UPDATES & ANALYSIS

7.30

May 2024 Opinion Roundup

by Chloe Dinardo | July 30, 2024

The Iowa Supreme Court entered opinions in eighteen cases during May 2024.  You can read Rox Laird’s analysis of Terrace Hill Society Foundation v. Terrace Hill Commission and Kristin Hurd, in her official capacity as Chairperson of the Terrace Hill Commission; State of Iowa v. Brandon William Lee; Jeffrey Peterzalek and Molly Weber v. Iowa District Court for Polk County; Darrin P. Miller, Individually, as Executor of the Estate of Meredith R. Miller, and as Parent, Guardian, and Next of Friend of S.M.M., a Minor v. Catholic Health Initiatives-Iowa, Corp. d/b/a MercyOne Des Moines Medical Center; William Nowysz, Joseph Losh, Hijinio Carreon, Noah Pirozzi, Danielle Chamberlain, and Daron Darmening, State of Iowa v. Lasondra A. Johnson. The remaining opinions from May are summarized below.

 

Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Ta Yu Yang, No. 23-1833

Opinion date: May 3, 2024

On review from the report of the Iowa Supreme Court Grievance Commission

Issue:

• Whether an attorney violated trust account recordkeeping and notice provisions of the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct and Iowa Court Rules when he failed to maintain client ledger sheets, did not keep records of outstanding checks and deposits, did not provide notices before withdrawal, did not complete monthly triple reconciliations, and kept $1,000 of his firm’s funds in the client trust account.

Ta-Yu Yang is an attorney practicing primarily in immigration law. The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board brought a complaint against Yang after uncovering several issues with his financial recordkeeping. Yang had been audited before, in 2014, and received private admonitions for failure to reconcile his client trust account. Come 2021, Yang received another audit request after overdrawing on a client trust account. The Client Security Commission found that he failed to resolve many of the financial recordkeeping issues uncovered in 2014, despite his stated intention to be in full compliance following the previous audit. The Board then filed the current complaint, alleging violations of Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct 32:1.15(a), (c), and (f) regarding safekeeping property and using client trust accounts, and rule 32:8.4(c) regarding misconduct. Additionally, the Board alleged that Yang violated various Iowa Court Rules relating to client trust accounts. The allegations in the complaint were deemed admitted when Yang failed to answer. Considering several mitigating and aggravating factors, the Board recommended a sixty-day licensure suspension. Yang appealed.

The Supreme Court held that Yang violated several Iowa Rules in failing to maintain proper records of trust account funds and withdrawing funds before providing proper notice and accounting to clients. Attorneys are required to follow a variety of recordkeeping rules, and Yang’s failure to follow these rules was a clear violation. Yang was also sanctioned for knowingly making false statements that he would correct these issues in 2014, without actually taking steps to do so. However, the Supreme Court held that Yang keeping $1,000 of his firm’s funds in the client trust account was insufficient to show a commingling-of-funds violation. This is because Yang was previously given informal guidance by the Office of Professional Regulation that he was allowed to have a “small amount” of his firm’s funds in the trust account. There was no showing “that Yang left this money in the account to defer tax liability, to avoid the claims of creditors, or because he regarded the client trust account as a melting pot from which he could pay both client and personal expenses.” Ultimately, the Court suspended his license for thirty days. Justice Mansfield delivered the opinion of the Court, with Justice McDonald, joined by Justice May, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

Justice McDonald wrote separately, joined by Justice May. He concurred with the conclusion reached by the majority. However, Justice McDonald would not have reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the violations because Yang’s submission was before the Court under Iowa Court Rule 36.21, not Rule 36.22. Rule 36.21 is the process by which attorney disciplinary matters are submitted to the Court for the limited purpose of determining appropriate sanctions. Justice McDonald argued that, if attorneys want the Court to review both the violations and sanctions, they must pursue a true “appeal” under Rule 36.22. According to Justice McDonald, the Court “continues to treat rules 36.21 and 36.22 identically despite the fact there are two separate rules providing for two separate and distinct processes.”

 

Lori Randolph and Ronald Randolph v. Aidan, LLC, No. 23-0917

Opinion date: May 3, 2024

On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County

Issue:

• Whether Sioux City was immune under Iowa Code section 670.4(1)(j) from a third-party claim by a rental property owner who was a defendant in a personal injury action.
• Whether the common law public-duty doctrine applied to Sioux City.

After falling down stairs at a rental property, plaintiff Lori Randolph brought a negligence suit against the owner of the property, Aidan, LLC. Randolph alleged that the stairs were uneven and did not comply with the municipal code. Aidan then brought a third-party claim against Sioux City, seeking indemnification for any damages arising from the incident. Aidan alleged that a city employee had inspected the rental property and declared it compliant with the municipal code. Further, Aidan alleged that the city inspector who found the stairs to be in compliance was unqualified for his position; therefore, Sioux City was negligent in hiring him. Sioux City moved to dismiss the third-party negligent hiring claim based on the immunity provided under section 670.4(1)(j) of the Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act as well as under the common law public-duty doctrine. The district court denied the motion. Randolph and Sioux City filed an interlocutory appeal, which the Supreme Court granted.

The Iowa Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Under the Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act, municipalities are generally liable for their own torts as well as the torts of their “officers and employees, acting within the scope of their employment or duties,” subject to several exceptions or “immunities.” One such immunity, found in section 670.4(1)(j), protects municipalities from tort liability where: (1) the claim is based on the acts or omissions of an employee; and (2) “the damage was caused by a . . . property not under the supervision or control of the municipality;” unless (3) “the act or omission of the officer or employee constitutes actual malice or a criminal offense.” The parties agreed that the damage was caused by Aidan’s property, stairs, which were not under the supervision or control of Sioux City. They also agreed that the city inspector’s approval of the stairs was not done with actual malice. This appeal focused on the first element. Sioux City argued that Aidan’s claim was “based upon” the alleged negligence of Sioux City’s employee inspector and therefore all elements of 670.4(1)(j) immunity were established. Aidan, on the other hand, argued that its claims were based on the negligence of Sioux City itself—the employer—in negligently hiring an unqualified employee.

The Court engaged in statutory interpretation to understand the meaning of “based upon” within section 670.4(1)(j). Looking to the United States Supreme Court’s inquiry in its 1993 opinion in Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, the Court held that “[f]or purposes of paragraph (j) . . . a claim is “based upon” the particular conduct that constitutes the gravamen of the claim, that is, the conduct that must be proven to entitle the claimant to relief.” With that definition in mind, the Court held that statutory immunity under 670.4(1)(j) applied to Sioux City in this case because Aidan’s negligent hiring claim was “based upon” the alleged negligence of Sioux City’s employee in inspecting the stairs. Under Iowa law, in order to prevail on a negligent hiring claim, Aidan would be required to prove both the employer and the employee’s negligence. The dual nature of negligent hiring claims makes the negligence of the inspector a “gravamen” of the claim, such that 670.4(1)(j) immunity applies. Because the resolution of the statutory issue called for dismissal, the Court declined to engage in the public-duty doctrine analysis. Justice May authored the opinion of a unanimous Court.

 

K.C. v. Iowa District Court for Polk County, 23-0214

Opinion date: May 3, 2024

On certiorari from the Iowa District Court for Polk County

Issue:

• Whether the juvenile court erred in denying a juvenile’s motion for additional expert witness fees at the State’s expense.

K.C. faced charges for two misdemeanors: possession of marijuana and carrying a dangerous weapon. K.C. turned eighteen shortly after the incident leading up to the charge, so the State filed a petition for waiver of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. In preparation for the waiver hearing, K.C. contacted several experts in conducting evaluations for juvenile waiver cases. K.C. hired Dr. Tracey Thomas, whose estimated fees were the least expensive of the estimates K.C. received at $7,990. K.C. filed a motion for expert assistance at the State’s expense, which included an affidavit of Dr. Thomas’ rate and expected services. The State did not resist. The juvenile court approved the use of an expert, with the specific amount of fees to be set at a later date. Weeks later, and after K.C. had already proceeded to work with Dr. Thomas, the juvenile court set a cap on expert witness compensation at $4,590. K.C. filed for additional fees to cover the remaining expenses, supported by an invoice. The motion was denied. K.C. then filed a petition for writ of certiorari challenging the juvenile court’s denial of his motion for additional expert witness fees at the State’s expense.

The Iowa Supreme Court sustained the writ and remanded the case with further instructions. The Court recognized the lack of a specific framework for determining reasonable fees for compensating expert witnesses in juvenile delinquency proceedings. But the Court declined to specifically adopt such a framework in this case, instead holding that the juvenile court’s denial was an abuse of discretion no matter what factors applied. The Court held that the juvenile court was wrong to summarily deny K.C.’s motion, without supporting its ruling with substantial evidence. The Court noted that, while district courts do have discretion to determine reasonable fees, the Court has previously held that “reasonable compensation for court-appointed lawyers is ‘full compensation.’” And in the same vein, full compensation is expected to be given to experts, like Dr. Thomas. Chief Justice Christensen authored the opinion of a unanimous Court.

 

Elizabeth Roberts v. Eric Roberts, as trustee of the W. David Roberts Revocable Trust, Dave Roberts Growth & Ventures, Inc., and Eric Roberts as personal representative of the Estate of William David Roberts, No. 23-1131

Opinion date: May 10, 2024

On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Shelby County

Issue:

• Whether amendments made during a marriage to a prenuptial agreement are enforceable under Iowa Code Sections 596.7 and 597.2.

Before David and Elizabeth Roberts were married in 1993, they executed a prenuptial agreement. The prenuptial agreement provided that David and Elizabeth would retain their own premarital property and that upon the death of either, “the survivor shall have and make no claims of any kind against the estate of the other for any reason or by way of any right as the surviving spouse of such decedent for dower, statutory right, election, right of support, right of inheritance and homestead rights.” The agreement provided an exception in Paragraph Eight—where the surviving spouse would have a right to make claims against the deceased’s estate—for the house “occupied by the Parties at the time of such death regardless of ownership thereof” and “one-third of ALL (net equity in) real property of the deceased,” excluding personal property. The Agreement also stated in Paragraph Ten that, should David acquire additional real estate, Elizabeth would receive at least a ten percent share in that real estate.

In 2017, David and Elizabeth executed a Partial Revocation of the Prenuptial Agreement, revoking both Paragraphs Eight and Ten. After David’s death, Elizabeth filed an action to enforce the Prenuptial Agreement. Elizabeth argued that the partial revocation was an unenforceable “post-nuptial agreement.” Following a hearing, the district court found that the partial revocation was valid and enforceable based on “common law principles of contract law.” Elizabeth appealed.

The Iowa Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Elizabeth’s main argument on appeal was that Iowa law does not allow partial revocation of (or amendments to) prenuptial agreements. The Court considered Iowa Code Chapter 596, modeled after the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, and noted that the Iowa legislature did not adopt the portion of the uniform law relating to amendment. Instead, section 596.7 provides only for full revocation of prenuptial agreements. The legislature’s omission of the word “amended” when adopting the Act speaks to its intent to exclude anything less than revocation. Yet, despite the “partial revocation” language used by the parties, David and Elizabeth amended their prenuptial agreement.

In addition, the Court noted that Iowa Code Section 597.2 makes “a contract between husband and wife, with reference to her interest in his estate, [invalid].” According to the Court, the concern with post-nuptial agreements that seek to amend prenuptial agreements is that “the spouse with economic leverage (or some other type of leverage) may be able to take advantage of the other spouse.” This concern is eliminated when the couple decides to revoke the agreement altogether. Accordingly, the Roberts’ post-nuptial amendment was invalid and unenforceable. Justice Mansfield delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all justices joined except Chief Justice Christensen, who took no part in the decision.

 

State of Iowa v. Adam Aaron Rhodes, No. 23-0338

Opinion date: May 10, 2024

On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Des Moines County

Issue:

• Whether a replica of an antique muzzleloader rifle qualifies as a “firearm” within the meaning of Iowa Code section 724.26(1) (2021), which prohibits felons from possessing a “firearm or offensive weapon.”

Adam Rhodes was convicted of third-degree burglary in 2004. 16 years later, Rhodes was convicted of knowingly possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, after shooting a deer with a muzzleloader. Rhodes appealed his conviction, arguing that his muzzleloader was a replica of an antique firearm and therefore was not a firearm within the meaning of Iowa Code section 724.26(1).

The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed. Iowa Code Chapter 724 makes it illegal for convicted felons to possess firearms or offensive weapons. The two are different, but neither may legally be possessed by a felon. The Court agreed with the State that, even though antique replicas are categorically excluded from the definition of “offensive weapon” under Chapter 724, the muzzleloader was still a “firearm” under the statute. Chapter 724 does not include a definition of “firearm,” but the word’s ordinary meaning encompasses any “instrument used in the propulsion of shot, shell, or bullets by the action of gunpowder exploded within it.” The Court noted that Iowa cases have consistently applied this definition, and the muzzleloader in this case fits “squarely within this common meaning.” Despite its antique nature, the muzzleloader Rhodes possessed could propel a projectile by explosive force and therefore was a firearm. “Offensive weapons” on the other hand, describe those weapons that are “particularly lethal,” such as machine guns. The Court declined to follow federal precedent exempting antique firearms from the definition of “firearm,” considering the difference in language between the Iowa and federal felon-in-possession statutes. Namely, the Iowa legislature declined to adopt the same explicit exemption for antique firearms as the federal statute. Justice Waterman authored the opinion of a unanimous Court.

 

Dee A. Delaney v. Second Injury Fund of Iowa, No. 23-0182

Opinion date: May 10, 2024

On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issue:

• Whether the workers’ compensation commissioner erred in its interpretation and application of Iowa Code Section 85.64 by concluding that, because Delaney’s injury was technically to the whole body, she could not claim Second Injury Fund benefits.

Dee Delaney suffered an injury to her lower left leg in 1986. In 2019, she injured her lower right leg while working at Nordstrom, Inc. The later injury led to a knee surgery, which caused lymphedema in Delaney’s lower right leg and foot. Delaney subsequently filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits against Nordstrom and the Second Injury Fund. The commissioner determined based on expert opinions provided that Delaney’s lymphedema was a sequela (a condition resulting from a previous disease or injury) of her 2019 work injury. It then found that the lymphedema was an injury to the body as a whole, not limited to a scheduled member of the body. And because her second injury was not limited to a scheduled member, Delaney was not entitled to Fund benefits. On judicial review, the district court affirmed the commissioner. However, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, finding that Delaney’s loss of use of her right leg triggered possible Fund benefits.

The Iowa Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals and reversed and remanded the judgment of the district court. The Court clarified that vascular injuries such as lymphedema are not per se whole-body injuries. The commissioner erroneously found all vascular injuries to be injuries to the whole body rather than a case-by-case, fact-based inquiry. Injuries to bodily systems may result in scheduled injuries under section 85.64, according to the Court, and may in Delaney’s case as well. But the commissioner did not analyze the specifics of Delaney’s vascular injury. The Court also reaffirmed its 2007 holding in Second Injury Fund of Iowa v. George that “loss of or loss of use of another such member or organ” under section 85.64 includes “a loss to another such member regardless if the second loss includes other injuries.” Therefore, the fact that the sequela injury may have been to a scheduled member of the body as well as to the body as a whole did not automatically disqualify Delaney from recovery under section 85.64. Justice McDonald authored the opinion of the Court in which all participating justices joined. Justice May took no part.

State of Iowa v. Iowa District Court for Emmet County, No. 22-1703

Opinion date: May 10, 2024

On certiorari review from the Iowa District Court for Emmet County

Issue:

• Whether the defendant, the prosecution, or the judicial branch is responsible for the costs of a technology vendor hired to assist in conducting the privilege review of email account information in connection with a criminal proceeding.

A former police chief, Craig Juan Merrill, was charged with twenty-one different criminal violations. In investigating Merrill’s conduct, the Emmet County Sheriff applied for a search warrant seeking access to Merrill’s Yahoo! Mail account. However, before the search warrant was issued, the State wanted to ensure no privileged communications between Merrill and his attorney would inadvertently be produced. The State suggested hiring a “filter team” to do a privilege review of the emails. The district court instead opted to do an en camera review of the emails. But, upon receiving the drive which included over 5,800 emails and enduring some technical difficulties along the way, the district court began to question the most effective method for privilege review. A third-party technology vendor was appointed to do the review. But the parties disagreed as to who should foot the bill. The district court held that a non-party could not be ordered to pay the costs of a third-party review. Thus, the costs were left to be paid by the State, with the possibility of being taxed to Merrill at the conclusion of the case. The State filed a writ of certiorari regarding the district court’s order.

The Iowa Supreme Court sustained the writ and concluded that the judicial branch should be responsible for the costs of the technology vendor. The Court noted that the district court could have ordered that a filter team, the defendant’s counsel, or a “special master” conduct the review. Instead, the district court opted to do the review itself. The court’s decision to take on the review itself was “disfavored” among the options mentioned. District courts should instead keep a distance from initial privilege review so that they can “later rule on contested claims of privilege as necessary.” In this “unique circumstance,” because the district court voluntarily assumed a task it did not need to undertake and ultimately could not complete the task, the judicial branch must bear the costs. Justice McDonald delivered the opinion of a unanimous Court.

 

Conservatorship of Janice Geerdes by Laura Jenkins v. Albert Gomez Cruz, No. 22-1905

Opinion date: May 17, 2024

On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issue:

• Whether evidence was sufficient to establish a confidential relationship between a grantor and grantee, creating a presumption of undue influence.
• Whether evidence was sufficient to support a finding that a grantee procured a quitclaim deed to land by undue influence.
• Whether evidence was sufficient to support a finding that a grantor lacked mental capacity to enter into a conveyance of land.

Janice Geerdes, an elderly widow, owned farmland. Albert Cruz started out as the family’s farmhand and became a close friend of the Geerdes family. Following Mr. Geerdes’ death, Albert continued to spend time with Janice. In 2004, Janice and Albert formed a partnership, Blue Acres Pork, for the purpose of raising hogs. Janice deeded a 9.64-acre hog site to herself and Albert as tenants in common. Albert did not contribute funds to the partnership but received payments corresponding to his share of the partnership. Janice’s daughter, Laura, began to show concern regarding the relationship between Janice and Albert. Janice underwent cognitive tests in 2017 and 2018, indicating she may have been developing dementia. In January 2019, Janice transferred her remaining interest in the 9.64-acre hog site to Albert for no consideration via quitclaim deed. In July 2019, Laura filed a petition and was appointed conservator for Janice. In 2020, Laura brought suit in her capacity as conservator asking the court to set aside the quitclaim deed due to undue influence and lack of capacity. The district court ruled for Laura in a bench trial. A divided panel on the Court of Appeals affirmed.

The Iowa Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals, holding that the conservator did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that Geerdes was under undue influence or lacked capacity. Establishing the existence of a confidential relationship raises a rebuttable presumption of undue influence, and the district court found that Albert failed to negate the presumption. But, according to the Court, the record was insufficient to establish either a confidential relationship between Janice and Albert or undue influence absent a confidential relationship. Iowa precedent has established that “one person must have trusted the other to handle their affairs” for a confidential relationship to be created in the context of undue influence. That was not the case here. Albert was not in charge of Janice’s affairs. The record simply established that Janice was voluntarily generous to Albert over the course of their friendship because she wanted to be. Additionally, the accountant with whom Janice and Albert discussed the preparation of the quitclaim deed testified that Janice directed the conversation regarding the deed, not Albert.

With regard to the mental capacity argument, the Court held that Janice’s cognitive assessments alone did not establish a lack of mental capacity by clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence. According to the Court, “[m]ere mental weakness in a grantor will not invalidate a deed,” especially when other testimony regarding the conveyance indicated that Janice knew what she was doing when she signed the property over to Albert. Justice Mansfield delivered the opinion of a unanimous Court.

 

Emilio Puente v. Civil Service Commission of Iowa City, No. 22-1619

Opinion date: May 17, 2024

On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issue:

• Whether a plaintiff substantially complied with the requirements for filing a notice of appeal from a municipal Civil Service Commission ruling by filing a “petition for judicial review.”

Emilio Puente was a police officer in Iowa City until he resigned on February 3, 2022. A month later, on April 13, Puente sought to rescind his resignation and be reinstated. The city denied his request on April 15. Puente subsequently filed a complaint with the Civil Service Commission to review the denial. The complaint was filed on April 27.

The Commission dismissed Puente’s complaint as untimely, and Puente filed a petition for judicial review. The Commission filed a motion to dismiss the case. The Commission argued that Puente should have filed a notice of appeal under 400.27, not a petition for judicial review under 17A.19. The district court dismissed the case, and the Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal.

The Iowa Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals, holding that Puente substantially complied with the requirements of section 400.27. Although Puente labeled his filing incorrectly, he effectuated personal service of the petition and the contents of his filing satisfied all the requirements of the proper section, invoking the district court’s jurisdiction. The Court relied on its 1993 opinion in Burnam v. Board of Review, in which the Court reversed the dismissal of taxpayers’ petition for review of the county board of review’s tax assessment because the taxpayers substantially complied with the notice of appeal requirements. The petition in Burnam included all “essential matters,” and so did Puente’s petition. His reference to section 17A.19 was not fatal and he did not have to mention the word “appeal.” Justice Oxley authored the opinion of a unanimous Court.

 

State of Iowa v. Amy Lois Rasmussen, No. 22-1144

Opinion date: May 24, 2024

On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issue:

• Whether the district court improperly considered defendant’s lack of remorse and abused its discretion in imposing a sentence on the defendant for two counts of assault causing bodily injury.
• Whether the no-contact order in a later dismissed simple-assault case was an illegal sentence and void.

After a physical altercation between four people occurred outside the Boone City Hall, the defendant, Amy Rasmussen, entered an Alford guilty plea to two counts of assault causing bodily injury. The State dismissed her related simple misdemeanor charge involving the third victim, and the defendant was sentenced to consecutive one-year sentences for each count of assault. Before the simple misdemeanor case was dismissed, the district court also entered a no-contact order (“NCO”), which prohibited the defendant from contacting any of the three victims. The defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed her sentence.

The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part. While the district court did not consider any improper sentencing factors or abuse its discretion in sentencing, it did improperly enter an NCO with respect to the third victim’s case because it had already been dismissed. The court reviewed prior cases holding that district courts have no authority to impose NCOs absent a conviction from a criminal offense relating to that victim. Thus, the NCO protecting the third victim in the dismissed simple misdemeanor case was improper. Still, the district court could have entered an NCO protecting the third victim in the related assault case. Even though she was not the “actual person to whom the [assault] was directed,” she was nonetheless a “victim” of that same assaultive conduct under Iowa Code section 664A.1(3) because she was present during the altercation and at least experienced emotional harm from it. Chief Justice Christensen authored the opinion of a unanimous Court.

 

State of Iowa v. Abel Gomez Medina, No. 22-0199

Opinion date: May 24, 2024

On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issue:

• Whether the district court’s decision to allow a victim to testify by closed-circuit television after she turned 18 violated Iowa Code 915.38 and the Confrontation Clause.

Abel Gomez Medina was convicted for sexual abuse and indecent contact with a child. At trial, the victim was permitted to testify by closed-circuit television. Her testimony spanned two days. The first day, she was a minor. But the second day, she turned 18. Gomez Medina objected to her closed-circuit testimony the second day, arguing that since she reached the age of 18, her closed-circuit testimony violated Iowa Code Section 915.38. The district court overruled the objection and allowed the victim to continue testifying the second day because the statute allows closed-circuit testimony for a victim or witness with a mental illness, regardless of age. Gomez Medina appealed. On appeal, Gomez Medina added an argument that the district court’s ruling violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which the Court declined to address as not properly preserved for appellate review.

The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly allowed the victim’s closed-circuit testimony under 915.38. The district court’s decision to allow the victim’s continued testimony after she turned 18 was based on her established mental illnesses of PTSD and depression. According to the victim’s guardian ad litem and therapist, requiring in-person testimony would have traumatized the victim and affected her ability to testify truthfully. Section 915.38(1)(c) explicitly allows for closed-circuit testimony under such circumstances. Justice McDermott authored the opinion of a unanimous Court.

 

In the Matter of the Estate of Richard D. Janssen, No. 23-0093

Opinion date: May 31, 2024

On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County

Issue:

• Whether, in an action to contest a will, all interested parties must remain joined as indispensable parties until final judgment under Iowa Code Section 633.312 and Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.234.

In 2014, Richard and Melva Janssen executed new wills which explicitly excluded one of their daughters, Sheryl, from any inheritance. Melva died in 2017. In 2018, Sheryl found out about her exclusion from the will and arranged for her father to meet with a new attorney. She drove him to the appointment and attended the meeting wherein he executed a new will leaving certain property to Sheryl upon his death. Richard died three months later. Richard’s four sons then brought suit against their two sisters, Sheryl and Debra. The brothers sought to set aside Richard’s 2018 will, claiming that he lacked capacity to make the changes because of undue influence imposed by Sheryl and Debra.

The case was first tried in 2019, resulting in a mistrial due to a hung jury. Before the second trial, two of the brothers voluntarily removed themselves as plaintiffs. The remaining two brother-plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims against Debra, leaving Sheryl as the sole defendant. The case proceeded to trial a second time. This time, the jury returned a verdict for the brothers, finding that Sheryl had unduly influenced Richard to change his will in 2018. In one of several post-trial motions, Sheryl argued that Debra was an “interested” and therefore “indispensable party” to the will contest under Iowa Code Section 633.312. According to Sheryl, Debra’s absence from the second trial stripped the district court of jurisdiction. The district court ruled that Debra, as well as the two additional brothers who removed themselves, were indispensable parties required to remain in the will contest until final judgment under section 633.312 and Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.234. It granted a new trial. The brothers appealed.

On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that nothing in section 633.312 requires all interested parties to remain in the case until final judgment. In their view, the statute does require “all known interested parties” be joined at the onset or served notice. But these requirements were met when all siblings were joined as parties and participated in the first trial before being voluntarily dismissed. Sheryl, on the other hand, argued that “indispensable party status cannot be waived by consenting to dismissal” and such parties must remain in the suit until judgment. Thus, Sheryl argued, a new trial was the proper remedy.

The Iowa Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Court held that Debra’s dismissal did not preclude the district court from entering judgment on the will contest, despite the fact that Debra still had rights at stake under the will. According to the Court, all that section 633.312 requires is that known interested parties be joined when the action is filed. As additional interested parties may become known later in a case, a district court is obliged to bring those new interested parties in. But this was not a situation where interested parties were never joined in the lawsuit. In fact, each interested party participated fully in the first trial, satisfying the requirements of section 633.312.

The Court also held that section 633.312 and Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.234(3) do not preclude an indispensable party, once joined, from consenting to dismissal. Simply put, the statute is silent as to any such requirement. Therefore, Debra was not required to remain a party until final judgment. Justice Oxley authored the opinion of a unanimous Court.

 

State of Iowa v. Darius LeJuan Wade, No. 22-1650

Opinion date: May 31, 2024

On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issue:

• Whether the word “fix” in Iowa Code Section 907.7(1) requires courts to specify a definite length of time when ordering probation, or whether it allows courts to impose a time range for probation.

Darius Wade was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon as a habitual offender and operating while intoxicated, second offense. At sentencing, the district court suspended the prison sentence and imposed probation “for a period of 2-5 years.” Wade appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his felon in possession conviction and that the unspecific range of years constituted an illegal sentence. The Court of Appeals affirmed on both issues. Wade sought further review, which the Supreme Court granted.

The Iowa Supreme Court granted further review only on the issue regarding whether the sentence was illegal, and the Court vacated in part the Court of Appeals’ decision affirming the district court on that issue. Wade argued that the use of the word “fix” in Iowa Code 907.7(1) indicates that the district court must set the defendant’s probation for a definitive period of time, not a range of time. Applying the ordinary meaning of the word “fix,” the Court agreed. The Court noted other instances where the Iowa Code differentiates between “fixing” something and setting a “range,” showing that the two concepts are distinct, not interchangeable. The Court held that the district court imposing a range of years was inconsistent with the word “fix” in the statute. Instead, district courts must establish a specific length for the term of probation. Justice McDermott authored the opinion of a unanimous Court.