UPDATES & ANALYSIS

5.30

Iowa Court of Appeals April 2025 Published Opinion Roundup

by Rox Laird | May 30, 2025

The Iowa Court of Appeals selects certain opinions for publication in the Northwestern Reporter. In April, the Court of Appeals selected six opinions for publication. Following are summaries of those opinions.

 

International Association of Firefighters Local #1366 v. City of Cedar Falls; Iowa Public Employment Relations Board, No. 23-1368

Opinion date: Filed Oct. 2, 2024

On appeal from Polk County District Court

Issue: Did the Iowa Public Employment Relations Board ‘disagree with itself’ in its reasoning in a challenge to the City of Cedar Falls’ decision to lay off eight firefighters?

The union representing Cedar Falls firefighters filed a complaint with the Iowa Public Employment Relations Board claiming the city violated the Public Employment Relations Act (Iowa Code Chapter 20) when it placed eight of the city’s firefighters on administrative leave pending layoff as part of a process of creating a hybrid public safety department consisting of cross-trained police officers and firefighters. Traditional firefighters who chose not to be trained for new positions under the hybrid system were given the options of applying for other city jobs, accepting a severance package, or being laid off.

The Iowa Public Employment Relations Board adopted an administrative law judge’s proposed decision that the city committed a prohibited practice in violation of Iowa Code section 20.10(2) by placing the traditional firefighters on administrative leave pending layoff based on her conclusion that the city’s action was motivated by animus toward the union. The Board ordered the city and union to agree on an appropriate remedy, and when they could not the Board issued a cease-and-desist order, concluding that damages resulting from the layoff would be inappropriate because the layoff was not determined to be a prohibited practice.

In seeking review of the Board’s decision in district court, the union argued the Board was incorrect in determining the layoff was not found to be a prohibited practice. The district court agreed and remanded the matter to the agency to fashion an appropriate remedy addressing both the placement of the firefighters on administrative leave and the layoff. A three-judge panel of the Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the district court, reversed the Board decision, and held that the Board’s remedy that denied the firefighters’ request for damages resulting from the layoff violated Iowa Code section 17A.19(10)(i) of the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act, thus putting the question of the proper remedy back before the Public Employment Relations Board.

The Court of Appeals cited language in the Administrative Procedure Act regarding “reasoning that is so illogical as to render it wholly irrational” in seeking to reconcile the Board’s holding there was “overwhelming evidence” of the city’s union animus in placing the firefighters on administrative leave pending layoff, thus rendering it a prohibited practice, and at the same time determining the city’s decision to lay off the firefighters was not a prohibited practice.

“Here, ‘reasoning that is so illogical as to render it wholly irrational’ would be reasoning that is so internally inconsistent so as to make it irreconcilable,” Court of Appeals Judge John Sandy wrote. “While our judicial power does not confer authority to substitute our judgement for that of the agency, it is the agency that disagrees with itself.”

If placing the traditional firefighters on administrative leave was a prohibited practice,’ he added, “we fail to see how the later layoffs were not also a prohibited practice. And the City offers no cogent explanation otherwise. Certainly, a layoff is more serious than leave.”

 

In the Interest of J.R., Minor Child, J.J., Mother, Appellant, No. 24-0942

Opinion date: Jan. 9, 2025

On appeal from Butler County District Court, considered en banc

Issue: Did a mother who did not participate in a juvenile court hearing regarding termination of her parental rights forfeit her right to appeal the termination?

In response to a mother’s petition appealing the termination of her parental rights, the State argued the mother forfeited her right to appeal because she did not appear at the termination hearing in juvenile court. The Iowa Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, held that while there has been “some tension” in its prior rulings on the question, the mother in this case did not entirely forfeit her right to appeal. Judge Tyler Buller filed a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

The mother, identified as J.J., in this case, received notice of the termination hearing in juvenile court but declined to participate either in person or by phone. Her attorney, however, cross-examined a Department of Health and Human Services social-services worker and relayed J.J.’s resistance to termination and her preference for a guardianship.

In assessing whether J.J. preserved the right to appeal the termination of her parental rights, the Court of Appeals said it has taken different approaches on the question in prior decisions.

“We have held that a parent leaves nothing for us to review when they fail to raise any argument in opposition at the hearing,” Judge Gina Badding wrote on behalf of the Court of Appeals. “But we have also indicated that certain steps of the termination analysis are reviewable ‘regardless of whether the parent contests the issue.’” The Court has “asked whether waiver or preservation of error is the better framework for thinking about these questions,” she wrote, or “we have simply acknowledged a problem without letting it stop us from reaching the merits.”

The Court clarified its reasoning on the issue.

“We take this opportunity to make two important clarifications. First, to the extent our unpublished decisions suggest otherwise, there is no categorical rule that a parent must personally participate in a termination hearing to preserve error or prevent a waiver on appeal. A parent’s physical or remote participation in the hearing is a due process right,” Judge Badding wrote, citing earlier Iowa Supreme Court decisions, but it is not a requirement for a parent represented by an attorney.

“Second, our preservation rules are not one-size-fits-all. While issues generally must be raised in and decided by the juvenile court before they are raised on appeal, that is not the case when a parent argues the State failed to meet its burden of proof,” Badding wrote, noting that the Iowa Supreme Court has held that “the sufficiency of the evidence may be challenged on appeal even though not raised below.”

Turning the merits of whether termination was proper, the Court of Appeals concluded the mother waived her right to raise on appeal her argument that the juvenile court should not have terminated her parental rights given the bond between her and the child, the age of the child, and the necessity of placing the child in an institution. “On that claim, the mother’s passive approach has consequences because any exception was hers to prove,” appellate Judge Badding wrote. “Accordingly, we find this issue waived.”

J.J., however, was able to appeal on the question the sufficiency of the State’s evidence in support of termination and on the question of the best interest of the child, because the burden is on the State on both of those issues. The Court held that the State met its burden on both questions.

“Having made little to no progress towards [the goal of reunification with her child], we conclude sufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that the child could not be safely returned to the mother’s custody at the time of the hearing,” the Court of Appeals held. And, because the child “deserves permanency in a household that will meet her needs and support her, the State proved the child’s best interests are served by terminating the mother’s parental rights.”

In his separate opinion, appellate Judge Buller wrote that he concurred in the judgment. “But I part ways with the majority’s ‘second’ purported clarification, which chips away at our error-preservation rules to hold a parent need not argue below that ‘the State failed to meet its burden of proof’ to raise sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. This holding is unnecessary to disposition of the case, and I think it is wrong.”

 

State v. Hernandez, No. 23-0630

Opinion date: Filled Jan. 9, 2025

On appeal from Polk County District Court, considered en banc

Issue: Did a child’s testimony by closed-circuit video violate a defendant’s right to confront his accuser under Iowa law and U.S. Supreme Court precedent?

Mario Hernandez appealed his conviction by a Polk County jury for the second-degree sexual abuse of his minor stepdaughter, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, and arguing the district court erred in allowing the child victim to testify by closed-circuit video. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and held that Hernandez’ rights under the U.S. Constitution or Iowa law were not violated by the victim’s closed-circuit testimony.

All members of the Court, sitting en banc, concurred. Judge Gina Badding filed a separate special concurring opinion.

Hernandez’ 12-year-old stepdaughter J.D. testified by closed-circuit video that Hernandez repeatedly and frequently sexually abused her, starting about the first grade and increasing to two or three times a week by the sixth grade. She told the jury that Hernandez forced her to perform oral sex on numerous occasions, touched her vagina with his finger or hand multiple times, and attempted to penetrate her vagina with his penis once.

Hernandez, testifying in his defense, denied abusing J.D. The jury convicted him on three counts of sexual abuse in the second degree, and the trial court sentenced him to three consecutive terms of 25 years in prison, each with a mandatory minimum of 17½ years.

On appeal, Hernandez argued for acquittal saying there was no physical or objective evidence of the allegations, no witness testimony other than J.D.’s, and no corroboration to support her testimony.

The Court rejected all three arguments. “Because the jury was entitled to accept the victim’s testimony, corroboration was not required, and there was sufficient evidence Hernandez performed sex acts with the victim during the relevant date range, we reject Hernandez’s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence,” Judge Tyler Buller wrote for the Court.

Hernandez also argued the district court erred in allowing the victim to testify by closed-circuit video in violation of his right to confront the witness testifying against him. While Hernandez’ appeal was pending, that question was decided by the Iowa Supreme Court under the Iowa Constitution in State v. White (2024). The Iowa Supreme Court held in White that the Iowa Constitution requires that child victims be confronted by their abusers, meaning one-way or possibly two-way closed-circuit testimony is generally not permitted.

Because that decision departed from both federal constitutional precedent in Maryland v. Craig (1990) and Iowa Code section 915.38, both of which permit closed-circuit testimony under certain circumstances, the Court of Appeals faced the question of which of those applied in the Hernandez appeal.

Because Hernandez failed to raise the question of his confrontation right under the Iowa Constitution at trial, he failed to preserve error, the Court of Appeals said, so that question was not before the Court. Thus, the Court concluded that, in this case, it was confined to deciding the question of Hernandez’ confrontation right under Iowa Code section 915.38 and the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Craig, which are “one and the same.”

Under section 915.38, a district court considering allowing closed-circuit testimony must make a specific finding that it is necessary to protect the minor, specifically with regard to trauma caused by testifying in person.

In J.D.’s case, a therapist testified that she recommended closed-circuit testimony based on concerns J.D. expressed about seeing Hernandez again, and the therapist’s concerns that J.D. would be “traumatized by the presence of the defendant” and may falsely recant the abuse allegations.

Based on that testimony, the district court concluded the evidence demonstrated it was necessary to allow J.D. to testify by closed-circuit video, and J.D. testified by video with counsel, the judge, the court reporter, and J.D. in a deposition room and Hernandez in the courtroom.

The Court of Appeals held that the district court did not err in finding the statute was satisfied.

“Our review confirms the district court’s fact-findings were supported by substantial evidence,” Court of Appeals Judge Buller wrote, “and we are convinced the trauma and emotional distress disclosed in this record—which reflects an unhealthy bond, a risk of psychological regression, and the danger of recantation or coerced testimony—is sufficient to satisfy Iowa Code section 915.38 and federal case law.”

Writing in a separate concurring opinion, Court of Appeals Judge Badding wrote that while she concurred in the majority opinion, this case “should not be used as a blueprint” for the evidence needed to meet the requirements of Iowa Code section 915.38 and the U.S. Supreme Court’s Craig decision.

The therapist spoke “mostly in generalities, leaving us to fill in the blanks with inferences from her statements to get to the requisite finding of necessity,” Judge Badding wrote. And while this testimony was “just enough to satisfy section 915.38(1) and Craig,” she wrote that more should be presented in the future to ensure that the Craig exception does not “swallow” the constitutional confrontation right.

 

Iowa Civil Rights Commission, and Mari A. Van Gundy v. McKillip Management and James McKillip, No. 23-1747

Opinion date: Filed February 5, 2025

On appeal from Polk County District Court

Issue: Did a rental manager violate the Iowa Civil Rights Act by soliciting a sexual relationship with a tenant who failed to make her rent payments?

James McKillip was convicted by the Polk County District court for sexual harassment discrimination and retaliation in a civil action brought by the Iowa Civil Rights Commission accusing McKillip of creating a hostile housing environment and engaging in quid pro quo discrimination when he allegedly solicited a sexual relationship with a tenant who failed to make her rent payments and retaliated against her when she refused his advances. The tenant, Maria Van Gundy, joined the litigation as an intervenor. McKillip’s management company was dismissed from the case.

McKillip initially helped Van Gundy obtain a rental property he managed and her rent was temporarily covered by a low-income rental assistance agency. When that assistance expired and Van Gundy was unable to make rent payments, she accused McKillip of seeking sexual favors. When she refused his advances McKillip threatened to evict her.

A five-judge panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court in a decision written by Court of Appeals Judge Julie Schumacher.

In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals reviewed what it described as scarce state-court precedent on housing discrimination based on a person’s sex or sexual orientation under Iowa Code section 216.8. The Iowa Supreme Court directly addressed the claim only once, in 2007, which was limited to the question of the sufficiency of evidence to support a district court’s finding. But that decision did not interpret section 216.8 or decide what such a claim requires under Iowa law.

Sexual-discrimination and hostile-housing environment claims in housing have been recognized by the federal courts under the federal Fair Housing Act, and the Iowa Civil Rights Act was similarly intended to promote freedom of choice in housing and to prohibit discrimination, the Iowa Court of Appeals said.

Citing federal caselaw, McKillip argued there was insufficient evidence that his conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to establish a hostile-housing environment. The Court of Appeals disagreed. “We are unpersuaded by McKillip’s attempt to draw a connection between these out-of-state cases and the more egregious facts here,” Court of Appeals Judge Schumacher wrote in concluding the district court’s finding is supported by substantial evidence.

The Court of Appeals further affirmed the district court’s assessment of $20,000 in punitive damages, and it assessed the costs of the appeal to McKillip and remanded the case to the district court to determine reasonable appellate attorney fees for Van Gundy.

 

State v. Jason Tyer, No. 24-0472

Opinion date: Filed Jan. 9, 2025

On appeal from Cerro Gordo County District Court

Issue: Did the Cerro Gordo County District Court err in imposing an indeterminate sentence of five years while ordering that all five years be served?

Jason Tyer pleaded guilty to domestic abuse assault, third offense, a class “D” felony, and was sentenced by the Cerro Gordo District court to an indeterminate term of no more than five years, the maximum sentence for a conviction of a class “D” felony, and it ordered Tyer to serve all five years before being eligible for parole or work release. Tyer argued on appeal that the sentence violated state law.

A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals disagreed in a decision affirming the district court.

Under Iowa Code section 902.3, the sentencing court was required to impose a sentence of confinement “for an indeterminate term.” In his appeal, Tyer argues that because the district court ordered him to serve a minimum sentence that is identical to the maximum term allowed by law, the court imposed a determinate sentence in violation of section 902.3. (In a footnote in its decision, the Court of Appeals notes that no Iowa cases have addressed whether the court may impose a minimum sentence that is equal to the statutory maximum.)

A determinate sentence imposes a specific number of years of imprisonment while in an indeterminate sentence the Legislature has set a range of the minimum and maximum number of years to be served. Indeterminate sentences are parole eligible; determinate sentences are not.

Tyer does not dispute that section 902.3 applies to his sentence but he argues that the statute does not allow the sentencing court to impose a five-year minimum sentence.

The statute, in section 902.13(1), provides that a person sentenced in a case such as Tyer’s “shall be denied parole or work release until the person has served between one-fifth of the maximum term and the maximum term of the person’s sentence,” and in 902.13(2) it says that the sentencing court shall determine the minimum term of confinement “within the parameters set forth in subsection 1” to be served before a person may be paroled or placed on work release.

Tyer focuses on the words “between” and “within” used in that section and argues that “the court can only impose a minimum term of confinement that is less than five years and more than one year, but not a sentence that is for the maximum term of confinement, five years.”

The Iowa Supreme Court has previously noted that most state and federal courts hold that the word “‘within’ connotes the limit beyond which action may not be taken.”

In Tyer’s case, the Court of Appeals concluded that construing section 902.13(2) to allow the sentencing court to impose a minimum five-year sentence before eligibility for parole or work release “provides a less strained reading and logical result,” and it complies with general rules of statutory construction set by the Legislature.

The Court of Appeals also disagreed with Tyer’s argument that the district court’s sentence violates his right to due process because ordering him to serve all five years of his sentence means he will not accumulate credits toward a reduction in the number of days of his sentence for good conduct.

“Ultimately, an administrative law judge determines the amount of earned time credit to which an inmate is entitled,” Judge Mary Chicchelly wrote on behalf of the Court of Appeals, citing Iowa Code section 903A. “Without an order denying Tyer credit for earned time, there is no error to correct.”

 

In the Interest of L.A., Minor Child, S.A., Mother, Appellant, J.A., Father, Appellant, No. 24-2086

Opinion date: Filed March 19, 2025

On appeal from Muscatine County District Court, considered en banc

Issue: Did the juvenile court properly terminate the parental rights of the mother and father of a child born with methamphetamine in her system?

Both parents of minor child L.A. separately appeal the termination of their parental rights. The Iowa Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, unanimously affirmed the district court. In its decision, the Court corrected “a misstep in our prior cases” reviewing termination-of-parental-rights proceedings.

In the case of L.A., the mother argued on appeal that the State failed to prove a statutory ground for termination and that the juvenile court should have placed the child in a guardianship rather than terminating the mother’s parental rights.

The Court disagreed with both arguments. The child was born with methamphetamine in her system, the mother had not made sustained progress with her substance-use problems and repeatedly missed required drug tests. The Court of Appeals also concluded the mother failed to preserve error on her argument that the juvenile court should have placed the child in guardianship in lieu of termination.

In his appeal, the father argued that termination of his parental rights was not in the child’s best interests and that he should have been given additional time to work toward reunification.

The Court of Appeals disagreed, saying the child has never been in father’s care or custody and, based on the evidence, it concluded the father does not have a significant bond with the child, who is bonded to the grandparents who have provided for her needs throughout the juvenile court proceedings and intend to adopt.

The Court of Appeals also disagreed with giving the father additional time to work toward reunification, noting that the juvenile court had previously granted the father an additional six months to work toward reunification and yet he refused to engage in substance abuse testing and showed no ability to maintain sobriety outside of treatment setting.

The Court of Appeals noted that, in his appeal, the father conflated the second and third steps of the Court’s three-step process of reviewing such termination cases. The second step of that process evaluates whether termination is in the child’s best interest under Iowa Code section 232.116(2); the third step evaluates whether a permissive exception under section 232.116(3) should be applied to preclude termination.

“The father argues that terminating his parental rights is not in the child’s best interests because he loves the child and there is a bond between them,” Judge Paul Ahlers wrote on behalf of the Court of Appeals. “Though this argument conflates a best-interests argument (step two of the three step process) with a permissive-exception argument (step three of the three-step process), we interpret his argument as a challenge under the second step. Before we can proceed to address his challenge under that step, we find it appropriate to first correct a misstep in our prior cases.”

Judge Ahlers cited 26 previous Court of Appeals decisions in which the Court has “tried to detangle the conflation by stating that the closeness of the parent-child relationship or the bond between parent and child is not a proper consideration in the best-interests analysis (step two).” He explained that, “upon further reflection,” the Court determined that those cases “were not the clearest or best way to navigate the problem when petitions on appeal conflate these issues,” and the best-interests analysis requires the Court to apply the framework of section 232.116(2).

Citing Section 232.116(2), Judge Ahlers explained that district courts must consider, among other factors, the child’s mental and emotional conditions and needs when analyzing what is in the best interest for the child. Judge Ahlers then reasoned that “[a] child’s mental and emotional condition and needs is inherently impacted by the child’s bond with a parent,” and as such the parent-child bond is relevant to the question of the child’s best interest.

“As such, we hereby steer a corrective course and disavow the parts of our cases—including, but not necessarily limited to, those cited [in this opinion]— that state that the bond between a parent and child is not part of the best-interests analysis,” Judge Ahlers wrote.

Tags: Iowa Court of Appeals