedly wrongful conduct.  The Iowa Supreme Court did not consider the merits of the argument because Larson did not preserve the issue for appeal.  The Court rejected Larson’s argument that he preserved error on the issue by raising the issue in his motion to dismiss.  In order to preserve the issue, Larson was required to raise the issue again in a motion for direct verdict at the close of the plaintiff’s evidence and renew the motion at the close of all evidence.  The Court also rejected Larson’s argument that he preserved error during a pretrial argument on a motion in limine as error preservation requires a final ruling on a specific motion or request.

On cross-appeal, Halbur contended the district court erred in dismissing his claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The Court stated they will imply this cause of action only where the public policy is “clearly defined and well-recognized” and there is a “compelling need” for a cause of action to enforce the public policy issue. The Court concluded the district court properly dismissed Halbur’s claim as §70A.28 provided a remedy for the public policy at issue, and, therefore, the common law claim was unnecessary.  Justice McDonald authored an opinion of the court.

Justice Mansfield dissented. He argued that Larson effectively preserved error on his argument when his attorney identified their intent to preserve error on Larson’s motion to dismiss arguments at a pre-trial hearing regarding motions in limine. Justice Mansfield argued that under the whistleblower statute, the person who is the subject of the whistleblowing communication—in this instance, Larson—had to be a different person than the recipient of the whistleblowing communication.

 

Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Patricia Jean Lipski, No. 24-1124

Opinion date: December 13, 2024

On review from the report of the Iowa Supreme Court Grievance Commission

Issues:

• Whether an attorney violated ethical standards under the Iowa Rule of Professional Code by failing to timely file both a notice of appeal and a petition on appeal.
• Whether a fourteen-day license suspension was sufficient disciplinary action for an attorney who violated several rules of professional conduct and received prior discipline for essentially identical conduct.

Patricia Lipski, a solo practitioner licensed in Iowa since 2001, focuses primarily on juvenile court work and occasionally defends clients in misdemeanor criminal cases.  This disciplinary action arose from a termination-of-parental-rights case in which Lipski was appointed to represent “Alicia,” the child’s mother.  After missing several meetings arranged for Alicia to sign a notice of appeal, Lipski eventually filed the notice on the deadline without Alicia’s signature.  The court ordered the filing of an amended notice signed by the client within seven days.  While Lipski obtained Alicia’s signature on the amended notice, she filed two days after the deadline.  Lipski never communicated with Alicia about the fact her appeal had been filed late, that the State had filed a motion to dismiss, or that the court had ordered an explanation for the late filing and threatened to dismiss.  Lipski did not respond to Alicia’s messages about the appeal and never disclosed the reason for the dismissal. The Grievance Commission found Lipski violated five rules of professional conduct and recommended a fourteen-day suspension of Lipski’s license to practice law.

The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the findings of the Grievance Commission that Lipski’s conduct violated several rules of professional conduct, including failure to communicate and misrepresentation, but the Court imposed a thirty-day suspension rather than the recommended fourteen-day suspension.  The Court considered mitigating factors including Lipski’s service to an underserved population in juvenile cases, pro bono work, and other community service.  The Court also considered aggravating factors including client harm and experience as an attorney.  The most aggravating factor was Lipski’s history of misconduct, leading the Court to conclude that prior reformatory efforts had not had the intended effects. Based on these factors, the Court imposed a longer suspension—30 days—than the 14-day suspension recommended by the Grievance Commission.  Justice McDermott authored the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice Christensen and Justices Waterman, Mansfield and Oxley joined.

Justice Oxley authored a concurring opinion in which Chief Justice Christensen and Justice Waterman joined. Justice Oxley explained that the nature of Lipski’s practice, serving underserved communities, meant that Lipski could not afford administrative support—highlighting the barriers to access to justice present in many Iowa communities.  Justice McDonald authored a concurrence in which Justice May joined, arguing that under the applicable procedural rules the Court should not have analyzed the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the sanctions.

 

Second Injury Fund of Iowa v. Regena Strable, No. 24-0056

Opinion date: December 13, 2024

On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County

Issues:

• Whether the Second Injury Fund of Iowa is liable for a worker’s second injury when the injury results in further injury to body parts beyond those enumerated in Iowa Code § 85.64.

Regena Strable injured her ankle at work resulting in permanent partial disability to her leg.  That injury then caused further injury (“sequela injuries”) to her hip and lower back as well as post-traumatic stress disorder and anxiety.  After Strable entered a full commutation agreement for the ankle injury and sequela injuries with her employer, she sought benefits from the Second Injury Fund of Iowa for carpel tunnel injuries to both wrists sustained a decade earlier.  The Fund allocates liability between the Fund and the employer when an employee suffers a second specified injury pursuant to Iowa Code § 85.64 so that the employer is only liable for the second injury and not the effect of the pre-existing disability.  The Fund’s liability is limited to only permanent injuries to an explicitly enumerated extremity, including the arm, leg, hand, foot or eye.

The deputy commissioner denied Strable’s request, reasoning that § 85.64 only imposed liability on the Fund when the second injury was limited to an injury identified in the section.  The deputy reasoned the sequela injuries to Strable’s hip, lower back, and mental health caused the scheduled ankle injury to become an unscheduled injury not covered by the statute.  The Iowa Worker’s Compensation Commissioner disagreed with the deputy commissioner and granted Strable benefits.  The district court reversed the decision of the Commissioner, agreeing with the deputy commissioner.

The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order and remanded to the commission for a determination of the proper amount and timing of the Fund’s liability. The Court explained that the Fund is liable under § 85.64 if the first and second qualifying injuries caused injury to an enumerated body part regardless of whether those injuries caused other non-enumerated or unscheduled injuries.  While the Fund expressed concern Strable would be compensated twice for the same injury, the Court emphasized that in calculating the Fund’s liability, the Commissioner was to only consider the extent to which the employee’s earning capacity was diminished by the combined effect of the losses to the enumerated extremities.  The Court did find, however, that the Commissioner miscalculated the Fund’s liability in this case because it did not consider the employer’s liability for Strable’s sequela injuries in its calculation.  Justice Oxley authored a unanimous opinion of the Court.

 

Silvia R. Cianzio v. Iowa State University, No. 23-1371

Opinion date: December 13, 2024

On interlocutory appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County

Issues:

• Whether recovery in a wage discrimination case under Iowa Code § 216.6A and § 216.6 is limited by the 300-day statute of limitations under § 216.15(13) or the two-year statute of limitations for wage claims under § 614.1(8).

Silvia Cianzio was employed at Iowa State University as professor from 1979 until she retired in 2020.  A survey of her department’s professors revealed male professors on average earned more than female professors.  Cianzio specifically earned $11,276 to $46,049 annually less than male professors in her specialty.  After she retired, Cianzio filed a petition against the University alleging one count of wage discrimination in violation of Iowa Code § 216.6A and one count of wage discrimination in violation of Iowa Code § 216.6.  The University moved to dismiss, in part, arguing Cianzio could not claim damages for discrimination that occurred beyond the 300-day period preceding the filing of her civil rights complaint according to Iowa Code § 216.15(13).  The district court granted the motion, in part, holding Cianzio could recover damages for discrimination beyond the 300-day period but not beyond the two-year statute of limitations for wage claims defined by Iowa Code § 614.1(8).  Cianzio submitted an interlocutory appeal contending the district court erred in granting, in part, the University’s motion.

The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the district court’s ruling granting the motion.  The Court rejected the University’s argument that Cianzio’s wage recovery was limited to the 300-day period prior to filing the complaint and the alternative argument that recovery would be limited to the two-year statute of limitations defined by § 614.1(8).  The Court explained that both periods—the 300 days and two years—were statute of limitations defining the time in which a party may pursue an action or claim.  These time periods had no relationship to the damages available for a timely filed claim.  The Court held Cianzio could recover wages for the period of time for which she had been discriminated against.  Justice McDonald authored a unanimous opinion of the Court, except for Justice May, who took no part in the decision.

 

Ashley Lynn Koester v. Eyerly-Ball Community Mental Health Services, No. 23-0300

Opinion date: December 13, 2024

On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issues:

• Whether the district court properly dismissed claims of statutory wrongful termination and retaliation and wrongful discharge in violation of public policy where the terminated employee alleged termination based on information submitted on timesheets.

Ashley Koester was hired in 2019 as a per diem nurse for Eyerly-Ball Community Health Services.  Koester was compensated for hours in which she was “on call,” meaning the time that she was available to respond to potential dispatch calls.  Koester was also eligible for overtime pay.  However, Eyerly-Ball did not consider on-call hours for the purposes of overtime.  At some point during her employment, Koester contacted the United States Department of Labor which informed her that, based on Eyerly-Ball’s requirements for being on-call, the hours should count towards the forty-hour threshold for overtime pay.  Koester then began recording her on-call hours for the purpose of overtime.  Her supervisor always approved her timesheets, and she always received her overtime pay.

Management eventually discovered that Koester was being paid overtime, and Koester was terminated.  About two and a half years after her termination, Koester filed an action against Eyerly-Ball for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy and wrongful termination and retaliation in violation of Iowa Code § 91A.10.  The district court granted the defendants motion to dismiss both counts reasoning that both claims were unavailable because Koester “did not demand wages” and “was not due any wages.”  The Iowa Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of the wrongful discharge in violation of public policy claim, holding that the public policy behind chapter 91A was broad enough to encompass Koester’s claim.

The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s findings and vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals.  Regarding the statutory claim, the Court found that Koester did not engage any of the behaviors that triggered § 91A.10(5) – filing a complaint, assigning a claim, or bringing an action under § 91A.10.  Koester only submitted her timesheets.  Regarding the common law claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, the Court recognized three situations in which the common law action may be available—enforcing a statutory right, refusing to participate in illegal activity, and whistleblowing.  Because none of these situations applied to Koester’s case, the Court affirmed dismissal of the claim.  Justice Mansfield authored a unanimous opinion of the Court, except for Justice May, who did not participate.

 

John Feller v. State of Iowa, No-23-0005

Opinion date: December 13, 2024

On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issues:

• Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying modification of sex offender registration requirements based on factors such as the defendant’s demeanor at the hearing.

In April 2011, John Feller plead guilty to two counts of lascivious acts with a child arising out of conduct with his step daughter, J.B., between 2007 and 2011.  After plea negotiation, “some temporary help” in the county attorney’s office opened a new file rather than amending Feller’s existing file leading Feller to plead guilty in two separate cases rather than one amended case.  Upon release, Feller submitted an application for his sex offender registration (SOR) requirements and was informed he would have to register for life because he was convicted “a second/subsequent” sex offenses.  In December 2021, Feller applied to modify his SOR requirements under Iowa Code § 692A.128.

The district court denied Feller’s application, citing factors including the nature of letters sent to his own biological daughter, L.F., Feller’s demeanor at the hearing, and submission of testimony through affidavit rather than in person.  The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision.

The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court, vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals, and remanded the case to the district court for an order granting Feller’s application.  The Court emphasized that when determining whether to extend the applicant’s registry requirements, the district court should only consider factors related to whether the applicant is at low risk to reoffend.  The Court found the district court abused its discretion in denying Feller’s application because it relied on “irrelevant and improper factors” including Feller’s testimony through affidavit, apparent lack of remorse, and communications with his daughter, L.F.  The Court also considered that Feller had successfully completed sex offender treatment, complied with registry requirements, and presented evidence that he was a low risk to reoffend.  The Court emphasized that Feller would have been removed from the registry after ten years had he been charged in one case rather than two separate cases demonstrating the legislature only intended Feller’s crimes to require registration for 10 years.  Justice Christensen authored a unanimous opinion of the Court.

 

State of Iowa v. Artell Jamario Young, No. 23-0480

Opinion date: December 20, 2024

On direct appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County

Issues:

• Whether a search of an individual’s home by federal probation officers based on a confidential source violated the Iowa Constitution.

Artell Young was convicted of the federal crime of felon in possession of a firearm in February 2017 and received a prison sentence.  Following his discharge in January 2019, Young had to undergo a thirty-six-month period of supervised release.  A condition of the release authorized Young to be searched by federal probation officers.  In September 2021, a confidential source informed Young’s probation officer that they saw Young receiving drugs and telling others he was cooking cocaine.  Federal probation officers then searched Young’s home with the purpose of looking for evidence of a violation of Young’s supervised release.  The search team uncovered relatively small amounts of crack cocaine, powdered cocaine, and marijuana.  Because the weights of the drugs did not warrant federal prosecution, the officers turned over the results of the search to the Des Moines Police Department.

Young was subsequently charged with possession with intent to deliver crack cocaine, possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) as a second offense, possession of a controlled substance (marijuana) as a second offence, and failure to possess a tax stamp in violation of Iowa law.  Young moved to suppress evidence found during the warrantless search of his home citing violations of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution.  The district court upheld the search.  A jury found Young guilty of three counts of possession of a controlled substance.  Young appealed arguing the search of his home violated article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution.

The Iowa Supreme Court upheld the search and affirmed the convictions and sentence of the district court.  The Court concluded that the constitutionality of the search should be evaluated by the law of the jurisdiction that initiated and conducted the search.  The search was conducted by federal probation officers and was undisputedly valid under federal law.  Additionally, the Court noted that no argument could be made that the search was conducted to bypass Iowa search and seizure restrictions as the search occurred without the knowledge or involvement of state law enforcement.  Judge Mansfield authored a unanimous opinion of the Court.

 

State of Iowa v. Wichang Gach Chawech, No. 22-1974

Opinion date: December 20, 2024

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issues:

• Whether the district court erred in imposing a mandatory minimum sentence under Iowa Code § 902.7 when that statute was not specifically cited in the trial information.

Wichang Chawech was arrested on the night of October 9, 2021 after he fired a single round at a male patron in a crowded bar.  The bullet grazed the man’s jaw and hit a woman in the neck, causing her to die.  At trial, the jury found Chawech guilty of two counts of assault with intent to inflict serious injury, one count of willful injury causing serious injury and one count of intimidation with a dangerous weapon.  At trial, the jury answered interrogatories in which it found that Chawech was either “in immediate possession and control of a dangerous weapon,” “displayed a dangerous weapon in a threatening manner,” or “was armed with a dangerous weapon” during each offense.  Based on the interrogatories answered by the jury, the district court applied a mandatory minimum sentence under Iowa Code § 902.7.

Chawech raised three issues on appeal.  First, Chawech argued there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction.  Second, Chawech argued the district court failed to merge two of his counts.  Finally, Chawech argued that the district court imposed an illegal sentence under § 902.7 because that sentence was never charged.  The Iowa Court of Appeals found there was sufficient evidence to uphold the conviction and rejected Chawech’s attack on the mandatory minimum sentence based on failure to preserve the error.  The Court of Appeals, however, found that two of the counts should have been merged and vacated part of Chawech’s sentence.  Chawech sought further review.

The Iowa Supreme Court focused on Chawech’s challenge to the mandatory minimum sentence and affirmed all other parts of the decision of the Court of Appeals.  The Supreme Court first considered whether the error preservation ruling was correct.  The Court noted that challenges to illegal sentences are excepted from the general rules of error preservation that apply to most cases.  The Court found that Chawech’s challenge was an illegal sentence challenge because he claimed the district court erred in applying the sentence because trial information did not satisfy the requirements of Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 2.6(6). Therefore, error preservation was not required.   The Court then considered whether the sentence was illegal.  The Court found that under both rule 2.2(6) and the U.S. Constitution, the State was not required to cite § 902.7 in the trial information.  The State only needed to include predicate facts that trigger the mandatory sentence.  Justice May authored the opinion of a unanimous Court.

 

Tags: Iowa Supreme Court 2024-25