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Iowa Court of Appeals December 2024 Published Opinion Roundup

by Rox Laird | January 13, 2025

The Iowa Court of Appeals selects certain opinions for publication in the Northwestern Reporter. In December, the Court of Appeals selected eight opinions for publication. Following are summaries of those opinions.

 

State v. Moore, No. 22-1794

Opinion date: Filed July 3, 2024, Amended July 11, 2024

On appeal from Polk County District Court

Issues: Was evidence sufficient to support the defendant’s murder conviction, and did the trial court properly apply the sentencing factors for juvenile offenders?

Quarian Moore appealed his conviction by a Polk County jury on charges of first-degree murder and attempted murder for shooting two people on a Des Moines street in November 2021. Moore, 17 at the time of the shootings, was in a vehicle that pulled alongside the victims’ vehicle when the shootings occurred, resulting in the death of Dean Deng and injuries to a second victim identified as B.C.

Moore challenged the sufficiency of the evidence against his conviction. Moore also challenged the trial court’s application of required youthful-offender sentencing factors in imposing a sentence of life in prison for murder, requiring that he serve 25 years before being eligible for parole.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court as to both of the issues raised on appeal in a decision written by Chief Court of Appeals Judge Mary Tabor joined by Judge Sharon Soorholtz Greer and Senior Judge Thomas Bower.

Because none of the other vehicle occupants involved in the encounter were willing to cooperate with authorities, the prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence at trial. The Court of Appeals said the evidence, while circumstantial, was “solid,” including a video timeline pieced together from surveillance cameras in the area showing Moore’s movements and shell casings matching a handgun Moore discarded while fleeing police.

The Court of Appeals also noted incriminating evidence against Moore that “bookend[ed]” the State’s case: “On the front end was [a] Snapchat video showing Moore brandishing a gun with his friends a few hours before the shooting. At the back end were Moore’s phone calls to his girlfriend from jail” in which Moore seemed to be coaching her on what to say to investigators.

“In sum, the State presented substantial evidence that Moore was the shooter,” Chief Judge Tabor wrote. “The prosecutors did not rely on evidence that created mere speculation, suspicion, or conjuncture. Instead, they presented threads of evidence that, when woven together, could convince a jury of Moore’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, we affirm Moore’s convictions.”

 

Bennett v. Mrstik, No. 23-0643

Opinion date: Sept.18, 2024

On appeal from Page County District Court

Issue: Did the district court err in dismissing an incarcerated pro se plaintiff’s petition for failure to meet the deadline for serving the original notice on defendants?

Chad Bennett, an incarcerated and self-represented plaintiff, failed to meet extended deadlines for serving defendants who he claimed violated his statutory and constitutional rights. The district court dismissed Bennett’s petition, finding that he did not establish good cause to justify another extension of time and that no authority supported his request that the court order a neighboring county’s sheriff to serve the Marion County defendants. Bennett appealed to the Iowa Supreme Court, which transferred the case to the Iowa Court of Appeals.

In a decision written by Judge Paul Ahlers joined by Judges Julie Schumacher, and Samuel Langholz, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court.

The Court of Appeals concluded that Bennett failed to preserve error on two issues Bennett raised to justify his failure to meet the deadline to serve the original notice. On the remaining issue, Bennett argued that instead of dismissing his petition, the district court should have exercised one of two options under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.302(5) in cases where the time of service exceeded 90 days: direct an alternate time or manner of service, or extend the time of service.

The district court found that while Bennett’s incarceration made serving defendants difficult, he failed to demonstrate good cause for missing the deadline that had twice been extended. “This finding is supported by substantial evidence,” Judge Ahlers wrote, “so we are bound by it.”

The other option was for the district court to direct an alternate manner of service, but the Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not err in denying Bennett this option, as Bennett failed to establish that service could not be attained using methods of service provided for in Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.305.

 

In re the marriage of Rosanne M. Samuels da Fonseca Silva and Daniel Samuels da Fonseca Silva Upon the Petition of Rosanne M. Samuels da Fonseca Silva, n/k/a Rosanne Marie Samuels Petitioner-Appellant, and Concerning Daniel Samuels da Fonseca Silva, Respondent-Appellee

 

In re the marriage of Mustapha Samuels El Khayat and Rosanne Samuels El Khayat Upon the Petition of Mustapha Samuels El Khayat, n/k/a Mustapha El Khayat, Petitioner-Appellee, and Concerning Rosanne Samuels El Khayat,Respondent-Appellant, No. 23 -0685

Opinion date: October 2, 2024

On appeal from Dubuque County District Court

Issue: Was a couple’s divorce decree void due to allegedly improper service of the dissolution decree?

Rosanne Samuels challenged decrees dissolving her two marriages arguing the first marriage dissolution is void due to her failure to properly serve her first husband in that divorce action and, therefore, because she was never divorced from that husband, her second marriage should be annulled rather than dissolved.

The district court in the two consolidated cases denied Samuels’ petition to vacate the first divorce decree and affirmed the second divorce decree sought by her second husband, Mustapha El Khayat.

The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in an opinion written by Court of Appeals Judge Samuel Langholz joined by Judges Julie Schumacher and Tyler Buller.

In rejecting Samuels’ argument for vacating the first divorce decree, the Court of Appeals cited the doctrine of judicial estoppel, which prohibits a party who successfully asserted a position in one proceeding from asserting an inconsistent position in a subsequent proceeding. In the first instance, Samuels claimed she could not contact her first husband to provide service and instead provided service by publication; in the second instance, she claimed she had known his whereabouts at the time and thus improperly served him by publication.

“Because Samuels ‘successfully and unequivocally asserted’ these positions [regarding her inability to locate her first husband] in the first dissolution proceeding in 2016, judicial estoppel prohibits her from asserting the opposite positions in her petition to vacate that dissolution decree,” Langholz wrote, citing the Iowa Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Tyson Foods Inc. v. Hedlund. “Holding otherwise would undermine the integrity of the judicial process that Samuels used to obtain her dissolution decree.”

 

Randall v. Trier, No. 24 -0178

Opinion date: Oct. 30, 2024

On appeal from Washington County District Court

Issue: Was the district court’s award of joint physical care in the best interests of the couple’s child?

Natalie Trier and Cory Randall, who never married and who live separately, had successfully shared responsibility of caring for their child until Randall began dating a different woman. Randall subsequently sought a custody order in district court requesting joint physical care of the child.

After a bench trial, the district court granted the couple joint physical care, which the Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed in an opinion written by Judge Mary Chicchelly joined by Chief Judge Mary Tabor and Judge John Sandy.

In reviewing the record reflecting each parent’s involvement with the child and Trier’s and Randall’s relationship, the Iowa Court of Appeals concluded joint physical care is in the best interests of the couple’s child.

Citing the Iowa Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in In re Marriage of Hansen and the Iowa Court of Appeals’ 2013 decision in In re Marriage of Dickey, the court applied four considerations: “(1) what has been the historical care giving arrangement for the child between the two parties; (2) the ability of the [parents] to communicate and show mutual respect; (3) the degree of conflict between the parents; and (4) the degree to which the parents are in general agreement about their approach to daily matters.”

In applying those considerations, and additional factors such as “emotional bonds between the parents and children,” the court concluded that the child’s “familial relationships further support the finding of a joint-physical-care arrangement.”

 

Minnesota Lawyers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Rasmussen, Nelson & Wonio PLC, and Joseph T. Rasmussen, No. 23 -1668

Opinion date: Oct. 2, 2024

On appeal from Audubon County District Court

Issue: When was a claim deemed to have been made for purposes of determining whether legal malpractice insurance applied?

Minnesota Lawyers Mutual Insurance informed its insureds Rasmussen, Nelson & Wonio PLC and attorney Joseph T. Rasmussen that under terms of its policy it had no duty to defend or indemnify the firm in a legal malpractice suit brought by former clients Tom and Brenda Muhr. The district court granted summary judgment to the insurer, and the Rasmussen firm appealed to the Iowa Supreme Court, which transferred the case to the Iowa Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court in an opinion written by appeals court Judge Tyler Buller joined by Judges Julie Schumacher and Samuel Langholz.

The Rasmussen firm was first made aware by the Muhrs in March 2021 that a financing statement identifying them as creditors on a $2.7 million secured property loan, on which the firm had previously advised them, had lapsed. This meant the Muhrs lost their status as first-priority secured creditors for the property. Tom Muhr verbally informed the Rasmussen firm that the Muhrs would not bring a claim against the firm. After this conversation, the firm renewed its legal malpractice insurance and did not provide notice to the insurer about this financing statement issue. The property at issue was eventually foreclosed on for $1.7 million, and the Muhrs only received $150,000 because of their loss of first-priority secured creditor status. The Muhrs sued the firm and Rasmusson for legal malpractice.

The insurer filed a separate petition for declaratory judgment, which is at issue in the present case. In that petition, the insurer denied any obligation to indemnify or defend the firm or Rasmusson. The insurer cited the firm’s statement on its policy renewal application that it was not aware of any claim against it and argued the firm was aware of the potential for a claim when informed by the Muhrs in March 2021 of the lapsed financing statement.

The firm argued it was not aware of the claim until April 2022 when it was informed of a potential suit by the Muhrs’ new attorney—which occurred after the firm renewed its malpractice insurance. Thus, the firm answered “No” to the question on the application: “In the last 12 months . . . has any firm member become aware of any INCIDENT which could reasonably result in a claim being made against the firm or a member of the firm?”

The firm argued that the statement in the application incorporates a reasonableness standard into the policy, and Tom Muhr’s verbal statement that the Muhrs did not intend to sue when informing the firm of its error means the lawyers did not believe a claim could result.

The Court of Appeals disagreed.

“In context, we think the application’s phrase ‘could reasonably result in a claim’ means the known act, error, or omission is a legally reasonable basis for a claim, not whether the insured subjectively believes it will be a claim,” Judge Buller wrote. “In other words, the claim originates from the insured’s knowledge of an error sufficient to sustain a suit, not their knowledge it will result in a filed lawsuit. The loss of first priority on a multimillion-dollar loan is the sort of error which reasonably could result in a claim, so the Firm and Rasmussen had a duty under the insurance contract to disclose the error when it was discovered — in February or March 2021.”

 

State v. Lyons, No. 23 -0980

Opinion date: Oct. 2, 2024

On appeal from Dubuque County District Court

Issue: Did the State have sufficient evidence to convict a man for indecent exposure when he was witnessed masturbating in public?

Dale Patrick Lyons Jr. appealed his conviction in Dubuque County District Court on a charge of indecent exposure claiming the evidence was insufficient to convict him, that he was not competent to stand trial, and that his right to a speedy trial was violated. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s conviction in an opinion written by Senior Appellate Judge Richard Doyle joined by Judges Mary Chicchelly and Tyler Buller.

A woman was driving toward an apartment building to visit a friend when she witnessed Lyons standing facing a wall with his shorts down masturbating his erect penis. He was prosecuted under Iowa Code section 709.9(2)(a), which says, “A person who masturbates in public in the presence of another, not a child, commits a serious misdemeanor,” and which goes on to say in section 709.9(2)(c) that, “‘masturbate’ means physical stimulation of a person’s own genitals or pubic area for the purpose of sexual gratification or arousal of the person, regardless of whether the genitals or pubic area is exposed or covered.”

Lyons argued the State failed to present sufficient evidence to convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that he stimulated his genitals “for the purpose of sexual gratification or arousal.” The Court of Appeals disagreed. “Stroking an erect penis is prima facie evidence that a person is stimulating the genitals ‘for the purpose of sexual gratification or arousal,’” Judge Doyle wrote. “And Lyons was seen stroking his erect penis. There is little doubt that he was in a state of arousal when observed by the woman.”

The court also agreed with the district court’s finding that Lyons was competent to stand trial.

Lyons had been diagnosed with depression and anxiety about two years before undergoing an evaluation ordered by the court conducted by Dr. Abraham Assad, M.D., staff psychiatrist at the Iowa Medical and Classification Center. Assad’s unrebutted conclusion was that Lyons was competent to stand trial. While both the prosecution and defense counsel argued Lyons was not competent to stand trial, the district court held otherwise.

The Court of Appeals agreed, saying the record supports the district court’s findings that Lyons had the present ability to effectively assist in his defense, appreciate the charges, and understand the proceedings and his relation to the proceedings.

As for Lyons’ speedy trial violation argument, the Court of Appeals held that Lyons failed to preserve the issue in the district court and thus did not consider it.

 

State v. Orton, No. 23 -1058

Opinion date: Aug. 7, 2024

On appeal from Linn County District Court

Issue: Did the district court properly apply youthful-offender factors in sentencing a juvenile convicted of murder to a minimum of 50 years in prison?

Ethan Orton appealed his 50-year minimum sentence on two counts of first degree murder, claiming the district court failed to properly apply juvenile sentencing factors. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s sentence in a decision written by appeals court Judge Sharon Soorholtz Greer joined by Chief Judge Mary Tabor and Judge Julie Schumacher.

Orton pleaded guilty to two counts of first-degree murder he committed when he was age 17 years and seven months for stabbing both of his parents and hitting his mother multiple times with an ax, which resulted in their deaths. The district court sentenced Orton to two terms of life in prison with 50-year minimums, to be served concurrently, before being eligible for parole.

Orton challenged his sentence on appeal, raising three issues: that the district court failed to start from a presumption against a minimum term of incarceration; that it failed to properly apply the constitutional juvenile-sentencing factors; and that if failed to adequately explain its sentencing decision.

Sentencing options for first-degree murder for a person under age 18 under Iowa Code section 902.1(2)(a) include a life sentence with either immediate parole eligibility or parole eligibility after serving a minimum term. A sentencing court considering imposing a mandatory minimum sentence for an offender who was a juvenile at the time of the offense must consider five mitigating factors prescribed by the Iowa Supreme Court at an individualized sentencing hearing. Those factors include the age of the offender and a failure to appreciate risks and consequences; the youth’s “family and home environment”; the circumstances of the crime and circumstances relating to youth that may have factored into the commission of the crime; challenges for juvenile offenders navigating the criminal process; and the possibility of rehabilitation and the capacity for change.

The Court of Appeals held that the court properly examined the five factors specific to Orton’s circumstances, and that it appropriately applied the presumption against a minimum term of incarceration.

Finally, in response to Orton’s argument that the district court failed to adequately explain its decision to impose a 50-year sentence, the Court of Appeals quoted a lengthy excerpt from the district’s court’s summary of its decision, and concluded “the district court provided adequate reasons for the sentence it imposed.”

 

State v. Howard, No. 23 -1363

Opinion date: Oct. 2, 2024

On appeal from Scott County District Court

Issue: Was there sufficient evidence to convict a Davenport man of murder for a shooting that occurred during a fistfight?

Demetrius Howard was convicted by a Scott County jury of first-degree murder and of being a felon in possession of a firearm for the fatal shooting of Corey Martin at a Davenport convenience store where the two had engaged in a physical altercation.

Howard appealed, arguing there was insufficient evidence of his guilt and that the district court erred in admitting a statement he made in a recorded call from jail about the missing “murder weapon.” The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court in an opinion written by Court of Appeals Judge Tyler Buller joined by Judges Julie Schumacher and Samuel Langholz.

In challenging the evidence presented to the jury, Howard claimed there was insufficient evidence to prove he was not justified in killing Martin, and that there was insufficient proof of criminal intent. The Court of Appeals disagreed with both arguments.

As for Howard’s justification defense, the Court of Appeals said substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding that Howard unreasonably escalated the fistfight between the two in the convenience store before Howard pulled out a handgun and shot Martin. In any case, Judge Buller wrote, “Iowa’s justification defense does not authorize citizens to use a gun in a fistfight.”

The court also disagreed with Howard’s argument that, given the short time between Martin punching him and the shooting, he could not have formed the necessary mens rea to support a first-degree murder conviction.

There is no question that Howard “had opportunity to deliberate when, after the initial shot inside, he pursued Martin out the front door of the store and fired one or more additional shots into Martin’s back as Martin fled unarmed and on foot. There was sufficient evidence on the mens rea elements.”

Finally, the court held there was no error in the district court admitting into evidence a statement Howard made in a recorded call from the jail saying law-enforcement officers had been unable to find what he termed the “murder weapon.”

While conceding the statement was prejudicial, Buller wrote that “all powerful evidence is prejudicial to one side,” and the question is whether the risk of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence. “Here we conclude the evidence was not unfairly prejudicial, as it did not inflame the passions of the jury, invite improper considerations, or otherwise undermine the truth-seeking function of trial.”

 

Tags: Iowa Court of Appeals