UPDATES & ANALYSIS

12.20

November 2024 Opinion Roundup

by Matt McGuire | December 20, 2024

The Iowa Supreme Court entered opinions in twelve cases in November 2024. At the links immediately below, you can read Rox Laird’s analysis of the following opinions:

• Brendeland et. al v. Iowa Department of Transportation, concerning deadlines to challenge eminent domain actions and to file notices of appeal in district court;
• Summit Carbon Solutions v. Kasischke, concerning the constitutionality of an Iowa statute granting pipeline surveyors access to private property;
• In the Interest of N.S., concerning application of a 2022 amendment to the Iowa Constitution regarding the right to bear arms; and
• K. v. Obstetric & Gynecologic Associates, concerning evidentiary determinations in a trial that resulted in a $97 medical malpractice jury verdict.

The remaining opinions from November are summarized below.

 

State of Iowa v. Corey Robert Fenton, No. 22-1681

Opinion date: November 8, 2024

On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issues:

• Whether evidence was sufficient to support Fenton’s conviction for solicitation of commercial sexual activity under Iowa Code § 710A.2A.

In November 2021, Corey Robert Fenton, a 36-year-old man, began communicating on Facebook with “Neveah,” a profile controlled by an undercover detective posing as a 15-year-old girl. After several months of online communication, Fenton suggested meeting at a Flying J shower room in Altoona, Iowa, where they could engage in sexual activity. The State charged him with solicitation of commercial sexual activity, alleging that he promised to exchange items of value (food, clothes, marijuana, Uber fare, and shower costs) in return for sex. At trial, the State argued that any of these offers constituted “commercial sexual activity” under Iowa Code § 710A.1(1). The jury found Fenton guilty, and he was sentenced to five years in prison. The Court of Appeals conditionally affirmed Fenton’s conviction, while remanding for consideration of Fenton’s motion for new trial on other grounds. Fenton sought further review.

The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals, reversed the district court’s judgment, and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the charges against Fenton. The Court held that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support Fenton’s conviction for solicitation of commercial sexual activity under Iowa Code § 710A.2A. This statute’s definition of “commercial sexual activity” requires that a “sex act or sexually explicit performance” be conducted “for which anything of value is given, promised to, or received.” The Court interpreted this statute as requiring an express or implied “quid pro quo” relationship between the promise of an item of value and the sex act. Here, Fenton’s offers to “spoil a little,” buy food, or provide marijuana were vague and not explicitly tied to an exchange for sexual activity. The Court noted that his offer to rent a shower room was for logistical convenience, not as payment for sex, and his offer to call an Uber was to facilitate transportation, not as an inducement for sexual activity. Additionally, Fenton never brought food, clothes, or marijuana to the meeting. The Court found that insufficient evidence supported Fenton’s conviction, and under the Double Jeopardy Clause, the State could not retry him. Chief Justice Christensen authored the opinion of a unanimous Court, except that Justice May did not participate.

 

Dupaco Community Credit Union v. Iowa District Court for Linn County, No. 23-0054

Opinion date: November 8, 2024

On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issues:

• Whether the district court erred in imposing sanctions on Dupaco Community Credit Union and its attorneys under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.413(1) and Iowa Code section 619.19 for making an incorrect assertion of fact in an affidavit, in briefing, and during oral argument.

Dupaco Community Credit Union filed a probate claim for a deceased borrower’s unpaid car loan. The administrator of the estate sent a notice of disallowance of the claim via certified mail addressed to a Dupaco employee but omitted Dupaco’s name. The notice was signed for by Ron LeConte, a third-party courier operating on Dupaco’s behalf. Dupaco contested the notice of disallowance and asserted it never received the notice.

In response to a submission from the administrator containing a receipt signed by LeConte, Dupaco filed a reply brief and an affidavit incorrectly asserting LeConte was a postal service employee and not an agent of Dupaco and claiming that the notice had not been sent by certified mail. Counsel for Dupaco repeated these assertions during a hearing with the district court. The administrator later submitted further evidence showing LeConte operated a delivery service and Dupaco was one of his clients, followed by Dupaco dismissing its claim against the estate.

The administrator subsequently moved for sanction against Dupaco and its attorneys, and the Court ordered Dupaco and its attorneys to pay the $14,000 of the administrator’s attorney’s fees. The district court concluded that the inquiry into LeConte’s identity was insufficient and that counsel’s reliance on flawed USPS tracking information led to a misrepresentation of the facts in violation of Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.413. Dupaco and its attorneys petitioned for a writ of certiorari, and the Iowa Court of Appeals annulled the writ—after which Dupaco and its attorneys filed an application for further review.

The Iowa Supreme Court sustained the writ of certiorari, vacated the sanctions imposed on Dupaco Community Credit Union, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court held that the district court abused its discretion by imposing sanctions under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.413(1) and Iowa Code section 619.19. The Court held that the district court improperly assessed the reasonableness of the inquiry at the time the filings were made and that hindsight had improperly influenced the district court’s ruling.

The Iowa Supreme Court held that Dupaco’s and its attorneys’ investigations into LeConte’s identity were reasonable under the circumstances, and that an incorrect but nonfrivolous assertion of fact does not violate Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.413. The Court also rejected the district court’s conclusion that Dupaco and its attorneys possessed an affirmative duty to correct their errors with a subsequent filing. In addition, the Court held that sanctions against an attorney who did not sign the filings in question were improper as a matter of law. Justice Mansfield authored the opinion of a unanimous Court.

 

In the Interest of J.V., No. 23-0579

Opinion date: November 8, 2024

On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issues:

• Whether guardians of a child in a termination of parental rights case proved by clear and convincing evidence that the mother abandoned the child under Iowa Code § 600A.8(3)(b).
• Whether termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child under Iowa Code § 600A.1.

J.V., born in 2016, is the biological child of a mother with a history of methamphetamine addiction, mental health challenges, and a criminal record. Shortly after his birth, J.V. was placed in the care of a married couple who later became his legal guardians. Although the mother regained custody for a period, she experienced multiple relapses, prompting the guardianship. Under the guardianship order, the mother was granted scheduled visitation rights. However, her visits became infrequent, especially after she began dating a man with a history of methamphetamine addiction. By April 2020, the mother had stopped visiting J.V. altogether and did not resume in-person visits despite the guardians’ encouragement.

The guardians moved with J.V. out of Iowa, first to Colorado in 2021 and later to Texas, without obtaining prior court approval or providing the mother with their new address. While the mother occasionally contacted the guardians to request phone calls with J.V., she did not maintain consistent contact. By the time of the termination hearing, the mother had not seen J.V. in person for three years. The district court denied the guardians’ petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights, finding that the guardians’ actions had limited the mother’s ability to maintain contact. A divided Iowa Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the mother had abandoned J.V. and that termination was in his best interest. The Iowa Supreme Court granted the mother’s application for further review.

The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, reversed the district court’s judgment, and remanded the case for the termination of the mother’s parental rights. The Court held that the guardians had established by clear and convincing evidence that the mother had abandoned J.V. under Iowa Code § 600A.8(3)(b) and that termination of her parental rights was in J.V.’s best interest.

The Court found that, despite some barriers posed by the guardians, the mother failed to maintain substantial and continuous or repeated contact with J.V. for a significant period. While the guardians had imposed some restrictions, such as requiring phone calls to be scheduled and refusing to provide their out-of-state address, these did not excuse the mother’s failure to maintain regular communication. She had access to the guardians’ phone numbers and could have arranged calls, but she did not. From April 2020 onward, the mother did not physically visit J.V. or maintain regular contact. The Court emphasized that Iowa Code § 600A.8(3)(b) requires parents to demonstrate consistent efforts to maintain a parent-child relationship, which the mother had failed to do.

The Court further concluded that termination of parental rights was in J.V.’s best interest. J.V. had been integrated into the guardians’ family, calling them “Mom” and “Dad” and considering their three biological daughters his siblings. The Court emphasized the importance of stability and permanency in J.V.’s life. While the mother had made significant improvements in her life, including addressing her addiction and mental health, she remained essentially a stranger to J.V. The Court noted that preserving a biological connection alone is insufficient to deny termination when a child has become attached to a new family. Accordingly, the Court ordered termination of the mother’s parental rights, allowing the guardians to proceed with adoption. Justice Mansfield authored the opinion of a unanimous Court, except for Justice May, who did not participate.

 

State of Iowa v. Reuben Daniel Schooley, No. 23-1117

Opinion date: November 8, 2024

On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Emmet County

Issues:

• Whether insufficient evidence supported the defendant’s conviction for child endangerment causing bodily injury.
• Whether the district court improperly considered a guardian ad litem’s victim-impact statement in sentencing.

Reuben Daniel Schooley was convicted of child endangerment causing bodily injury after an Emmet County jury found that Schooley used excessive corporal punishment on his nine-year-old daughter, A.S. Schooley argued that the evidence did not support his conviction, but the Iowa Supreme Court held that substantial evidence existed for a rational jury to determine that the corporal punishment at issue was excessive. The Court emphasized that while parents have the right to discipline, corporal punishment must be reasonable and not abusive.

Schooley also appealed his sentence of incarceration for five years, asserting that the district court improperly relied on a victim-impact statement submitted by the child’s guardian ad litem (GAL). The Court ruled that Schooley had waived this challenge by failing to object at sentencing. Additionally, the Court found no affirmative evidence that the district court improperly considered unproven allegations in the GAL’s statement. The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing incarceration rather than probation. Justice Oxley authored the opinion of a unanimous Court.

 

State of Iowa v. Jeffrey John Flynn, No. 23-1448

Opinion date: November 15, 2024

On discretionary review from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County

Issues:

• Whether a peace officer’s failure to follow the implied consent procedures under Iowa Code §§ 321J.6 and 321J.8 requires suppression of a chemical breath test result.
• Whether actual consent to chemical testing can excuse noncompliance with the statutory requirements for written requests and advisories under Iowa Code chapter 321J.

During a traffic stop in Dubuque County, Deputy Rob Freund stopped Jeffrey Flynn for speeding. Suspecting intoxication due to the smell of alcohol and Flynn’s admission of drinking three beers, Freund conducted field sobriety tests, which Flynn failed. Flynn also failed a preliminary breath test. After his arrest, Flynn was transported to the law enforcement center, where Freund requested Flynn submit to a chemical breath test. Freund did not provide a written request or advise Flynn of the consequences of refusal, as required under Iowa Code §§ 321J.6 and 321J.8. Flynn consented to the test, which revealed a blood alcohol concentration of 0.110.

Flynn moved to suppress the breath test result, arguing that the deputy’s failure to follow the statutory procedures violated chapter 321J. The district court granted the motion, reasoning that Iowa Code §§ 321J.6 and 321J.8 mandate compliance when certain conditions are met, including when a preliminary breath test indicates an illegal alcohol concentration and when the person is under arrest. The district court emphasized that “shall” in the statute imposes a duty, and allowing officers to bypass these requirements would render the statute meaningless. The State sought discretionary review, arguing that compliance with chapter 321J was unnecessary because the officer did not “invoke” the statute and Flynn voluntarily consented to the test.

The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s suppression order, holding that Freund’s request for a chemical breath test invoked the requirements of Iowa Code chapter 321J, and his failure to follow those procedures rendered the test result incompetent as evidence. The Court explained that when certain statutory conditions exist—such as when a person is arrested for OWI and has failed a preliminary breath test—the officer does in fact invoke the statute when requesting a breath test and therefore must comply with the statutory procedures for obtaining consent. These procedures require a written request and advisories informing the driver of the consequences of refusal.

The Court also rejected the State’s argument that Flynn’s “actual consent” to the test excused compliance with chapter 321J. The Court explained that the implied consent statute’s bounds are not the same as the warrant requirements under the federal and state constitutions, and that failure to follow the required procedures under the implied consent statute rendered the test result not competent as evidence. Justice McDonald authored the opinion of a unanimous Court.

 

Daniel Murillo v. State of Iowa, No. 22-1967

Opinion date: November 15, 2024

On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issues:

• Whether a district court is required to defer to the Iowa Department of Corrections’ determination that a registered sex offender has “successfully completed” his required sex offender treatment program as required by Iowa Code § 692A.128(2)(b).
• Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the plaintiff’s application to modify his sex offender registry requirements.

Daniel Murillo was convicted of third-degree sexual abuse in 2005, requiring him to register as a sex offender. He participated in a sex offender treatment program (SOTP) while incarcerated and was issued a certificate of completion in 2009. Murillo applied to modify his sex offender registry obligations in 2022, citing his completion of treatment, his low risk of recidivism, and over 12 years of compliance with the registry.

The State opposed the modification, relying on a psychological evaluation conducted by Dr. Anthony Tatman. While actuarial tests classified Murillo as “low risk” to reoffend, Dr. Tatman questioned whether Murillo had truly “successfully completed” the SOTP, describing Murillo as inconsistent in acknowledging responsibility for his actions.

The district court denied Murillo’s application, concluding that Murillo had not “successfully completed” the SOTP under Iowa Code § 692A.128(2)(b) and that he posed an ongoing risk to the community. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed, and Murillo sought further review, arguing that his completion certificate from the Department of Corrections (DOC) proved he had satisfied the statutory requirement and that the district court had improperly considered irrelevant factors.

The Iowa Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals decision but affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Court agreed with Murillo that he had “successfully completed” his sex offender treatment program, as evidenced by his DOC-issued certificate of completion. The Court held that the DOC, as the program administrator, determines whether an offender successfully completes treatment, and that decision is entitled to deference. The Court rejected the district court’s reliance on Dr. Tatman’s doubts about Murillo’s sincerity during treatment, reasoning that completion of a program is a binary determination — either completed or not — and it is inappropriate for the district court to question the DOC’s determination that Murillo had successfully completed the SOTP absent evidence of bad faith or fraud.

However, the Court upheld the district court’s exercise of discretion in denying Murillo’s request for modification of his registry requirements. Even though Murillo met the statutory threshold criteria for modification, the district court retains discretion to deny the request if it finds the applicant poses a risk to public safety. The Court found no abuse of discretion, noting the district court’s reasoning that Murillo’s inconsistent acceptance of responsibility for his crime indicated a need for further treatment. The Court emphasized that district courts may consider an applicant’s truthfulness and ongoing acknowledgment of responsibility when assessing the risk to public safety. Chief Justice Christensen authored the opinion of a unanimous Court, except for Justice May, who did not participate.

 

State of Iowa v. Chad Allen Staton, No. 22-0380

Opinion date: November 15, 2024

On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issues:

• Whether the district court violated a defendant’s right of allocution by disallowing discussion of rejected plea offers during sentencing.
• Whether the district court properly exercised its discretion in limiting the scope of allocution under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.23.

Chad Allen Staton was convicted by a jury of two counts of second-degree sexual abuse and one count of incest. At sentencing, Staton’s attorney attempted to reference rejected plea offers as part of his argument for a lesser sentence. The prosecutor objected, and the district court sustained the objection. Staton’s attorney continued to argue that Staton had maintained his innocence throughout the case and could not express remorse because he still claimed he was innocent. Staton personally addressed the court, maintaining his innocence and referring to the charges as “lies.”

The district court sentenced Staton to an indeterminate 40-year prison term with a mandatory minimum of 17.5 years. Staton appealed, arguing that his right to allocution was violated when the court prevented discussion of his rejected plea offers, which he claimed was relevant to explain his lack of remorse. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed, and Staton sought further review by the Iowa Supreme Court.

The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment and the decision of the Court of Appeals, holding that the district court did not violate Staton’s right of allocution by disallowing discussion of rejected plea offers. The Court explained that Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.10(5) explicitly prohibits the admission of rejected plea offers in any criminal or civil proceeding, and a sentencing hearing is a “criminal action” under this rule. The Court emphasized that this prohibition serves the important policy goal of encouraging plea negotiations by ensuring that rejected plea offers are not later used as evidence. The Court held that this rule does not violate defendants’ right of allocution, which allows the defendant and their attorney to make statements in mitigation of punishment before sentencing, because this right may be subject to reasonable constraints. Justice Waterman authored the opinion of a unanimous Court.

 

Rochon Corporation of Iowa, Inc. n/k/a Graphite Construction Group, Inc. v. Des Moines Area Community College, No. 22-2098

Opinion date: November 22, 2024

On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issues:

• Whether a contractor was entitled to release of retainage funds from a public entity before completion and final acceptance of the construction project under Iowa Code § 573.16.

In 2019, Des Moines Area Community College (DMACC) hired Graphite Construction Group, Inc. (formerly Rochon Corporation of Iowa) as the general contractor for a construction project on DMACC’s Ankeny campus. As work progressed, DMACC withheld 5% of each monthly payment as retainage pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 573, totaling approximately $510,000. By January 2022, Graphite submitted its final invoice, although the project was not complete, and a punch list had not been created. DMACC’s project architect refused to release the retainage.

During the same period, a subcontractor, Metro Concrete, Inc., filed a claim under Iowa Code chapter 573 against both Graphite and DMACC, alleging that Graphite owed it over $212,000 for concrete work. Graphite responded by demanding that Metro file suit, and Metro complied. To secure the release of the retainage, Graphite posted a surety bond for twice the amount of Metro’s claim, relying on Iowa Code § 573.16(2). Graphite then moved to compel DMACC to release the retainage, arguing that the posting of the bond required DMACC to pay the retained funds. DMACC opposed the motion, asserting that, under Iowa Code § 573.14, retainage could not be released until 30 days after the project’s completion and final acceptance.

The district court denied Graphite’s motion, concluding that the plain language of Iowa Code § 573.14 required completion and final acceptance of the project before release of retainage, and that Graphite could not use the bonding procedure in section 573.16 to bypass the timing requirements of section 573.14. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Graphite was entitled to retainage because it had met the procedural requirements of section 573.16(2) by posting a surety bond.

The Iowa Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ ruling and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Court held that Graphite was not entitled to the release of retainage funds prior to completion and final acceptance of the project, even though Graphite had posted a surety bond under Iowa Code § 573.16. The Court emphasized that the statutory text of Iowa Code § 573.14(1) requires retainage to be held for at least 30 days after project completion and final acceptance unless specific statutory exceptions apply. Because the project was not yet complete, neither of the exceptions under section 573.15A or section 573.28 applied.

The Court rejected Graphite’s argument that the bond-posting procedure under Iowa Code § 573.16(2) created an independent path for early release of retainage. It explained that § 573.16’s bonding procedure operates only after the project’s completion and final acceptance, as indicated by the overall structure of chapter 573. The Court reasoned that allowing the release of retainage before project completion would undermine the statute’s purpose of protecting subcontractors and ensuring the completion of public construction projects. Justice May authored the opinion of a unanimous Court.

 

Tags: Iowa Supreme Court 2024-25