UPDATES & ANALYSIS

7.08

Iowa Court of Appeals April 2024 Published Opinion Roundup

by Nicole Frazier | July 8, 2024

The Iowa Court of Appeals selects certain opinions for publication in the Northwestern Reporter.  On April 11, 2024, the Court of Appeals selected three opinions for publication, summarized below.

 

In re Marriage of Schuler, No. 23-0638

Opinion date: March 6, 2024

On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Poweshiek County

Issue:

• Whether the district court erred in declining a request to amend child support obligations for the children being “otherwise self-supporting” when one child became a mother and another child planned to participate in a foreign-exchange program.

 

The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling declining a modification of child support obligations.  The Schulers agreed to a stipulated dissolution decree in which the father, Scott, would continue to pay child support for each of the former couple’s children “until . . . [they] turned eighteen and graduated high school, married, died, or ‘otherwise became self-supporting.’”  Over time, the family circumstances changed, prompting Scott to petition the district court for termination or modification of his child-support obligations.  The Schulers’ seventeen-year-old minor child B. gave birth to a child the previous year while attending high school and subsequently moved in with her boyfriend, sixteen-year-old minor child G., two weeks prior to the modification hearing.  In addition, the Schulers’ minor child A. was accepted into a foreign-exchange program.  Scott asserted that the children were now self-supporting, and therefore, the change in circumstances warranted a child support termination or modification from the court.

The district court disagreed, finding that the change in circumstances did not constitute the children being “self-supporting.”  On appeal, the Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision.  The Court of Appeals first addressed Scott’s argument that child B. was self-supporting because she gave birth to her own child and moved in with her boyfriend.  In a 2008 case, Bedford v. Bedford, the Iowa Court of Appeals determined that a child that gave birth to a child, but was still dependent on parental financial support, did not warrant a termination of child support obligations.  Similarly, the Court of Appeals found that although child B. had given birth, both child B. and her boyfriend child G.’s continued reliance on parental financial assistance indicated the need for continued child support obligations.

The Court of Appeals then addressed Scott’s argument that child B. living with G., as well as child A. planning to study abroad necessitated a termination or modification of child support obligations.  The Court of Appeals disagreed with Scott, referencing the fact that the mother Sarah would still maintain the same level of financial obligations, supporting both minor children B. and A. in the same manner as if they had maintained residence at home.  In addition, the Court of Appeals considered the large income disparity between the higher-incomed Scott versus the lower-incomed Sarah.

Ultimately, the Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision, referencing the definition of self-supporting as “having the resources to be able to survive, without requiring external assistance.” Judge Tyler Buller authored the opinion of a unanimous panel.

 

In re Marriage of Kisting, No. 23–0948

Opinion date: February 7, 2024

On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County

Issue:

• Whether the district court erred in granting a modification of the dissolution of marriage based on a “substantial change in circumstances” when the modification maintained joint legal custody, but revoked physical care and decision-making power form one parent.
• Whether the district court violated a father’s constitutional rights in a modification order restricting his parental rights.

 

In the original decree dissolving the marriage of Matthew Kisting and Sara Bahl, the former couple agreed to share joint legal custody and joint physical care of their two minor children L.R.K. and S.J.K.  After the district court determined there was a substantial change in circumstances, Sara’s petition for modification of the decree was granted in which both parents maintained joint legal custody, but physical care and decision-making power related to education and religious decisions were granted to Sara, while Matthew had visitation privileges.

On appeal to the Iowa Court of Appeals, Matthew argued that the modification should not have been granted in the first place because there was no substantial change in circumstances and that the district court improperly relied on domestic abuse allegations in its analysis.  The Court of Appeals disagreed, citing the Iowa Supreme Court’s 2015 ruling in In re Marriage of Hoffman, where the “parent seeking modification bears the burden of proving 1) the circumstances have materially and substantially changed since the decree’s entry and 2) the ability to minister more effectively to the children’s wellbeing.”  Applying that analysis to this case, the Court of Appeals agreed with the district court’s assessment.  The change in circumstances was evident by the parents’ deterioration of their ability to agree or communicate.  In addition, the differences in parenting styles were extreme.  Matthew adopted a conservative Catholic view, including the desire to remove the children from school and adopt homeschooling, wanting L.R.K. to discontinue participation in sports and instead marry early, wanting S.J.K. to participate in sports, and wanting the children to attend Latin mass with L.R.K. wearing a veil for modesty.  In contrast, Sarah wanted the children to remain in private Catholic school, continue participating in sports, and attend local Catholic mass.  The Court of Appeals acknowledged that it respects the right of both parties to practice the religion of their choosing. However, the parents’ inability to communicate supported a finding of a substantial change.

In addition, the Court of Appeals cited two recent events that further led to its finding, including extreme disagreement in how to address electronic access and dating in regards to L.R.K. and the domestic abuse allegations from a day when Sara attempted to pick up L.R.K. and S.J.K. from Matthew’s house, resulting in a permanent protective order against Matthew.  Furthermore, Matthew recorded interrogating the children and then submitting the recordings as evidence.

In assessing who would better minister to the children’s wellbeing, the Court of Appeals considered Sara’s strong history of being the primary caregiver to both children and Sara’s commitment to support the children bonding with Matthew.  In contrast, Matthew had displayed an inability to reciprocate, refusing to compromise on splitting attendance to school events and sharing court documents with the children, as well as making pejorative remarks about Sara.  Lastly, though not dispositive, the Court of Appeals considered L.R.K.’s request to stay with Sara and have visitation with Matthew.  The Court of Appeals reasoned, “Because a substantial change in circumstances occurred justifying changing in the physical-care arrangement and because Sara is better able to meet the best interests of the children, we affirm.”

Matthew also argued that the district court had violated his parental rights and religious freedoms in violation of both the United States and Iowa Constitutions.  Matthew asserted that the district court’s modification of the decree to instead grant Sara decision-making authority regarding all educational and religious decisions was a violation of his parental, and therefore, constitutional rights.  In response, Court of Appeals explained that because both parents retained joint legal custody, the district court’s order providing decision-making authority was inconsistent with authority granted under joint legal custody decisions, citing Iowa Code section 598.1, which states that “parties must be given equal rights in legal custody decisions, including ‘the child’s legal status, medical care, education, extracurricular activities, and religious institution.’”  The Court of Appeals explained that the district court granting Sara this decision-making authority was in error because both parents retained joint legal custody.  As such, the Court of Appeals decided Matthew’s constitutional argument on this point was moot and that the modification regarding decision-making rights should be vacated and remanded.

Matthew’s second assertion for the argument that his parental rights, and therefore, Constitutional rights had been violated was that the district court erred when it ordered limiting his visitation and communication rights with the children.  In addressing this argument, the Court of Appeals explained that a district court may “override the parents’ qualified right to control the upbringing of their children, when harm to the physical or mental health of the child is established.”  Based on Matthew’s previous history, the Court of Appeals rejected Matthew’s separate constitutional argument regarding limits on visitation and communication with the children, stating there was no “unlawful interference” and that the district court did not interfere with Matthew’s constitutional or parental rights. Judge Mary Chicchelly authored the opinion of a unanimous panel.

 

 

Muhr v. Willenborg, No. 22–1780

Opinion Date: January 24, 2024

On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Carroll County

Issues:

• Whether the district court erred in its application of Iowa Code chapter 651 when it ordered a hybrid of partition in kind and partition by sale for a family farm’s division of heirs property.
• Whether the district court erred in assessing its “great prejudice” inquiry.

 

Upon the death of their mother, Plaintiffs David Muhr and Christine Mickel, Defendant Rachelle Willenborg’s husband and two other siblings of Muhr, Mickel, and Willenborg’s husband inherited farmland in Carroll County as cotenants.  Willenborg’s husband passed away in February 2020, leaving his share of the inheritance to his wife, Rachelle.  As of November 2020, the remaining interests were only those of Muhr, Mickel, and Willenborg.  Due to the inability to agree on how to proceed regarding the land, Muhr and Mickel petitioned the district court to grant a partition by sale of the farmland.  Willenborg, in contrast, requested that the district court partition the land in kind to keep for her descendants.  Both parties agreed to be governed by subchapter III in Iowa Code chapter 651 with neither party wanting to buy out the other cotenant.  Upon review, the district court appointed a referee to look at the farmland and to give an expert opinion on the best way to divide it.  In addition, Muhr and Mickel obtained an updated appraisal in January 2022, finding that the property’s market value was $3,221,400.

After the referee’s extensive assessment of the farmland’s topography, the referee suggested that splitting the property would be impractical.  Rather, the referee concluded a two-way split into North and South Parcels would be better, allowing for ease of accessibility for both land parcels and a more advantageous environment for soil conservation and farming.  The North Parcel would consist of two-thirds of the entire property worth $2,096,400, while the remaining South Parcel would be worth $1,125,000.  The district court then used this assessment in its analysis—ultimately awarding the North Parcel to Muhr and Mickel, while Willenborg would retain ownership of the South Parcel and pay an owelty payment of $25,600 each to Muhr and Mickel to account for the difference.

Muhr and Mickel appealed to the Iowa Court of Appeals, arguing that the district court overstepped its authority in its application of Iowa Code chapter 651 and that the district court erred in the “great prejudice” inquiry.  This analysis involves the court looking at a set of eight factors to determine if a partition in kind would be appropriate or if accepting a partition in kind would result in “great prejudice” to the cotenants as a group, such as in this case, where a partition in kind would result in “less desirable parcels of land” and a significant decrease in fair market value.  In addressing whether the district court erred in its application of the statute the Court of Appeals looked to the history, text, and purpose of Iowa partition law.

The Court of Appeals noted that until 2018, Iowa vacillated between a preference for partition in kind and partition by sale.  Ultimately, in 2018, the General Assembly adopted Iowa Code chapter 651.  According to the text, subchapter II of the statute specified a “preference for partition by sale and permitting hybrid partitions.”  Under subchapter III, “special provisions for heirs property” further mandated that heirs property must “1) file an initial decree and appoint a referee to submit an appraisal based on the property’s fair market value, 2) if desired, the cotenants have forty-five days to buyout the property interest of the other cotenant(s), and 3) if a buyout cannot resolve the issue, the court must petition the property in kind, unless doing so would result in great prejudice to the cotenants.”  The Court of Appeals also asserted that the legislative purpose was to ensure protection to heirs property.

Applying the statute to this case, the Court of Appeals then analyzed whether the district court’s hybrid partition was permitted.  The Court of Appeals agreed with the district court’s decision for a hybrid partition, but disagreed with their reasoning, stating that the prerequisite for ordering a hybrid partition is that there must be great prejudice, and that the district court’s analysis was lacking.  However, in addition the Court of Appeals also disagreed with Muhr and Mickel, who argued that the statute dictation the district court’s only option was to partition in kind.  Instead, the Court of Appeals determined that a partition in kind is one of several alternatives for partitioning heirs property, as is evident by Iowa Code section 651.30’s title “Alternatives to Partition in Kind.”  The Court of Appeals pointed to the long-standing history of Iowa courts having the authority to order hybrid partitions to ensure an equitable solution, and the statute’s purpose to “protect farmers from losing their land by judicial sale.”

Muhr and Mickel further argued that the district court’s great prejudice inquiry was flawed.  The Iowa Court of Appeals agreed that the analysis was lacking, but asserted that the court correctly ordered a hybrid partition.  However, the Court of Appeals acknowledged the challenges of interpreting the statute and the resulting confusion, choosing to provide clarity on the correct method for the “great prejudice” inquiry, as well as how to evaluate if a hybrid partition is equitable and practicable.  For the great prejudice inquiry, the Court of Appeals listed a set of eight factors to be weighed in total to be dispositive.  In addition, the Court of Appeals explained that the impracticability of partitioning in kind, resulting in less desirable parcels for both parties, along with Willenborg’s sentimental attachment to the land, assisted in the factor analysis that a partition in kind would result in great prejudice.

Lastly, the Court of Appeals assessed whether the hybrid partition was equitable and practicable, citing the report’s conclusion that the hybrid partition would be more practicable and protect the parties from a diminished property value, using these facts to further affirm the order for a hybrid partition.

Ultimately, the Court of Appeals affirmed the hybrid partition ordered by the district court, stating the following: “Equity was done, consistent with the purpose of the statute . . . . The district court had the authority to order a hybrid partition under chapter 651 once it concluded a partition wholly in kind would result in great prejudice.” Judge Tyler Buller authored the opinion of a unanimous panel.

 

In the Matter of the Estate of Ross C. River, Deceased., No. 23–0167

Opinion Date: January 10, 2024

On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jackson County

Issues:

• Whether the district court erred in dismissing a challenge to a will for lack of standing based on the putative heir’s failure to establish the decedent’s recognition of the heir either in writing or generally and notoriously.

 

Ross River, a well-known businessman and farm property owner in the town of Maquoketa, died in 2021, leaving a will that did not mention Jay Claeys as one of the children to acquire an inheritance.  Furthermore, River, before his death, specifically executed a codicil disinheriting Claeys.  In August 2021, Claeys contested the will, arguing that River “lacked capacity to execute the will and was unduly influenced by [his] wife and Bruce, [his son].”  In turn, the Estate moved for summary judgment based on Claeys not being an heir and lacking standing.  The district court granted summary judgment against Claeys, and Claeys appealed to the Iowa Court of Appeals.

In its analysis, the Court of Appeals pointed to Iowa Code section 633.222, which states that, “Unless the child has been adopted, a biological child inherits from the child’s biological father . . . if the child has been recognized by the father as his child: but the recognition must have been general and notorious, or in writing.”  The Court of Appeals further explained that the statute’s reference to the word “general” means common to many, while “notorious” suggests “generally known and talked of by the public.”  In an 1899 decision, Watson v. Richardson, the Iowa Supreme Court held that a father’s recognition must thus be “as extensive as the immediate community of his residence and within the common knowledge of the public.”

Applying this analysis to the case, the Court of Appeals assessed the history of Claeys’s and River’s interactions and the testimony provided.  The Court of Appeals concluded Claeys was unable to create a genuine factual dispute based on his testimony.  The Court of Appeals then evaluated Claeys’s evidence.  Claeys presented his mother’s testimony stating that River, who was married and had recently suffered the death of his daughter, and Claeys’s mother who was married to another man and had children of her own, agreed to have a child together in 1977.  Claeys’s mother asserted that her husband was not the father because he had undergone a vasectomy six years earlier.  She further asserted that she was certain River was the father.  In addition to his mother’s testimony, Claeys asserted that River was present on the day of his birth and during his childhood, including visiting and bringing gifts during holidays, as well as giving Claeys employment during the summer.  Claeys asserted that he learned River was his father when he turned nineteen from his maternal grandfather, who was a good friend of River.  Claeys stated that he often asked River to participate in a paternity test, but River would continuously make an excuse or postpone the appointment.  Furthermore, Claeys stated that River’s sons and wife had knowledge that River was purportedly Claeys’s father.  River’s sons and wife denied such knowledge.  Clayes further asserted that River’s son David interacted with Claeys often, referring to him as “Bro,” and that River may have told David’s and Claeys’s mutual coworker.  Lastly, Claeys pointed to the fact that he worked for River at one of his businesses full-time for approximately four years.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s summary judgment ruling, holding that while Claeys was able to establish a factual dispute as to paternity, he was not able to establish that River’s recognition was general and notorious as required under the statute.  The only testimony presented was that of Claeys and his mother, while River’s notoriety in the community had been evident for over forty years.  Ultimately the Court of Appeals stated: “While we do not require River’s recognition to ‘be proclaimed from the housetops,’… . . Claeys’s scarce evidence that River told a handful of people that [he] was his son over forty years and sometimes gave Claeys gifts does not rise to general and notorious recognition.” Judge Samuel Langholz authored the opinion of a unanimous panel.

 

Tags: Iowa Court of Appeals