UPDATES & ANALYSIS

6.17

March 2024 Opinion Roundup

by Chloe Dinardo | June 17, 2024

The Iowa Supreme Court entered opinions in ten cases during March 2024. These opinions are summarized below.

Thorington v. Scott County, No. 22–1194

Opinion date: March 1, 2024

On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County

Issue:

• Whether Iowa’s qualified immunity statute, Iowa Code § 670.4A (2022) retroactively covers a tort claim against a county and law enforcement officer alleging excessive force in violation of article I, § 8 of the Iowa Constitution.

On October 23, 2018, Scott County Deputy Sheriff Greg Hill fatally shot Robert Mitchell during Mitchell’s attempt to evade arrest. Patty Thorington, Mitchell’s mother and the administrator of his estate, initiated legal action against Scott County and Hill, asserting claims under both common law and the Iowa Constitution. The defendants sought summary judgment on all claims, contending, among other arguments, that they were shielded by Iowa’s qualified immunity statute. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all claims except for the excessive force claim under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution, and a related loss-of-consortium claim.

Following Nahas v. Polk County, a case from last term involving whether § 670.4A(4) applies retroactively, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. Because the alleged underlying misconduct took place before the qualified immunity statute was enacted, the statute’s protections do not apply to the claims in this case. The opinion of the Court was delivered per curiam. Justice Waterman did not participate.

 

State of Iowa v. Kadin Jeffrey Miller, No. 22–0903

Opinion date: March 8, 2024

On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issue:

• Whether the State proved that the defendant’s conduct, for which he was convicted of harassment in the first degree, was sexually motivated, necessitating sex offender registration under Iowa Code chapter 692A.

Kadin Miller recorded himself having consensual sexual intercourse with his girlfriend and, after their relationship ended poorly, posted the video to a pornography website without her consent. He was convicted of harassment in the first degree and sentenced to two years in prison, with an additional requirement to register as a sex offender. Miller appealed, and argued that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Miller’s actions were “sexually motivated,” as required for the sex offender registration under Iowa Code chapter 692A, among other arguments. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

The Supreme Court, reversing in part the decision of the Court of Appeals, held that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Miller’s crime of posting a sexually explicit video without consent was sexually motivated. The Court found that the evidence in the record was not sufficient to establish that Miller’s commission of the crime was for his own sexual gratification. The Court noted that the defendant presented “strong evidence” that the motivation behind his actions, as indicated in his guilty plea, was to retaliate against his ex-girlfriend for the manner in which their relationship ended. Justice McDonald authored the opinion of the Court, joined by all justices except Chief Justice Christensen.

Chief Justice Christensen dissented, arguing that Miller’s decision to post the video on a pornography website, combined with showing the video to another individual, provided sufficient evidence of sexual motivation. Justice Christensen’s dissent highlighted the inherently sexual nature of the act and of the website on which the video was posted, arguing that if Miller’s actions were not sexually motivated, it is unclear what actions would meet this threshold under the law.

 

David A. Vaudt and Jeanie K. Vaudt vs. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., et al., No. 23–0482

Opinion Date: March 8, 2024

On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County

Issues:

• Whether the district court erred in dismissing property owners’ claims for boundary by acquiescence and adverse possession based on the statute of limitations.

Over twenty years ago, David and Jeanie Vaudt established a landscape barrier along the eastern border of their property, marked by trees, bushes, and mulch. Fredesvindo Enamorado Diaz and Denice Enamorado purchased the property next to the Vaudts in May 2021 and had a survey conducted in July 2021. The survey revealed that the landscaped area established by the Vaudts was encroaching onto the Enamorados’ property. The Vaudts filed a petition to quiet title against their new neighbors, asserting claims of boundary by acquiescence and adverse possession. Wells Fargo, holding the neighbors’ mortgage, argued these claims were time-barred by a one-year statute of limitations concerning actions arising from property transfers by a trustee. The district court, finding that the Iowa Supreme Court’s 2000 opinion in Heer v. Thola controlled, agreed with Wells Fargo and dismissed the claims.

The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision, holding that the precedent set by Heer was incorrectly applied and should be overruled. The Court clarified that boundary by acquiescence claims, which the Vaudts presented, arise from the conduct and consent of adjoining landowners over a ten-year period, not from the transfer of property by a trustee’s deed. Therefore, the one-year statute of limitations under Iowa Code section 614.14(5)(b), which applies to claims “arising by reason of” a transfer of property, did not apply to or foreclose the Vaudts’ claims. The Court explained that the statute of limitations under section 614.14(5)(b) only applies to actions that directly arise from the transfer of an interest in real estate by a trustee, which was not the case here. The claims of boundary by acquiescence and adverse possession were based on longstanding facts and actions independent of the trustee’s deed transfer. Justice Oxley authored the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Christensen and Justices Waterman, Mansfield, McDermott, and May.

Justice McDonald dissented in part. He agreed with the majority that Heer v. Thola was wrongly decided, but argued that the case should not be rule in deference to stare decisis. Justice McDonald noted that the legislature has had numerous opportunities to change the statute in the twenty-plus following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Heer and declined to do so, suggesting acquiescence to the Court’s prior statutory interpretation.

 

State of Iowa vs. David Dwight Jackson, No. 21–1319

Opinion Date: March 15, 2024 (amended March 26, 2024)

On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issues:

• Whether the district court erred in admitting rebuttal evidence over a defendant’s hearsay objections concerning his medical condition.

David Jackson was convicted of vehicular homicide by operating while intoxicated (OWI), reckless driving, leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death, and operating a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent. The primary issue at trial was the cause of the accident. Jackson contended that he blacked out due to a medical condition and lost control of the vehicle, leading to the fatal crash. To rebut Jackson’s claim, the State introduced testimony from an employee of a healthcare vendor subcontracted to provide services to the county jail. This employee, who had not treated Jackson but had reviewed some of Jackson’s post-accident medical records, testified over Jackson’s hearsay objection. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the district court erred in admitting the challenged testimony as it was hearsay and not permissible under exceptions to the hearsay rule. The Court detailed that while medical records might qualify as business records and be admissible, the testimony about the contents of these records, without the records themselves being admitted, does not satisfy the business records exception to the hearsay rule. The Court vacated Jackson’s convictions for vehicular homicide, reckless driving, and leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death, and affirmed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent, remanding to the district court for further proceedings. Justice McDonald authored the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Oxley, McDermott, and May.

Justice Mansfield dissented in part, joined by Chief Justice Christensen and Justice Waterman. Justice Mansfield argued that the exception to the hearsay rule regarding records of a regularly conducted activity allowed the employee to testify regarding the content of the records. He also argued that the notion that the records themselves should have been introduced was an argument never made by Jackson.

 

Lime Lounge, LLC v. City of Des Moines, Iowa, No. 22–0473

Opinion Date: March 22, 2024

On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issue:

• Whether the City of Des Moines ordinance governing conditional use permits (CUPs) for bars is preempted by Iowa Code chapter 123.
• Whether the CUP ordinance violates the Iowa Constitution’s equal protection provision.
• Whether the CUP ordinance constitutes unlawful “spot zoning.”

Lime Lounge, LLC owned and operated a bar in Des Moines’s East Village, which had its CUP revoked following noise complaints. The bar challenged the constitutionality of the CUP ordinance, arguing that it was preempted by Iowa Code chapter 123 and violated equal protection and spot zoning prohibitions. The district court initially granted a temporary injunction, finding that Lime Lounge had established a substantial chance of succeeding on their preemption claim and allowing the bar to remain open. Ultimately, the district court dismissed the suit after a trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal.

The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts’ decisions, holding that the Des Moines CUP ordinance is not preempted by state law and withstands constitutional challenges under rational basis review. The Court held that Iowa Code chapter 123 allows municipalities to regulate bars through zoning and other measures within their local police powers. The Des Moines CUP ordinance does not create an additional licensing requirement but instead regulates the location and operation of premises selling alcohol, which is permissible under local zoning authority granted by Chapter 123. With respect to Lime Lounge’s equal protection challenge, the Court held that rational-basis review applied to the challenge and that the CUP ordinance’s differing treatment of establishments is rationally related to legitimate governmental interests such as controlling noise and ensuring public safety in mixed-use neighborhoods. Finally, the Court held that the CUP ordinance does not constitute illegal spot zoning as the CUP ordinance applies uniformly within the district and addresses specific community needs without creating isolated zones with different restrictions. Justice Waterman authored the opinion of a unanimous Court. Chief Justice Christensen did not participate.

 

State of Iowa v. Lawrence George Canady, III, No. 22–0397

Opinion Date: March 22, 2024

On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issues:

• Whether the district court erred in admitting evidence over the defendant’s objections.
• Whether there was sufficient evidence to support a voluntary manslaughter conviction.
• Whether the sentencing court erred in not merging two convictions.
• Whether the court considered an improper sentencing factor when it referred to the minutes of testimony, such that resentencing is required.
• Whether the judge gave sufficient reasons for imposing a consecutive sentence.

Lawrence Canady was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, willful injury, and assault causing bodily injury. The State introduced several pieces of evidence, over the defendant’s objections, to prove Canady’s intent to join forces with his friend against the victim. This evidence included a recorded jail phone call, cell phone rap video, Snapchat photo, and testimony regarding the meaning of various slang phrases used therein. The Court of Appeals reversed Canady’s conviction, holding that the cell phone rap video and Snapchat photo were substantially more prejudicial than probative and thus failed balancing under Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.403.

The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed Canady’s convictions. It held that that the rap music video was properly admitted because the danger of prejudicial inferences lessens when, as here, the purpose of introducing the rap video is to show intent, not identity. The rap video was probative because it helped rebut Canady’s defense that he did not know of his co-conspirator’s plan. Similarly, the Snapchat photo and corresponding caption were used to show Canady’s knowledge of his friend’s gun, which was used to shoot the victim hours later. The Supreme Court found that the photo carried little risk of unfair prejudice and was properly admitted. Additionally, the testimony of a friend interpreting the meaning of certain words and phrases used by Canady in the rap video and Snapchat photo was proper lay testimony based on her own personal knowledge.

As for the other issues, the Court held that the evidence was clearly sufficient to support the verdict, the offenses did not merge, the defendant did not meet his burden of establishing reliance on an improper sentencing factor, and the judge provided sufficient explanation for imposing a consecutive sentence. Justice Mansfield authored the opinion of a unanimous Court.

 

State of Iowa v. Scott Randolph Luke, No. 22–1367

Opinion Date: March 22, 2024

On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issues:

• Whether the district court abused its discretion in imposing a prison sentence.
• Whether the district court abused its discretion in failing to articulate reasons for a consecutive sentence, as required by Iowa R. Crim. P. rule 2.23(2)(g).

Scott Luke committed domestic abuse assault while on probation for two prior charges of the same. In its sentencing order, the district court referenced its on-the-record oral reasoning, writing that “[f]or the reasons . . . stated on the record, the sentence shall be served CONSECUTIVELY.” The Court of Appeals held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing and provided sufficient reason for ordering a consecutive sentence.

The Supreme Court affirmed, finding the district court’s sentence and explanation to be acceptable. Because its oral reasoning amounted to more than an impermissible standardized sentencing explanation, the fact that the court did not go to the same lengths in its written order was not fatal. Combined, the two were sufficient. Additionally, the sentencing court was allowed to rely on the same reasons for both the prison term and the consecutive sentence. However, the Court concluded with an encouragement to sentencing courts to give a more detailed explanation for imposing consecutive sentences. Justice Mansfield authored the opinion of the court, joined by Justices Christensen, McDonald, Oxley, and May.

Justice McDermott filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Waterman. In Justice McDermott’s view, the written order did not cure the deficiency of the sentencing judge’s explanation. He wrote that the district court needed to state its reasons for ordering a consecutive sentence separately from its reasons for imposing the sentence, generally.

 

State of Iowa v. Faron Alan Starr, No. 23–0858

Opinion Date: March 29, 2024

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County

Issues:

• Whether public safety concerns arising from the whereabouts of stolen guns can justify a police officer’s refusal of an arrested person’s request to call and consult a family member or attorney and instead question the arrested person.

Faron Starr was found a day after allegedly stabbing his girlfriend and stealing guns from a nearby home. When Starr arrived at the police station, the detective ignored Starr’s request to call his father and instead proceeded to interview Starr about the events. In the interview, Starr admitted to the stabbing and led police to the stolen guns. Starr later moved to suppress his statements from the interview. The trial court concluded that Starr’s right to call or consult with a family member or lawyer without unreasonable delay under Iowa Code section 804.20 was invoked when he requested to call his father. The State argued that a public safety exception applied to section 804.20, and concern about the stolen guns warranted the delay. But this argument was unavailing. The court suppressed all evidence obtained after the detective denied Starr’s initial request to make the call.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court. Although some circumstances may necessitate delay, such exceptions are relatively rare. The Court looked to cases interpreting the public safety exception to Miranda as a guide, which cite the immediacy of the threat posed as a primary consideration. Here, the detective did not show much urgency about the guns. In fact, the stolen guns didn’t come up until nearly two hours after Starr had been taken into custody for questioning. Accordingly, any potential public safety exception was inapplicable because the State failed to show that the delay was necessary. Justice Mansfield authored the opinion of a unanimous court.

 

State of Iowa v. Jacob Lee Goble, No. 22–1507

Opinion Date: March 29, 2024

On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issues:

• Whether the district court relied on an improper factor when it mentioned parole in sentencing.

Jacob Goble pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance. The district court sentenced him to an indeterminate term of up to five years. During sentencing, the judge mentioned parole, stating “you will be paroled at some point and you’re going to have to make a decision at that point, am I going to keep doing this or am I going to turn my life around.” Goble appealed, arguing that the judge considered an improper factor. The Court of Appeals affirmed Goble’s sentence.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court, holding that the district court did not rely on an improper sentencing factor by mentioning parole. In State v. Remmers, the Supreme Court held in 1977 that imposing a longer prison sentence for the purpose of delaying the defendant’s release on parole is improper. The Court’s main concern in Remmers was the judge’s stated desire to strip the parole board of its own discretion. But there is no law that prohibits sentencing judges from mentioning parole. In fact, the Court noted, Iowa judges are directed to give recommendations to the parole board in Iowa Code section 901.9. Here, the judge briefly mentioned parole only because it was relevant to the court’s goal of rehabilitation and protection of the community, so it was not improper. Justice Waterman authored the opinion of the court, in which Justices Mansfield, McDonald, and Oxley joined.

Justice McDermott’s special concurrence argued that the majority should not have abrogated a Court of Appeals’ unpublished opinion from 2022, State v.Bowen. In his view, Bowen was correctly decided and factually distinguishable from the case at hand.

Justice May also filed a special concurrence, in which Chief Justice Christensen joined. Justice May raised concerns about Remmers, in which the Iowa Supreme Court held that the imposition of a longer prison sentence for the purpose of delaying the defendant’s release on parole is improper. He would overrule Remmers as wrongly decided and a source of confusion in Iowa sentencing practices.

 

Bridgestone Americas, Inc. and Old Republic Insurance Company v. Charles Anderson, No. 22–1328

Opinion Date: March 29, 2024

On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County

Issues:

• Whether the workers compensation commissioner erred in finding that the claimant’s right arm and shoulder injuries are compensable.
• Whether the commissioner erred in finding that the arm and shoulder injuries should be compensated as unscheduled injuries under Iowa Code section 85.34(2)(v).

Charles Anderson worked at Bridgestone for over 40 years building tires. The hard manual labor involved in building tires led to shoulder and arm injuries, which Anderson reported to Bridgestone in October of 2018. He received treatment from several physicians before bringing a workers compensation action against Bridgestone. He alleged his shoulder and arm injuries were related to his employment. At an arbitration hearing, Anderson’s injuries were determined to be unscheduled injuries, and he was awarded compensation based on a fifty percent loss of future earning capacity. Both the commissioner and the district court affirmed.

The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions. As to the first issue, the Court found sufficient evidence in the record supported the commissioner’s conclusion that Anderson’s injuries were work related and therefore compensable. With regard to whether the injuries were scheduled or unscheduled, the Court concluded that the district court erred in affirming the commissioner’s finding that the injuries were unscheduled. This is because Anderson’s shoulder and arm injuries did not fall under the plain language of Iowa Code § 85.34(2)(v), which defines an unscheduled injury as one “other than those . . . described or referred to in paragraphs ‘a’ through ‘u’ ” of section 85.34(2). But Anderson’s arm and shoulder injuries are described in paragraphs (m) and (n), respectively, so paragraph (v) is inapplicable. The type of injury affects compensation. Anderson’s injuries should have been scheduled under the proper interpretation of the statute; therefore, an award based on loss of earning capacity was improper. Justice May authored the opinion of a unanimous court.

 

Tags: Iowa Supreme Court 2023-24