UPDATES & ANALYSIS

11.07

Iowa Court of Appeals October 2024 Published Opinion Roundup

by Rox Laird | November 7, 2024

The Iowa Court of Appeals selects certain opinions for publication in the Northwestern Reporter. In October, the Court of Appeals selected four opinions for publication. Following are summaries of those opinions.

 

Trueblood v. MMIC Insurance, No. 23-0361

Opinion date: Sept. 18, 2024

On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County

Issue: Can an Iowa plaintiff who loses a suit in a neighboring state refile the same claims in Iowa?

After parties settled a medical malpractice suit against a medical clinic for a laboratory mix-up that resulted in an unnecessary prostate removal surgery, the clinic’s pathologist named in the lawsuit sued the clinic’s insurance carrier, MMIC Insurance, in Minnesota, home of MMIC’s parent company. The pathologist, Joy Trueblood M.D., claimed MMIC pressured her to take the blame for the lab error and could have avoided trial by making larger settlement offers. Trueblood dismissed with prejudice her claim against an MMIC employee, Graziano, and the remainder of her claims were dismissed on motion by the Minnesota court as a matter of law.

Trueblood subsequently filed suit against MMIC in Iowa, raising nearly identical factual allegations while arguing there are key differences between Minnesota and Iowa common law. The Polk County District Court granted MMIC’s motion to dismiss based on its conclusion that under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Iowa must recognize Minnesota’s law, which precludes Trueblood from suing again. The district court initially dismissed MMIC’s motion for sanctions against Trueblood’s attorney but on rehearing awarded a $14,438.10 sanction to cover one defendant’s attorney fees.

The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the district court in a decision by a panel consisting of Julie Schumacher, Tyler Buller, and Samuel Langholz, with Judge Langholz authoring the opinion the a unanimous panel.

The court based its decision on the requirement in Article IV, section 1 of the U.S. Constitution that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.” The Court of Appeals applied Minnesota’s law of res judicata to find that Trueblood was barred from bringing substantially the same claim in another forum and arguing for application of a different state’s law.

On the issue of attorney sanctions, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s denial of MMIC’s requested sanctions. The Court noted that the district court did sanction Nicholas Rowley, Trueblood’s counsel, for filing suit a second time against Graziano in Iowa but concluded that the district court’s conclusion not to sanction Rowley for filing the second suit against MMIC was reasonable.

 

In the Interest of M.W.T. and C.W.T, Minor Children, T.D., Mother, Appellant, No. 24-0076

Opinion date: Aug. 7, 2024

On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County

Issue: Was sufficient testimony given under the Iowa Indian Child Welfare Act to support terminating a mother’s parental rights?

T.D. appealed the Polk County District Court’s termination of her parental rights to M.W.T. and C.W.T. in a case that turns on the Iowa Indian Child Welfare Act. A three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals consisting of Judges Sharon Soorholtz Greer, Gina Badding, and Tyler Buller reversed the district court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings, with Judge Buller authoring the opinion of the unanimous panel.

The Iowa Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) removed two children from D.T.’s and their father’s custody based on concerns about a no-contact order violation, D.T.’s failure to supervise the children, controlled-substance abuse in the home, failure to provide dental and mental-health care for the children, and physical abuse reported by the children.

The district court terminated the mother’s parental rights based on recommendations of the HHS, the assistant county attorney, and the children’s guardian ad litem. The mother appealed.

In reversing the termination, the Court of Appeals focused on the trial court’s conclusion that, while the expert testimony offered at trial did not directly address whether the tribe’s “culture, customs, and laws” would support the termination as required by the Iowa Indian Child Welfare Act (Iowa Code Chapter 232B), the district court nonetheless found it sufficient by “reading between the lines.”

The Court of Appeals disagreed, concluding the expert testimony was deficient based on the plain language of the statute and the district court erred in granting the petition for terminating the mother’s parental rights. The remedy for that deficiency in this case, the Court said, is to reverse and remand the case while noting that its opinion is not intended to displace the underlying child-in-need-of-assistance proceedings or any existing no-contact orders.

 

State v. Sampson, No. 23-1348

Opinion date: Aug. 7, 2024

On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County

Issue: Is a city’s ordinance regulating the operation of off-road vehicles preempted by state statutes?

Matthew Sampson moved to suppress evidence from a traffic stop by a Blue Grass officer leading to his arrest for operating while intoxicated. Sampson was driving a golf cart on a city street, which is prohibited by city ordinance between sunset and sunrise. Sampson argues the officer lacked probable cause because the city ordinance is preempted by state law. The district court denied his motion to suppress, and Sampson appealed.

A panel of the Court of Appeals consisting of Judges Mary Tabor, Sharon Soorholtz Greer, and Julie Schumacher affirmed the district court, with Judge Schumacher authoring the opinion of the unanimous panel. The Court of Appeals held that the city’s ordinance is not preempted by state statute either under express or implied preemption.

In arguing the city ordinance is preempted by state law, Sampson argued the ordinance is inconsistent with Iowa Code section 321I.30, which states in part: “This chapter and other applicable laws of this state shall govern the operation, equipment, numbering, and all other matters relating to an all-terrain vehicle when the all-terrain vehicle is operated or maintained in this state.”

That section goes on to say, however, that a city may regulate the operation of registered all-terrain vehicles and off-road utility vehicles, and the Court of Appeals said there is no “broad express preemption when the chapter explicitly allows for municipal regulation.” Nor, the court said, is the ordinance preempted by the statute under the municipal home rule amendment in the Iowa Constitution (Article III, section 38A).

The court also rejected Sampson’s implied preemption argument, saying the city’s ordinance is not irreconcilable with state statutes, which “do not prevent a city from imposing more stringent requirements or even barring nighttime driving.”

 

Meador v. Di, No. 23-1703

Opinion date: Aug. 7, 2024

On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County

Issue: Did a district court properly vacate an earlier court decree citing a lack of subject matter jurisdiction?

Jonathan Meador appeals a district court ruling vacating an earlier court decree regarding custody of his child after the district court concluded it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the district court.

Meador’s marriage to Di Lu was dissolved in China in 2018 with custody of their child awarded to Di and visitation rights to Jonathan. In 2020 Jonathan filed a stipulated agreement in Iowa District Court giving the parties joint legal custody of their child, which was approved by the district court. In 2023 Di moved to vacate that order arguing the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant Jonathan relief on his 2020 petition.

The district court granted Di’s motion to vacate, noting that the 2020 order treated Jonathan’s request as an initial custody determination controlled by Iowa Code section 598B.201, which confers jurisdiction when Iowa is the home state of a child on the date of the proceeding. The district court concluded Iowa was not the child’s home state in 2020 because neither parent was living in Iowa at the time and the child was living with her paternal grandparents who were not acting as parents.

Recognizing that the 2020 order was predated by the 2018 divorce decree, the court held that the 2020 decree must be vacated because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to make an initial custody determination or to modify the 2018 custody determination from China.

Jonathan did not contest the district’s court’s conclusion on subject matter jurisdiction in the 2020 order but instead suggested Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.1012 is the only mechanism for vacating the custody order.

The Court of Appeals disagreed in a decision by a panel consisting of Chief Judge Mary Tabor and Judges Sharon Soorholtz Greer and Julie Schumacher, with Judge Greer authoring the opinion of a unanimous panel. The Court cited prior decisions of the Iowa Supreme Court and Court of Appeals that say a decree entered absent subject matter jurisdiction must be vacated.

 

In the Interest of L.H., Minor Child, S.O., Father, Appellant, No. 24-1029

Opinion date: Aug. 21, 2024

On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County

Issue: Did a district court properly terminate a father’s parental rights?

S.O. appealed the district court’s termination of his parental rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e) and (h), arguing the State failed to prove the child could not be returned to his custody under 232.116(1)(h), which among other things requires there be “clear and convincing evidence that the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents as provided in section 232.102 at the present time.”

The Court of Appeals, in a decision by a panel consisting of Judges Sharon Soorholtz Greer and Paul Ahlers, and Senior Judge Michael Mullins, affirmed the district court, with Senior Judge Mullins authoring the opinion of the unanimous panel. The Court of Appeals held that S.O. offered no substantive argument contesting the termination under 232.116(1)(e).

The court also found the evidence clear and convincing that the child could not be returned to the father’s custody at the present time and termination was also proper under section 232.116(1)(h) based on his admitted methamphetamine use and failure to appear for drug tests with one exception.

 

In the Interest of R.M.-V, Minor Child, S.M., Mother, Appellant, No. 24-0924

Opinion date: Aug. 7, 2024

On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County

Issue: Were there grounds for termination of a mother’s parental rights?

S.M. appealed the termination of her parental rights, arguing the State failed to present sufficient evidence of grounds for termination, that termination was not in the best interests of the child, and that her close relationship with her child should bar termination.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court in a decision by a panel consisting of Judges Julie Schumacher, Mary Chicchelly, and Tyler Buller, with Judge Schumacher authoring the opinion of the unanimous panel.

In her appeal, the mother focused only on two elements of Iowa Code section 232.116(1): that grounds for termination exist if the child has been removed from the physical custody of the child’s parents for at least 12 of the last 18 months, or for the last 12 consecutive months and any trial period at home has been less than 30 days; and that there is “clear and convincing evidence that at the present time the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents as provided in section 232.102.”

S.M. argued the first element was not met because her child was initially placed with his father after removal and was not removed from the physical custody of his parents until a later date.

The court, however, said the significance S.M. puts on the plural “parents” is misplaced based on Iowa Code section 4.1(17), which says that in interpreting statutory language “the singular includes the plural, and the plural includes the singular.” As the court has previously held, removal of a child from one parent is sufficient to support termination of the other parent’s parental rights.

As for the other element of the parental termination statute cited by S.M., the court concluded based on her long history of unresolved drug use, there was “clear and convincing evidence” that the child cannot be returned to the custody of his parents at the present time, which was the time of the termination hearing.

Finally, the court held that termination is in the best interests of the child because he has been “moved from placement to placement, returned to the mother’s custody, and removed again because of the mother’s relapse. This is not permanency.” Nor has S.M. shown clear and convincing evidence that termination of her parental rights would be detrimental to the child because of the closeness of their relationship.

 

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