UPDATES & ANALYSIS

4.03

February 2024 Opinion Roundup

by Matt McGuire | April 3, 2024

The Iowa Supreme Court entered opinions in eighteen cases during February 2024. You can read Rox Laird’s analysis of Singh v. McDermott, Selden v. DMACC, and Senator Roby Smith et al. v. Iowa District Court for Polk County. The remaining opinions from February are summarized below.

 

State of Iowa vs. Jerome Emanuel Bailey Sr., No. 22–1440

Opinion date: February 2, 2024

On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Winnebago County

Issues:

• Whether the district court erred in dismissing an extortion charge on the grounds that the defendant’s email fell within a statutory defense for threats made with the reasonable belief that the person had a right to make the threat.
• Whether the State bears the burden to establish statutory defenses to extortion do not apply when a defendant files a motion to dismiss the charge.

After Jerome Bailey’s former property manager served a no-trespass notice upon Bailey at Bailey’s home, Bailey subsequently learned that the no-trespass notice was served by a registered sex offender. Bailey subsequently demanded $10,000 from the property manager via email in exchange for not pursuing criminal or civil charges, and was himself charged with extortion.  Bailey moved to dismiss the charge, claiming his email constituted a legitimate settlement offer rather than extortion. The district court granted this motion, concluding Bailey’s actions were protected under a statutory defense for threats made with the reasonable belief in one’s right to make such threats to recover property or compensation.

The Supreme Court held that the district court erred in dismissing the extortion charge against Bailey. The Court found that key issues, such as whether Bailey reasonably believed he had the right to make the threats and demand the specific monetary amount, involved disputed facts that could not be resolved at the motion-to-dismiss stage. The Court clarified that the State does not bear the burden to negate a statutory defense until the defendant meets an initial evidentiary burden, which was not met in this case. The Supreme Court remanded for further proceedings. Justice McDermott authored the opinion of a unanimous Court.

 

Alexandria M. Anderson, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Carter Jay William Anderson, and Terry Anderson, Individually vs. State of Iowa, No. 22–0759

Opinion date: February 9, 2024

On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County

Issues:

• Whether the district court correctly dismissed the individual professional negligence claims pled against the State by parents of a deceased child because the parents did not assert administrative tort claims individually, rather than on behalf of the child’s estate.
• Whether the district court erred in dismissing the estate’s claims because the estate’s administrator was not appointed until after the filing of the administrative tort claims.
• Whether the district court abused its discretion by refusing to allow new evidence to be filed with the plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider.

Carter Anderson, a ten-year-old child, was admitted to the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics (UIHC). The following day, Carter was found unresponsive and later died at another hospital, leading to allegations that his death was caused by improper placement of a feeding tube at UIHC. Carter’s mother, Alexandria Anderson, filed administrative tort claims on behalf of Carter’s estate against the State and individual UIHC employees, although she had not yet been officially appointed as the estate’s administrator at the time of filing. Twenty-one days later, she was officially appointed. The State acknowledged the claims but did not pursue a settlement, prompting a withdrawal of the claims and the initiation of a lawsuit in district court by Carter’s estate and his parents individually, seeking damages for professional negligence, wrongful death, and loss of consortium. The district court dismissed the suit, citing failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Iowa Tort Claims Act (ITCA), leading to the appeal to the Iowa Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court determined the district court properly dismissed individual claims by Carter Anderson’s parents for failing to file separate administrative claims for loss of consortium under the Iowa Tort Claims Act (ITCA). However, The Supreme Court held that the district court erred in dismissing claims by Carter’s estate, administered by his mother, Alexandria Anderson, even though she filed the administrative tort claims before officially being appointed as administrator. The Court reasoned that the subsequent appointment could ratify the pre-appointment actions, and thus the estate’s claims were validly presented. The Court also affirmed the district court’s decision not to permit new evidence during reconsideration, noting that it is generally improper to submit new evidence at the motion-to-reconsider stage and also concluded that such evidence, even if filed, wouldn’t have altered the outcome. Justice May authored the opinion of a unanimous court.

 

Justin Loew v. Menard Inc. and XL Insurance America, No. 22–1894

Opinion date: February 9, 2024

On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County

Issues:

• Whether the district court erred in denying a workers’ compensation claimant’s petition for judicial review of an agency decision denying his claim for additional workers’ compensation benefits for a new injury.
• Whether compensation for a new injury resulting in an 8% functional impairment should be denied based on a previous compensation for a different injury based on a 30% reduction in earning capacity.

Justin Loew suffered two distinct lower back injuries while employed with Menard Inc. The first injury was compensated based on a 30% reduction in earning capacity after it was determined to cause a 20% functional impairment to Loew’s lower back. Subsequently, Loew experienced a second injury that resulted in an 8% functional impairment, increasing his total functional impairment to 28%. Under Iowa Code section 85.34(2)(v) (2018), compensation for such injuries when the employee returns to work at the same or greater salary is to be based solely on the functional impairment rather than on the reduction of earning capacity. Despite this, the commissioner initially denied Loew additional compensation for the second injury, attributing this decision to a credit Menard was allegedly entitled to for the previous compensation that exceeded the functional impairment resulting from the new injury. Loew filed a petition for judicial review, and the district court affirmed the commissioner’s decision.

The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision, finding that the commissioner misapplied Iowa Code section 85.34(7) in denying Loew’s claim for the second injury. The Court explained that compensation for the first and second injuries is governed by distinct criteria—loss of earning capacity for the first and functional impairment for the second—making them not subject to offsetting one against the other. The Court also highlighted that the purpose of § 85.34(7) is to prevent double recoveries for the same disability, which did not apply in Loew’s case as he sought compensation for a new, distinct permanent partial disability. The Supreme Court emphasized the statute’s intention to ensure employers compensate for all work-related injuries without overcompensating or undercompensating any specific injury. Consequently, the court instructed that Loew was entitled to compensation for the 8% functional impairment caused by the second injury. Justice McDonald authored the opinion of a unanimous Court, except for Justice May, who did not participate.

 

Mid American Construction LLC and Grinnell Mutual vs. Marshall Sandlin, No. 22–0471

Opinion date: February 9, 2024

On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issues:

• Whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied the 2017 amendment to Iowa Code section 85.39 to limit an employee’s reimbursement for an independent medical examination (IME).
• Whether an employee is entitled only to the component cost of the impairment rating itself or the reasonable cost of the examination accompanying the physician’s determination of the impairment rating.

Marshall Sandlin, a laborer who suffered a foot injury while working for Mid American Construction LLC, sought an IME after receiving a 0% impairment rating from a physician arranged by his employer’s insurance provider, Grinnell Mutual. Dr. Mark Taylor conducted the subsequent IME, assigning a 2% impairment rating and charging $2,020 for his services. The workers’ compensation commissioner awarded full reimbursement for costs of the IME, a decision affirmed by the district court. On appeal, this ruling was modified by the Court of Appeals, which reduced the reimbursement to $500, which was the amount listed on Dr. Taylor’s fee schedule for determining an impairment rating.  The Court of Appeals interpreted the 2017 amendment to Iowa Code section 85.39 as limiting reimbursement to the work performed relating to the impairment rating alone.

The Supreme Court held that an employee is entitled to the reasonable cost of the examination necessary to ascertain the impairment rating, not merely the cost of the determination of the impairment rating itself. This includes costs for the physician’s time spent examining and testing the claimant, reviewing records, and the associated written report, based on the 2017 amendment to Iowa Code section 85.39(2). The amendment requires that the reasonableness of the fee be based on the typical fee charged in the locale for such an examination. The court found that the workers’ compensation commissioner did not make a necessary finding regarding the typical fee charged in the locale and therefore affirmed in part and vacated in part the decision of the Court of Appeals, and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the reasonableness of the fee charged for the examination. Justice Waterman authored the opinion of a unanimous Court.

 

P.M. Lattner Manufacturing Co. and Accident Fund General Insurance Co. vs. Michael Rife, No. 22–1421

Opinion date: February 9, 2024

On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issues:

• Whether the workers’ compensation commissioner correctly determined the benefits for Rife’s second permanent partial disability to “prevent all double recoveries and all double reductions in workers’ compensation benefits for permanent partial disability.”
• Whether Rife is entitled to reimbursement for an independent medical examination (IME) he obtained while pursuing his claim for benefits, and to what extent.

Michael Rife, a welder for P.M. Lattner Manufacturing Company, sustained two shoulder injuries during his employment, in 2009 and 2018. Rife sought workers’ compensation benefits for both injuries. In proceedings relating to Rife’s second injury, the workers’ compensation commissioner awarded Rife benefits for the second injury, treating it as a new permanent partial disability. P.M. Lattner appealed this decision to the district court, arguing that it should be entitled to a credit based on the prior functional impairment. The district court disagreed with the commissioner and found the commissioner erroneously interpreted the relevant statutes relating to whether awarding benefits for the second injury would constitute an impermissible double recovery. On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that P.M. Lattner was entitled to some credit based on the prior functional impairment, but that remand was necessary to apportion liability against the prior partial disability payment.

The Supreme Court reversed, following its decision that same day in Loew v. Menard Inc, in which the Court concluded that a second workers’ compensation award based on functional impairment cannot be offset against a prior award based on loss of earning capacity. Instead, the employer is entitled to an offset against the functional impairment caused by the first injury, such that the liability for the second injury is limited to the “marginal increase in functional impairment caused by the second injury.” The Court remanded for additional evidence to make this determination.

Separately, the workers compensation commissioner approved reimbursement of an IME obtained by Rife in the amount of $2,250. The district court reversed, finding that Rife was not entitled to any reimbursement, and the Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s finding. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ ruling that Rife was entitled to reimbursement but held that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Rife was entitled to reimbursement only for the cost of the impairment rating and not the cost of the examination, following its decision that same day in Mid American Construction LLC v. Sandlin. Justice McDonald authored the opinion of a unanimous Court.

 

Charlene Jorgensen and Michael Jorgensen vs. Adam B. Smith M.D., Adam Smith M.D. P.C., and Tri-State Specialists L.L.P., No. 22–0576

Opinion date: February 9, 2024

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County

Issues:

• Whether Iowa Code section 147.140 requires a plaintiff to produce a “certificate of merit affidavit” for a claim of negligent retention against a clinic.
• Whether Iowa Code section 668.11 necessitated designation of an expert regarding whether a defendant clinic negligently retained a surgeon.

Plaintiffs Charlene and Michael Jorgenson filed a lawsuit against Dr. Adam Smith, his professional corporation, and Tri-State Specialists L.L.P., alleging medical negligence relating to Charlene’s 2018 surgery. Plaintiffs asserted a “negligent retention” claim against Tri-State, arguing that Tri-State should have known Dr. Smith was unfit to practice surgical medicine and that Tri-State was negligent in failing to discharge him before he could harm Charlene. The district court denied Tri-State’s motion for summary judgment, which argued that the Jorgensos failed to comply with Iowa Code section 147.140 by not producing a “certificate of merit affidavit” for their negligent retention claim. The district court found that the claim did not require expert testimony to establish a prima facie case because it was a matter of nonmedical administrative or ministerial acts.

The Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed the district court’s decision, clarifying that Iowa Code section 147.140 does not apply to the Plaintiffs’ claims for negligent retention of a medical provider. The Court reasoned that the claim did not pertain to negligence in the practice of a medical profession or patient care that would necessitate a certificate of merit affidavit under section 147.140, as the claim pertained to administrative decisions by Tri-State. Further, the Court concluded that Iowa Code section 668.11, which mandates the designation of an expert in professional liability cases against licensed professionals, was not applicable since Tri-State was not a “licensed professional” under this statute. The Court reasoned that the necessity for expert testimony is determined by whether the issue is within the common understanding of a jury, focusing on the nature of the claim rather than the professional status of the defendant or the labeling of tasks as “administrative.” Justice May authored the opinion of a unanimous Court.

 

Alyssa Pratt vs. Adam B. Smith M.D.; Adam Smith M.D. P.C.; and Tri-State Specialists L.L.P., No. 22–0403

Opinion date: February 9, 2024

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County

Alyssa Pratt vs. Adam B. Smith M.D.; Adam Smith M.D. P.C.; and Tri-State Specialists L.L.P., No. 22–1573

Opinion date: February 9, 2024

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County

Issues:

• Whether Iowa Code sections 147.140 and 668.11 require dismissal of Alyssa Pratt’s claims of negligent retention against Tri-State and Smith P.C.
• Whether the district court properly considered a summary judgment motion following an order by the Supreme Court granting interlocutory appeal of a prior order in the case

Plaintiff Alyssa Pratt filed a lawsuit against Dr. Adam Smith, his professional corporation, and Tri-State Specialists L.L.P. Pratt alleged that the clinic, Tri-State, and the professional corporation, Smith P.C., negligently retained Dr. Adam Smith, a surgeon whom she claims was unfit to practice surgery. The district court had found that sections 147.140 and 668.11 of the Iowa Code required the dismissal in part of Pratt’s claims. Pratt appealed, and the Supreme Court granted interlocutory appeal to review the district court’s summary judgment order. Subsequently, the district court denied a motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants as to the remaining claims, and the Supreme Court granted interlocutory appeal to review that order as well in a separate appeal.

In the first appeal relating to the district court’s order dismissing Pratt’s claims in part, No. 22-0403, the Supreme Court ultimately decided to remand to give the parties and district court the opportunity to consider the Court’s opinions issued this term in Jorgenson v. Smith (summarized above), Hilts v. Smith, and Hummel v. Smith (summarized here). In the second appeal relating to the district court’s denial of the defendants’ summary judgment motion, No. 22-1573, the Supreme Court noted that its order granting the first interlocutory appeal in Case No. 22-0403 stayed proceedings in the district court. The district court, therefore, should not have considered the second summary judgment motion. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s order addressing the second summary judgment motion and remanded for further proceedings. Both opinions of the Court were delivered per curiam.

 

State of Iowa vs. T.J.W., No. 22–0805

Opinion date: February 9, 2024

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County

Issue:

• Whether the district court had the power to enter a restitution order after a criminal charge had been dismissed and expunged following the successful completion of a deferred judgment.

T.J.W. (T.J.) pleaded guilty to fourth-degree criminal mischief, and the district court granted her a deferred judgment, placing her on unsupervised probation for a year. After completing her probation terms, the court dismissed and expunged the charge against her. However, the court later set a restitution hearing and subsequently ordered T.J. to pay over $6,000 in restitution to a victim. T.J. challenged the restitution order, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction to impose it after the dismissal and expungement of her charge.

The Supreme Court held that once the district court dismissed and expunged the charge against T.J., it lost jurisdiction to impose further obligations on her, including restitution. The Court was not persuaded by the State’s argument that the district court had jurisdiction because the dismissal and expungement of the charge were conditional upon full payment of all monies owing. Furthermore, the Court concluded that no statutory or constitutional provision allowed the district court to retain jurisdiction to order restitution after the dismissal and expungement of charges. As a result, the April 8 restitution order was held to be void due to lack of jurisdiction and vacated. Justice McDermott authored the opinion of a unanimous Court.

 

State of Iowa vs. B.C.D., No. 22–0771

Opinion date: February 9, 2024

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County

Issue:

• Whether the district court had jurisdiction and authority to enter a restitution order for pecuniary damages after dismissing and expunging all charges upon the completion of a deferred judgment.

B.C.D. (B.D.) pleaded guilty to fourth-degree criminal mischief, and the district court granted her a deferred judgment, placing her on unsupervised probation for a year. After completing her probation terms, the court dismissed and expunged the charge against her. However, the court later set a restitution hearing and subsequently ordered B.D. to pay over $6,000 in restitution to a victim. B.D. challenged the restitution order, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction to impose it after the dismissal and expungement her charge.

For the same reasons explained in State v. T.J.W., the Supreme Court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to issue the April 8 restitution order after it had already dismissed and expunged B.D.’s charge. The Supreme Court granted B.D.’s writ of certiorari and vacated the restitution order. The opinion of the Court was delivered per curiam.

 

State of Iowa vs. Colby Davis Laub, No. 22–1530

Opinion date: February 9, 2024

On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Boone County

Issue:

• Whether a peace officer investigating a suspected offense of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI) can use a search warrant to obtain from the driver a breath specimen for chemical testing instead of invoking the statutory implied consent procedure set forth in Iowa Code chapter 321J.

Colby David Laub was charged with operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, first offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2(2)(a). Laub moved to suppress evidence of a chemical breath test as well as statements made to the arresting officer. The district court had granted Laub’s motion to suppress the results of a chemical breath test obtained via search warrant, alongside his statements made during the investigation, ruling that the officer should have used the implied consent procedure, that Iowa Code chapter 808 does not authorize warrants for bodily specimens, and that the officer’s actions violated Laub’s constitutional rights. The Supreme Court granted the State’s application for discretionary review.

The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision. First, the Court held that the statutory implied consent law does not preclude law enforcement from obtaining search warrants under the general search warrant provisions of Iowa Code chapter 808 for chemical testing in OWI investigations. The Court emphasized that the implied consent procedure is not the exclusive means by which law enforcement may obtain chemical testing, rejecting the district court’s conclusion that the officer’s actions violated Laub’s rights to equal protection and due process. The Court further noted that Iowa Code chapter 808 authorizes search warrants to search persons and seize property relevant to criminal prosecutions, implying authority to seize bodily specimens. Addressing Laub’s constitutional challenges, the Court noted that obtaining a search warrant provides more legal safeguards than the implied consent procedure and is aligned with constitutional preferences for search warrants in criminal investigations. Justice McDonald authored the opinion of a unanimous Court.

 

State of Iowa vs. Morgan Marie McMickle, No. 22–1531

Opinion date: February 9, 2024

On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Boone County

Issues:

• Whether a peace officer can use a search warrant to obtain a blood sample for chemical testing in a suspected OWI case, rather than invoking the statutory implied consent procedure.
• Whether failing to honor an arrestee’s request to speak with counsel under Iowa Code section 804.20 requires suppression of evidence unrelated to the statutory violation.

Morgan McMickle was involved in a vehicle collision in Boone County, where she rear-ended a stopped vehicle, left the scene, and continued driving. The driver of the other vehicle followed McMickle, and a passenger called 911. Deputy Sheriff Nathan Benjamin encountered McMickle’s vehicle parked on the roadside alongside the trailing vehicle. Upon encountering McMickle, Deputy Benjamin noticed signs of impairment in McMickle, including stupor, slurred speech, and the smell of alcohol. During this interaction, McMickle tried to call her lawyer using her cell phone and refused to cooperate with field-sobriety testing. Deputy Benjamin arrested McMickle and transported her to the law enforcement center for further investigation.

At the law enforcement center, McMickle’s repeated requests to speak with her lawyer were denied, and Deputy Benjamin obtained a search warrant for a blood draw. The blood test revealed a blood alcohol content of .274, more than three times the legal limit. McMickle was subsequently charged with operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI) first offense.

The district court granted McMickle’s motion to suppress evidence of a chemical breath test and her statements during an OWI investigation on the grounds that Iowa Code chapter 808 does not provide authority for the collection of bodily specimens and on the grounds that Deputy Benjamin’s refusal to allow McMickle to speak to her lawyer violated her rights under Iowa Code section 804.20. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed.  The Court held that the statutory implied consent procedure in Iowa Code chapter 321J is not the exclusive method for obtaining chemical testing in OWI investigations, and that peace officers are permitted to use search warrants under Iowa Code chapter 808 to collect bodily specimens. The Court disagreed with the lower court’s conclusion that using a search warrant instead of the implied consent procedure violated constitutional rights to equal protection and due process.

With respect to the second issue, the Court acknowledged that there was a violation of Iowa Code section 804.20, which requires allowing detained individuals the opportunity to communicate with counsel, and the State conceded that certain incriminating statements made by McMickle should have been suppressed. However, the Court held that the exclusionary rule did not support suppression of evidence of the blood test results because that information could be traced to a source independent of any violation of section 804.20. Justice McDonald authored the opinion of a unanimous Court.

Justice McDermott joined the opinion of the Court and also authored a short concurring opinion. In his concurring opinion, Justice McDermott cautioned readers of the Court’s opinion from inferring that the Court was endorsing or excusing the violation of McMickle’s rights under section 804.20 to communicate with counsel.

 

State of Iowa vs. Paula Lynn Cole, No. 22–1581

Opinion date: February 16, 2024

On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issue:

• Whether a mother “created” a substantial risk under Iowa Code section 726.6(1)(a) by leaving her five oldest children, aged five to twelve, asleep at home while she went to Walmart for groceries.

Paula Cole, a mother of six, left her five oldest children, ages five to twelve, asleep in their secured apartment to buy groceries from Walmart, taking her infant daughter with her. During her absence, a disagreement among the children led one of them to leave the apartment, which resulted in a neighbor and the children calling 911. The police arrived but found no harm or immediate danger to the children. Cole was charged and convicted of child endangerment under Iowa Code section 726.6(1)(a).

The Iowa Supreme Court reversed Paula Cole’s child endangerment conviction, finding that under the circumstances presented, Cole did not create a substantial risk to her children’s health or safety under section 726.6(1)(a). The Court clarified that a parent creates a substantial risk warranting criminal liability under section 726.6(1)(a) only when the parent’s behavior produces an identifiable risk outside the range of ordinary life risks. The behavior must be either independently unlawful, overtly abusive, or otherwise create an identifiable risk clearly outside ordinary life risks. According to the Court, Cole’s actions did not meet these criteria. There was no evidence suggesting that leaving the children home alone while she briefly went to Walmart created any extraordinary risk, nor was there evidence of any specific danger that the children were exposed to during her absence. The Court emphasized that life inherently involves managing risks and that the State did not prove Cole’s actions created a substantial risk beyond those of ordinary life. Justice May authored the opinion of a unanimous Court.

 

State of Iowa vs. Sydney Leiann Slaughter, No. 22–0892

Opinion date: February 23, 2024

On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issues:

• Whether the evidence was sufficient to show that Sydney Leiann Slaughter had the requisite intent to defraud under Iowa Code section 99F.15(4)(h).
• Whether the Court of Appeals correctly found that testimony regarding the definition of a “wager” fell outside the scope of admissible testimony.
• Whether there was sufficient evidence to establish that Slaughter did not make a “wager” contingent on winning a gambling game under Iowa Code section 99F.15(4)(h).

Early in the morning on November 29, 2020, Sydney Slaughter and her boyfriend, Anthony McNeese, were at the Isle of Capri Casino, and McNeese won a $4,000 jackpot. Slaughter claimed she had won the jackpot, and was charged with making a false claim of winning a jackpot under Iowa Code section 99F.15(4)(h). Slaughter challenged her conviction on appeal, arguing that the evidence was not sufficient to establish her intent to defraud, that an expert witness called by the State provided impermissible testimony regarding the definition of a “wager,” and that the evidence was not sufficient to establish that Slaughter did not make a wager as defined in the relevant statute. The Court of Appeals reversed Slaughter’s conviction, and the Supreme Court granted the State’s application for further review.

The Supreme Court affirmed Slaughter’s conviction, reversing the Court of Appeals. The Court held that circumstantial evidence identified by the State, including the fact that Slaughter took McNeese’s seat at the slot machine once the jackpot was won, sufficed to establish “intent to defraud” under the statute. The Court held that the district court erred in admitting the State’s expert’s testimony regarding the meaning of the term “wager,” but that such error was harmless. Finally, the Court ruled that the evidence supported the conclusion that Slaughter had not made a wager, as it was McNeese who had actually played the slot machine that won the jackpot. Chief Justice Christensen authored the opinion of the Court, with Justice Mansfield, joined by Justices Oxley and McDermott, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

Justice Mansfield’s separate opinion argued that permitting expert testimony on the meaning of the term “wager” was improper and prejudicial, undermining Slaughter’s primary defense that the State failed to prove the wager wasn’t made with her money. Justice Mansfield underscored the distinction between factual matters that may be ultimate issues (where expert opinions could be allowed) and opinions on legal matters, which are typically not admissible. He argued that allowing the DCI agent’s testimony improperly influenced the jury by presenting law enforcement’s interpretation of a legal term crucial to the case’s outcome. Justice Mansfield would have reversed and remanded for a new trial.

 

 

Tags: Iowa Supreme Court 2023-24