UPDATES & ANALYSIS

9.24

May 2025 Opinion Roundup

by Matt McGuire | September 24, 2025

The Iowa Supreme Court entered opinions in 18 cases in May 2025. At the links immediately below, you can read On Brief’s analysis of the following opinions:

• State v. McLain, concerning whether to abolish the automobile exception to warrant requirement of the Iowa Constitution, by Rox Laird;
• Doe v. Western Dubuque Community School District, concerning the applicability of statutory pre-answer qualified immunity defenses to traditional tort claims, by Mary Grace Henderson;
• League of United Latin American Citizens of Iowa v. Pate, concerning standing to challenge English-only voting materials, by Rox Laird;
• In the Matter of Property Seized for Forfeiture from Bitcoin Depot Operating and Bitcoin Depot Operating v. Carlson, concerning application of the duress defense to contract enforcement against digital currency vendors, by Rox Laird;
• State v. Gale, concerning statutory enhancements for defendants without prior convictions, by Mary Grace Henderson;
• Villarini v. Iowa City Community School District, concerning claims of wrongful discharge and defamation brought by a former high school tennis coach, by Mary Grace Henderson;
• Brodie v. Foxhoven, concerning standards for establishing a wrongful discharge in violation of public policy claim, by Mary Grace Henderson;
• Belhak v. Smith, concerning evidentiary issues supporting a medical malpractice verdict, by Mary Grace Henderson;
• Christensen v. Iowa District Court for Story County, concerning whether a prosecutor can be assessed a monetary penalty for misconduct, by Rox Laird;

The remaining opinions from May are summarized below.

 

Bradshaw Renovations, LLC v. Barry Graham and Jacklynn Graham, No. 22-1721

Opinion date: May 2, 2025

On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issues:

• Whether substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding of consumer fraud under Iowa Code chapter 714H relating to alleged overbilling practices.
• Whether the district court erred in denying Bradshaw’s equitable claims of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit in light of its contract with the Grahams.

In 2019, Barry and Jacklynn Graham hired Bradshaw Renovations, LLC to renovate their Urbandale home under a written contract incorporating an itemized estimate of $136,168.16. The agreement required changes in scope and cost to be documented in writing, subject to homeowner approval. Bradshaw revised the estimate once, raising the total to $139,168.16, and periodically invoiced the Grahams during construction. The Grahams paid over $140,000 by March 2020 but disputed a final bill of $18,779.15.

Bradshaw sued for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and quantum meruit. The Grahams counterclaimed for breach of contract and consumer fraud. At trial, the jury awarded the Grahams $16,000 for breach of contract and $40,000 for consumer fraud, including statutory damages. The district court also awarded attorney fees and dismissed Bradshaw’s equitable claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the consumer fraud verdict, concluding there was not substantial evidence that Bradshaw committed a “prohibited practice” under Iowa Code § 714H.3(1). The Court emphasized that while Bradshaw’s billing practices were sloppy, there was no misrepresentation made with the intent to induce the Grahams to contract, and no reliance at the time of contracting. Allegations about labor rates, profit markups, and receipts arose only after the work was completed and did not establish actionable consumer fraud.

On Bradshaw’s equitable claims, the Court affirmed the district court, holding that unjust enrichment and quantum meruit cannot be used to circumvent a written contract covering the same subject matter. Because the contract expressly required written change orders, Bradshaw could not seek equitable recovery when it failed to follow that procedure. Chief Justice Christensen authored the opinion of a unanimous Court.

 

County Bank v. Shalla, No. 22-1865

Opinion date: May 9, 2025

On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issue:

• Whether Iowa Code section 535.17, the credit agreement statute of frauds, bars tort claims for negligence and fraudulent misrepresentation arising from an oral agreement to secure financing.

Clint and Michelle Shalla lost their farm in foreclosure but entered into a debt settlement agreement with Greg and Heather Koch, who purchased the property while granting Clint an exclusive option to repurchase by August 15, 2015, contingent on providing written notice and proof of financing. Clint sought financing through Christopher Goerdt, then president of Peoples Trust and Savings Bank. The Shallas claimed Goerdt orally promised to “take care of the buyback” and secure financing, but no written commitment was made, and the option expired. Later, the Kochs agreed to sell back the farm at a higher price, and financing was arranged through County Bank, where Goerdt had moved. After defaulting on the new loan, County Bank filed foreclosure.

The Shallas filed counterclaims against County Bank and brought third-party claims against Peoples Trust and Savings Bank and Goerdt, including negligence and fraudulent misrepresentation based on the alleged oral promises to secure financing. The district court ultimately held these claims were barred by Iowa Code section 535.17, which requires all material terms of a credit agreement to be in writing. The Court of Appeals affirmed, with one judge dissenting on the application of section 535.17 to tort claims.

The Iowa Supreme Court held that the Shallas’ negligence and fraudulent misrepresentation claims were barred. Section 535.17 defines “credit agreement” broadly to include any contract to loan money or finance a transaction, encompassing all related promises. Goerdt’s oral statements to secure financing and assist in the repurchase were part of a single credit agreement and thus unenforceable absent a signed writing. Section 535.17(7) displaces common-law and equitable doctrines that would otherwise allow circumvention. The Court reasoned that permitting tort claims based on the same unwritten promises would undermine the statute’s purpose of requiring certainty and preventing fraud in credit transactions. Justice McDonald authored the opinion of the Court.

 

Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Karmen R. Anderson, No. 24-1894

Opinion date: May 16, 2025

On appeal from the report of the Iowa Supreme Court Grievance Commission

Issue:

• Whether the appropriate sanction for an attorney repeatedly missing appellate filing deadlines was suspension or a public reprimand.

Between December 2019 and October 2023, attorney Karmen R. Anderson failed to act diligently in twenty-four appellate matters. She missed forty-two filing deadlines, received twenty-four default notices, was removed from four cases, and paid $3,600 in default penalties. None of the appeals were dismissed, and no client complaints were filed, but her conduct delayed proceedings. The Iowa Supreme Court Disciplinary Board charged her with violating rules requiring diligence, expediting litigation, and avoiding conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.

The grievance commission found all violations proven and recommended a forty-five-day suspension plus mandatory continuing education. This recommendation was influenced by Anderson’s prior discipline: she had been publicly reprimanded in 2019 for nearly identical violations involving missed deadlines in eleven appeals. Anderson appealed the commission’s recommendation, arguing for a public reprimand or, alternatively, a suspension not exceeding thirty days.

The Iowa Supreme Court agreed Anderson clearly violated the charged rules, but it imposed a public reprimand rather than suspension. The Court considered aggravating factors, including her fifteen years of experience, prior discipline for the same misconduct, and her lack of cooperation in the disciplinary process. Mitigating factors included her provision of services to low-income clients, community service, pro bono work, and—most significantly—the absence of prejudice to clients, as none of their appeals were dismissed. Personal hardships cited by Anderson (illness, family stressors, caregiving responsibilities) were deemed only mildly mitigating because the Board showed they had little causal link to her missed deadlines.

The Court cautioned, however, that continued reliance on default notices as a “tickler system” is unacceptable, and future violations may warrant suspension. Justice McDonald authored the opinion of a unanimous Court.

 

State of Iowa v. Ronald Eugene Cooley, No. 23-1375

Opinion date: May 16, 2025

On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issue:

• Whether appearing “in person” is an essential element of the offense of failing to register a change of address under Iowa Code § 692A.104(2) such that the district court could not omit the element from marshaling jury instructions.

Ronald Eugene Cooley was convicted in 1991 of assault with intent to commit sexual abuse, subjecting him to Iowa’s sex offender registration requirements. In January 2021, Cooley moved to a Marion apartment and later to a Cedar Rapids apartment. By statute, he was required to “appear in person” to notify the sheriff of his new address within five business days. During this period, the Linn County Sheriff’s Office was closed to the public due to COVID-19, posting a sign instructing offenders to register via telephone.

Cooley testified that he attempted to appear in person and repeatedly called but could not reach staff. He eventually registered by phone but outside the five-day window. The State charged him with two violations: (1) falsely claiming residence at the Marion apartment and (2) failing to register the Cedar Rapids address within five days. At trial, Cooley requested the district court include language in its marshaling instruction to the jury that included an element that Cooley failed to “appear in person” to register the new address. Cooley was acquitted on the first charge but convicted on the second. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed.

The Iowa Supreme Court held that appearing “in person” is an essential statutory element under Iowa Code § 692A.104(2), and the district court erred by omitting this element from the marshaling instruction. The Court emphasized that the legislature expressly required personal appearance in subsections (1), (2), (5), and (7), distinguishing it from subsection (3), which allows alternative methods. The sheriff’s office lacked authority to substitute telephonic registration for the statutory in-person requirement, even during the pandemic, because altering the scope of criminal liability rests with the legislature, not local officials or courts.

The Court further found the instructional error was not harmless. Because Cooley presented testimony that he did appear in person, the jury should have been instructed that the State bore the burden of proving he failed that element. The jury’s acquittal on another count suggested it credited parts of his testimony, leaving uncertainty whether it would have convicted him under a proper instruction. Accordingly, the Court reversed the conviction, vacated the sentence, and remanded for a new trial. Justice McDermott authored the opinion of a unanimous Court.

 

State of Iowa v. Hope Jennifer Clark, No. 23–0964

Opinion date: May 23, 2025

On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issues:

• Whether law enforcement provided a defendant arrested for reckless driving with a sufficient opportunity to contact an attorney by informing the defendant of her rights and placing a phone on the table near her during her interrogation.

Hope Clark was stopped by deputies in Des Moines County after a reckless-driving complaint. Deputies observed erratic driving, signs of intoxication, and detected the odor of alcohol. Clark performed poorly on field sobriety tests and, upon being asked to take a preliminary breath test, requested an attorney. She was arrested and transported to the county jail.

At the jail, deputies placed Clark’s phone on the table near her, read her Miranda rights, informed her of implied consent provisions, and read Iowa Code section 804.20 aloud, noting she could call an attorney. Clark repeatedly stated she wanted her attorney but never actually attempted to dial. Deputies gestured toward her phone and told her she could call, but she declined to pick it up and ultimately refused the breath test. A jailer later told her she could not use her personal phone but could use the jail’s phone or obtain numbers from her phone.

Clark was charged with OWI, first offense, and moved to suppress evidence obtained after she was allegedly denied her section 804.20 right to contact counsel. The district court denied the motion, finding she had a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel. Clark was convicted, and the court of appeals affirmed her conviction.

The Iowa Supreme Court held that Clark’s statutory right under section 804.20 was not violated. The Court reasoned that deputies provided her a reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney: her phone was placed within reach, she was told multiple times she could call, and officers gestured toward the phone. The Court emphasized that only necessary administrative steps preceded this opportunity, and the approximately eleven-minute delay from her arrival at the jail was not “unnecessary.” Opinion: Chief Justice Christensen authored the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Mansfield, McDonald, and May.

Justice Oxley filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Waterman and McDermott. The dissent argued that Clark was never given a genuine opportunity to call her attorney, and that merely placing her phone nearby without stopping the interrogation rendered the right illusory.

 

Mehmedovic v. Tyson Foods Inc., No. 23–0603

Opinion date: May 23, 2025

On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County

Issues:

• Whether the estates adequately pleaded claims against Tyson executives and supervisors under the gross-negligence exception to the Iowa Workers’ Compensation Act (IWCA).
• Whether the estates’ fraudulent misrepresentation claims against corporate and supervisor defendants were barred by IWCA exclusivity.
• Whether intentional tort claims against employer corporations (Tyson Foods and Tyson Fresh Meats) could proceed outside the IWCA framework.
• Whether the COVID-19 Response and Back-to-Business Limited Liability Act shielded defendants from liability.
• Whether the estates waived claims for breach of duty against certain defendants by failing to raise them on appeal.

The estates of four deceased Tyson Foods employees brought suit alleging gross negligence and fraud after the workers contracted COVID-19 at Tyson’s Waterloo pork processing plant in spring 2020. The estates claimed Tyson executives and supervisors knowingly allowed symptomatic employees to continue working, misled workers through interpreters about the outbreak, and failed to adopt safety measures, despite closing another plant.

The petition named Tyson corporate entities, senior executives, and plant supervisors as defendants, seeking damages for gross negligence, fraud, and breach of duty. The district court dismissed the petition, holding that Iowa Workers’ Compensation Act provided the exclusive remedy for the plaintiffs’ claims, that the pleadings failed to meet the gross-negligence exception, and that the fraud claims were barred as repackaged negligence claims.

The Iowa Supreme Court held that the estates sufficiently pled gross negligence claims against executive and supervisor defendants. Applying notice pleading standards, the Court found allegations that supervisors required sick employees to work, executives tracked widespread illness while denying outbreaks, and management concealed risks were enough to show actual knowledge of peril, knowledge that injury was probable, and a conscious failure to avoid danger.

The Court further held that fraudulent misrepresentation claims against supervisors could proceed because intentional torts fall outside IWCA exclusivity. However, it affirmed dismissal of fraud claims against the corporate defendants, clarifying that IWCA bars all tort claims against employers, even intentional torts.

The Court also rejected dismissal based on the Iowa Back-to-Business Limited Liability Act, concluding the petition sufficiently alleged reckless disregard of COVID-19 risks to fall within an exception to the Act’s immunity. Claims for breach of duty against two medical staff defendants were deemed waived, by contrast, as the estates failed to raise them on appeal.

Justice McDermott authored the opinion of a unanimous Court.

 

Wilson v. Shenandoah Medical Center, No. 23–0509

Opinion date: May 23, 2025

On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issue:

• Whether plaintiffs established good cause to excuse their three-month delay in certifying an expert under Iowa Code § 668.11 based on the defendant’s failure to object or lack of prejudice.

Douglas Wilson underwent hip replacement surgery at Shenandoah Medical Center (SMC) in December 2019. During recovery, he experienced confusion, attempted to walk unassisted, and fell twice, suffering injuries. Douglas and Jane Wilson filed a medical malpractice suit against SMC in December 2021, alleging negligent postoperative nursing care.

Iowa Code § 668.11 requires plaintiffs in professional liability actions to certify expert witnesses within 180 days of the defendant’s answer, absent good cause. The parties agreed to a September 1, 2022 deadline, but the Wilsons did not file their certification until December 2—three months late and after SMC moved for summary judgment. The district court denied summary judgment, finding good cause based on SMC’s failure to object to the missed deadline and continued engagement in discovery. A divided Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed.

The Iowa Supreme Court held that the district court abused its discretion by excusing the Wilsons’ untimely certification. The Court emphasized that section 668.11 imposes a clear statutory deadline, and defense counsel has no duty to remind opposing counsel of it. Silence by opposing counsel, even while the parties are engaged in discovery, does not establish good cause. The Court further explained that a three-month delay is a “serious deviation” from the statutory rule, and the plaintiffs offered no valid explanation for the delay. Lack of prejudice to the defendant cannot by itself justify late disclosure.

Accordingly, the Court barred the plaintiffs’ expert from testifying. Because expert testimony is generally necessary in medical malpractice actions, the Court remanded for the district court to decide whether the Wilsons’ claims could proceed without such testimony or whether summary judgment was warranted. Justice Waterman authored the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Oxley, McDermott, and May.

Justice Mansfield filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Christensen and Justice McDonald. Justice Mansfield argued that the district court acted within its discretion under the multi-factor good cause analysis, noting that the Wilsons had disclosed the same expert through other filings and discovery, that the delay was not serious given the distant trial date, and that SMC suffered no actual prejudice.

 

LS Power Midcontinent, LLC v. State of Iowa, No. 24–0641

Opinion date: May 30, 2025

On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County

Issues:

• Whether the district court had authority to enjoin incumbent utilities and the Iowa Utilities Board (IUB) from participating in transmission projects already awarded under Iowa Code section 478.16, later declared unconstitutional.
• Whether the party seeking relief was required to separately challenge the IUB’s implementing rule under Iowa Code chapter 17A.

In 2020, the Iowa Legislature enacted a “right of first refusal” statute, granting incumbent utilities MidAmerican Energy and ITC Midwest automatic entitlement to certain large-scale transmission projects. LS Power Midcontinent (LSP), a qualified nonresident competitor, challenged the law’s constitutionality under article III, section 29 of the Iowa Constitution (single-subject and title requirements). In December 2023, the district court declared the ROFR unconstitutional and issued a permanent injunction preventing enforcement of the statute and barring MidAmerican, ITC, and the IUB from participating in Tranche 1 projects awarded in 2022 under the ROFR, unless rebid competitively.

The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s permanent injunction. It held that Iowa Code section 478.16 was void ab initio because it was unconstitutionally enacted, and thus projects awarded under it carried no vested rights. The incumbents were on notice of the constitutional challenge since 2020 and assumed the risk by exercising rights under the statute while litigation was pending. Because no construction had begun, injunctive relief could restore the competitive status quo. The Court also held that LSP was not required to separately challenge the IUB’s implementing rule under chapter 17A, since the rule was automatically invalid once its enabling statute was struck down. Justice Waterman authored the opinion of a unanimous Court, except that Justice McDermott took no part.

 

Tags: Iowa Supreme Court 2024-25