UPDATES & ANALYSIS

Iowa Court of Appeals August 2024 Published Opinion Roundup

by Rox Laird | September 16, 2024

The Iowa Court of Appeals selects certain opinions for publication in the Northwestern Reporter. On Aug. 27, the Court of Appeals selected four opinions for publication. Following are summaries of those opinions.

State v. Voshell, No. 23-1059

Opinion date: July 3, 2024

On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County

Issue: Was a defendant’s 180-day jail sentence for assault to commit sexual abuse improper?

Jason Curtis Voshell pleaded guilty to assault with intent to commit sexual abuse without injury, an aggravated misdemeanor, for sexually assaulting a 21-year-old woman at a pool party.

The district court imposed a one-year jail sentence with all but 180 days suspended.

In his appeal, Voshell challenged the victim impact statement and the court’s exercise of discretion in selecting a sentence. A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court in a unanimous opinion written by Judge Tyler Buller joined by Judges Paul Ahlers and Mary Chicchelly.

Voshell argued on appeal that the district court abused its discretion in imposing his sentence by considering only the deterrent effect of the sentence. The Court of Appeals disagreed, pointing out that the district court “expressly acknowledged Voshell’s age and maturity, family circumstances, employment, prospects for rehabilitation, and (relatively sparse) criminal history — in addition to the need for general and specific deterrence, the nature of the offense, and the harm to the victim. This is essentially a textbook-proper list of sentencing considerations.”

The court also disagreed with Voshell’s argument that the trial court applied a “fixed sentencing policy,” observing that Voshell did not receive the two-year prison sentence recommended by the State or the suspended sentence recommended in the pre-sentencing investigation, which indicates some mitigating factors outweighed some aggravating factors rather than a fixed-sentencing-policy.

Finally, Voshell argued the victim impact statement should not have been considered by the trial court because it was written by the victim’s mother rather than the victim. Because Voshell challenged the sentencing procedure rather than its legality, he was required to object “at the earliest opportunity after the grounds for the objection become apparent,” which he failed to do. Thus, the court did not reach the merits of Voshell’s argument.

State v. Kramer, No. 23-1185

Opinion date: July 24, 2024

On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County

Issue: Should a defendant have been allowed to waive his right to be represented by counsel after he raised “sovereign-citizen theories” to question the statutory and constitutional basis for his prosecution?

In district court proceedings on a charge of driving while barred, Paul Kramer sought to represent himself, and “loosely espoused sovereign-citizen theories” suggesting there was no constitutional or statutory basis for his prosecution. The district court nonetheless concluded Kramer knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel.

Following a bench trial, the court found Kramer guilty of driving while barred and imposed a 90-day jail sentence. He appealed his conviction and sentence. In a panel decision written by Judge Sharon Soorholtz Greer, joined by Chief Judge Mary Tabor and Judge Julie Schumacher, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court.

Kramer argued the district court should have ordered a competency hearing on its own motion and should not have allowed him to represent himself.

Kramer argued his “irrational behavior and demeanor at trial clearly showed that he was incapable of appreciating the charge against him, understanding the proceedings,” or effectively assisting in a defense.

Based on the record in this case, Kramer “responded appropriately to the court’s directions and gave coherent responses to questions,” Judge Greer wrote. “At his criminal trial, he presented an orderly — albeit ill-advised — defense, marshalled exhibits, raised a foundational issue, and cross-examined one of the State’s two witnesses.” Thus, the appellate court found no legal error in the district court’s proceeding without ordering a competency evaluation.

Kramer also argued that based on his misinformed beliefs about the law, the district court should not have allowed him to represent himself. “Kramer’s argument on appeal boils down to an assertion that because of his mistaken personal beliefs about how the law works, he should not have been allowed to represent himself,” Judge Greer wrote. “But we are unprepared to conclude that a defendant’s decision to pursue a defense based on sovereign-citizen theories precludes them from exercising their constitutional right to represent themself.”

Liberty Credit Services v. Inlow, No. 23-1201

Opinion date: July 3, 2024

On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marion County

Issue: Was a petition to enforce a 2002 small-claims judgment governed by a shorter statute of limitations regarding judgments not issued by a “court of record”?

Roger Inlow was found in default in 2002 on a small-claims action in Marion County District Court but did not appeal at the time and paid nothing on the judgment in favor of Liberty Credit Services. In 2022, just short of the 20-year statute of limitations, Liberty Credit filed a petition to enforce the judgment. Inlow argued in his defense that the 2002 judgment was not issued by a court of record because the Iowa Code in 2002 did not mandate audio recording of small-claims proceedings and it was thus barred by the 10-year limitations period in Iowa Code section 614.1(5).

The district court ruled in favor of Liberty Credit on summary judgment. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the district court in a panel decision written by Judge Tyler Buller, joined by Judges Mary Tabor and Samuel Langholz.

The Court of Appeals traced its ruling back to the 1972 passage of the Unified Trial Court Act that abolished all inferior courts, such as mayor’s courts, justice of the peace courts, police courts, superior courts, and municipal courts, and consolidated judicial authority into a single unified trial court.

Under Iowa Code section 602.6104(1), the authority of the unified trial court is exercised by district judges, district associate judges, associate juvenile judges, associate probate judges, and magistrates. There is no separate small claims court; rather, there is a small claims docket in district court, the appeals court said.

Inlow nonetheless argued that small-claims actions were not tried in a “court of record” in 2002 because, under the Iowa Code in effect then, small-claims proceedings were only electronically recorded at the magistrate’s discretion. (The Iowa Code was amended in 2009 to provide that “a magistrate shall cause the proceedings upon trial to be recorded electronically” if not reported by a certified court reporter.)

In any case, the appeals court said, “Inlow conflates the concept of a court keeping records with whether a court must keep a verbatim or stenographic record of every proceeding before it. And we are not aware of any requirement that a court of record keep verbatim records of every hearing or other interaction with the court. In any event, a critique of recording practices does not undermine our conclusion that the small-claims docket falls within the unified trial court, which is a court of record by statute.”

In the Interest of M.H., No. 24-0576

Opinion date: June 19, 2024

On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Warren County

Issue: Was a father ready to resume custody of his child at the time of a hearing on termination of his parental rights?

The father of a two-year-old child appealed the termination of his parental rights. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the district court in a panel decision written by Judge Sharon Soorholtz Greer, joined by Judges Mary Tabor and Julie Schumacher.

In his appeal, S.H. challenged the termination of his rights to M.H. by the juvenile court under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h), which allows for termination when there is clear and convincing evidence that, among other things, the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents “at the present time.”

S.H. argued that custody of M.H., who had been previously removed from the mother’s custody by the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services, could be returned to him at the time of the termination trial, which he interpreted as the statute’s meaning of “at the present time.”

Based on the record, however, the appellate court concluded S.H. had not shown the necessary evidence that the child should be returned to his custody. At trial, he confessed to using marijuana daily, but because he failed to submit to all requested drug screens it was unknown whether he accurately stated he last used methamphetamine, cocaine, and LSD multiple years in the past. Also, S.H. was not truthful about his relationship with the child’s mother – who did not challenge the termination of her parental rights.

Thus, while the father exhibited good parenting skills during fully supervised visits, questions about his sobriety and his ability to keep M.H. safe from the mother that still existed approximately 16 months after M.H.’s removal from parental custody, the appellate court said it could not say that M.H. could be safely returned to the father’s custody at the time of the termination trial.

Tags: Iowa Court of Appeals