UPDATES & ANALYSIS

2.26

November 2025 Opinion Roundup

by Matt McGuire | February 26, 2026

The Iowa Supreme Court entered opinions in eleven cases in November 2025. At the following link, you can read On Brief’s analysis of In re Davenport Hotel Building Collapse, No. 24-0727, concerning whether statutory qualified immunity protections apply to the City of Davenport and city employees in the context of common law negligence claims brought by families of residents who died in a 2023 apartment building collapse. The remaining opinions from November are summarized below.

 

Doe v. Iowa District Court for Polk County, No. 24-0453
Opinion date: November 7, 2025
On certiorari from the Iowa District Court for Polk County

Issue:

• Whether Iowa Code section 901C.3 requires expungement of the entire criminal case file when a defendant is convicted of a misdemeanor offense, or only the portions of the file directly related to the misdemeanor conviction.

Doe was charged in 2013 with domestic abuse assault and child endangerment. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the domestic abuse assault charge was amended to disorderly conduct, a simple misdemeanor, to which Doe pleaded guilty. The State dismissed the child endangerment charge. Ten years later, Doe petitioned for expungement of his misdemeanor conviction under Iowa Code section 901C.3, which allows defendants to apply for expungement of criminal case records under certain circumstances.

The district court granted expungement as to the disorderly conduct conviction only, leaving the remainder of the criminal case file accessible to the public. Doe filed a motion for implementation of expungement, arguing that the statute required whole-file expungement because the publicly accessible portions of the file still indirectly revealed information about the expunged conviction. The district court dismissed the motion, reasoning that the dismissed charge was not eligible for expungement because there was no misdemeanor conviction on that count.

The Supreme Court sustained the writ and remanded, holding that Iowa Code section 901C.3 mandates expungement of the entire criminal case file.

The Court reasoned that the term “criminal case” in section 901C.3 is ambiguous. However, the legislature added section 901C.3 to the Code two years after the Court’s 2017 decision interpreting nearly identical language in section 901C.2 to require whole-file expungement. The Court presumed that the legislature accepted that interpretation when it enacted section 901C.3 using nearly identical language. The Court concluded that criminal case expungements under section 901C.3, like those under section 901C.2, must be implemented on a whole-file basis. Justice McDonald authored the opinion of a unanimous Court.

 

State of Iowa v. Frederick Lee Hawkins III, No. 23-1468
Opinion date: November 14, 2025
On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issue:

• Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s convictions for assault with intent to commit sexual abuse against two of the three victims.

Frederick Hawkins III physically assaulted three women in rapid succession at a church in Ames that hosts a nonprofit meal program. The district court found Hawkins guilty of three counts of assault with intent to commit sexual abuse. On appeal, Hawkins conceded sufficient evidence supported his conviction as to the first victim but challenged the sufficiency of the evidence establishing his specific intent as to the second and third.

The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing.

The Court explained that assault with intent to commit sexual abuse requires the State to prove the defendant committed an assault with the specific intent to commit a “sex act” as defined by Iowa Code section 702.17. Specific intent is typically proved through circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences. The Court emphasized that when a defendant commits similar acts close in time and place, the defendant’s intent as to one victim may be probative of intent as to other victims. Here, the three assaults constituted a single criminal episode occurring in rapid succession over only a few minutes, in enclosed areas of the same building, against similar victims. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the totality of the circumstances supported an inference that Hawkins acted under the same impulse and with the same specific intent when he assaulted his second and third victims.

Hawkins also argued that the district court abused its discretion in failing to provide its reasons for imposing consecutive sentences consecutive to each other. The State conceded the error, and the Court vacated Hawkins’ sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. Justice McDonald authored the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Christensen and Justices Waterman, Oxley, and May.

Justice Mansfield filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Mansfield argued that the evidence was not sufficient to uphold Hawkins’s conviction as to the second victim.

Justice McDermott filed a dissenting opinion, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the convictions for assaulting the second and third victims. Specifically, Justice McDermott argued that the temporal connection between the three assaults did not provide sufficient basis to conclude that Hawkins possessed the required specific intent to commit the second and third assaults.

 

State of Iowa v. Pat Grant Kepner, No. 23-2060
Opinion date: November 14, 2025
On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issues:

• Whether the district court abused its discretion in excluding the defendant’s proffered expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identifications.
• Whether the defendant was prejudiced by the exclusion of that testimony.

Pat Kepner was charged with two counts of indecent exposure after two women, K.W. and E.P., reported on separate occasions that a man had exposed himself to them in parking lots. Both women identified Kepner as the perpetrator. At trial, Kepner sought to present testimony from Dr. Kim MacLin, a psychologist with expertise in perception and memory, about factors that can influence the reliability of eyewitness identifications. Dr. MacLin would have testified about how lineup and photo array procedures affect identification reliability, how witness confidence can be artificially inflated through repeated identification procedures and feedback from investigators, and that confidence does not necessarily correlate with accuracy. The district court excluded the testimony, concluding it would indirectly address witness credibility, which is the jury’s province. Kepner was convicted on both counts. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals opinion, reversed the district court judgment, and remanded for a new trial.

The Court reasoned that generalized expert testimony about factors affecting eyewitness identification reliability may assist juries in evaluating such evidence, much as expert testimony about child abuse victim behavior may assist juries in child sexual abuse cases. Dr. MacLin’s proposed testimony was wholly generalized and did not vouch for any particular witness’s credibility. She did not offer opinions about the specific identifications in this case or mention any witness by name. The district court erred by categorically excluding such testimony. Regarding prejudice, the Court found that the State had greatly emphasized the importance of the eyewitness identifications, telling the jury that the case “boils strictly down to identification.” Because the identifications were central to the State’s case, the Court could not conclude that Kepner received a fair trial without the expert testimony. Justice May authored the opinion of a Court, joined by all justices except for Justice Mansfield.

Justice Mansfield dissented, agreeing that Dr. MacLin should have been permitted to testify but concluding that Kepner was not prejudiced by the exclusion because the State had a strong case against him, including surveillance video showing a car matching Kepner’s distinctive vehicle and Kepner’s evasive statements during his police interview.

 

Benjamin Fogle et al. v. Clay Elementary School-Southeast Polk Community School District et al., No. 24-1351
Opinion date: November 14, 2025
On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County

Issues:

• Whether the Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act’s qualified immunity provisions and heightened pleading standard apply to claims brought under the Iowa Civil Rights Act.
• Whether the IMTCA’s heightened pleading standard applies to common law tort claims against a municipality.

Benjamin and Amanda Fogle filed suit on behalf of their son, P.F., alleging that he was bullied, harassed, and assaulted by other students at Clay Elementary School because of his sexual orientation. The petition asserted claims under the Iowa Civil Rights Act for discrimination and aiding and abetting discrimination, as well as common law tort claims. The school district and individual employees moved to dismiss, arguing that the claims failed to meet the heightened pleading requirements of Iowa Code section 670.4A. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the ICRA claims were not torts subject to the IMTCA. The defendants appealed as of right under section 670.4A(4).

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court explained that section 670.4A’s qualified immunity and heightened pleading standard apply only to “a claim brought under” the IMTCA. A claim for violation of the ICRA is a claim brought under the ICRA, not the IMTCA. The ICRA predates the IMTCA and has its own administrative procedures, filing requirements, and remedies. The Court also applied its 2025 opinion in Doe v. Western Dubuque Community School District, in which it held the IMTCA’s qualified immunity provisions do not apply to common law tort claims. Because section 670.4A did not apply to any of the challenged claims, subsection (4) did not authorize an appeal as of right, and the Court lacked appellate jurisdiction. Justice Oxley authored the opinion of a unanimous Court.

 

Ashley Hall et al. v. Southeast Polk Junior High School-Southeast Polk Community School District et al., No. 24-1352
Opinion date: November 14, 2025
On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County

Issues:

• Whether the Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act’s heightened pleading standard applies to claims brought under the Iowa Civil Rights Act.
• Whether the IMTCA’s heightened pleading standard applies to common law claims for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence against municipal employees.

Ashley and Ryan Hall filed suit on behalf of their minor child, A.H., asserting claims under the Iowa Civil Rights Act against the Southeast Polk Community School District for disability discrimination, sex discrimination, and harassment with respect to education. They also asserted ICRA claims for aiding and abetting against individual school officials and common law claims for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence against all defendants. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the claims failed to meet the heightened pleading requirements of Iowa Code section 670.4A. The district court denied the motion as to the ICRA and common law claims. The defendants appealed as of right under section 670.4A(4).

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and remanded the case for further proceedings, applying the same reasoning as the Fogle case, above. The Court’s opinion was issued per curiam.

 

Sandra K. Mormann et al. v. City of Manchester, Iowa, et al., No. 24-0828
Opinion date: November 21, 2025
On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Delaware County

Issues:

• Whether the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity under Iowa Code section 670.4(1)(k) as emergency responders.
• Whether the district court erred by submitting the plaintiffs’ assault and battery claims to the jury when those claims were not expressly pleaded.
• Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict on assault and battery.
• Whether the district court erred in admitting the decedent’s statements as a dying declaration.
• Whether the district court erred in admitting evidence of police department policies regarding video recording.
• Whether there was sufficient evidence to support a punitive damages award.

On December 10, 2020, Iowa State Trooper Eric Payne began pursuing a speeding motorcyclist on Highway 20 near Manchester. The motorcyclist, Augustin Mormann, fled through traffic and into residential areas. Trooper Payne disengaged due to the danger, but Manchester Police Lieutenant James Wessels continued pursuit in violation of department policy. According to the plaintiffs’ expert, Wessels intentionally struck Mormann’s motorcycle twice, causing a fatal crash. The jury awarded $4.25 million in compensatory damages and $10,000 in punitive damages for assault and battery. The defendants appealed on multiple grounds.

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Court rejected the defendants’ emergency response qualified immunity defense. Although Iowa Code section 670.4(1)(k) provides immunity for claims arising out of emergency responses, section 321.231(5) removes that protection when a driver acts with “reckless disregard for the safety of others.” The jury found in the punitive damages phase that Wessels acted with willful, wanton, and reckless disregard for Mormann’s safety, defeating the immunity defense. On the pleading issue, the Court found no abuse of discretion in permitting the assault and battery claims because the defendants knew this was an excessive force case and could not show unfair prejudice. On sufficiency of the evidence, expert testimony that Wessels intentionally collided twice with the motorcycle, combined with the physical evidence, supported the jury’s verdict. The Court also found no error in admitting Mormann’s dying declaration that he was “pushed off the road at a high rate of speed” or in admitting evidence that Wessels violated department policy by failing to activate his recording devices. Justice Waterman authored the opinion of a unanimous Court.

 

The Law Office of Shawn Shearer, P.C. et al. v. Iowa District Court for Fremont County, No. 24-0548
Opinion date: November 21, 2025
On certiorari from the Iowa District Court for Fremont County

Issues:

• Whether the district court abused its discretion in awarding $30,000 in sanctions against attorneys under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.413(1) for filing legal challenges to a wind turbine construction project.

Attorneys Shawn Shearer and Theodore Sporer represented Fremont County residents who filed suit challenging a wind energy project proposed by Shenandoah Hills Wind Project, LLC. The petition asserted claims challenging the county’s wind ordinance, approval of the permit, and compliance with the Open Meetings Act. Six days after the petition was filed in state court, a federal district court dismissed similar claims brought by Page County residents. Counsel for Shenandoah, the wind project developer, sought to intervene and sent the plaintiffs’ attorneys a letter demanding dismissal of the petition in light of the Page County ruling and threatening sanctions. The plaintiffs amended their petition in light of Page County ruling but otherwise sought to move forward in the litigation.

The district court dismissed the case, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. Meanwhile, filing the district court’s ruling, Shenandoah moved for sanctions. A different district judge granted sanctions, ordering the attorneys to pay $30,000 based largely on plaintiffs’ decision to maintain their claims following the federal court’s prior ruling. The sanctioned attorneys then filed a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court sustained the attorneys’ writ of certiorari and vacated the sanctions order. The Court explained that Rule 1.413(1) requires courts to evaluate counsel’s conduct at the time of signing, not based on subsequently learned information. There is no continuing duty to dismiss a lawsuit based on later developments. The Court also emphasized that each filing must be considered separately, and the district court failed to analyze the specific legal deficiencies in each of the ten pleadings it deemed sanctionable. The Court further concluded that the amended petition was not sanctionable, noting that the district court itself recognized the law concerning county home rule authority was “relatively untested” and “ambiguous.” The federal district court decision was not binding on Iowa courts, and the attorneys could argue it was wrongly decided. The Court also noted that the Court of Appeals reversed dismissal of the Open Meetings Act claims, confirming those claims were not frivolous. Rule 1.413(1) “was not intended to chill an attorney’s enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing legal or factual theories.” Justice Oxley authored the opinion of a unanimous Court.

 

Robert Teig v. Brad Hart et al., No. 24-0029
Opinion date: November 25, 2025
On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issues:

• Whether, under Iowa Code section 21.5(1)(i), a governmental body must have specific evidence of a reputational threat before closing a job interview, or may close the interview based on the candidate’s request and the inherent unpredictability of interviews.

On April 29, 2021, the Cedar Rapids City Council held a special meeting to interview Alissa Van Sloten for the position of city clerk. Van Sloten, who had worked for the city for over ten years, requested in writing that her interview be conducted in a closed session to prevent potential harm to her reputation. The council unanimously voted to enter a closed session. The interview was positive, and no negative information emerged. Robert Teig, a retired attorney, challenged the closed session as a violation of the Open Meetings Act. The district court ruled the closed session was lawful. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the governmental body must have specific evidence of a reputational threat before closing an interview.

The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals decision and affirmed the district court judgment. The Court explained that section 21.5(1)(i) permits a closed session to evaluate an individual’s professional competency “when necessary to prevent needless and irreparable injury to that individual’s reputation and that individual requests a closed session.” The statute is prophylactic—designed to prevent harm before it occurs. The Court found that the Court of Appeals’ interpretation, which would require opening and closing sessions as potentially harmful information emerged, would be unwieldy and impractical. It is unrealistic to know in advance what will come up in a job interview that might harm the interviewee’s reputation. The interviewee won’t know what questions will be asked, and interviewers won’t know what follow-up questions might arise. The Court also noted that this interpretation harmonizes with the Open Records Act, which categorically protects outside employment applications from public disclosure. Justice Mansfield authored the opinion of a unanimous Court.

 

In re Estate of Rex L. Felten, No. 24-1053
Opinion date: November 25, 2025
On appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clinton County

Issues:

• What standards govern good faith and probable cause when determining whether a no-contest clause in a will should be enforced against a beneficiary who unsuccessfully challenged the will.
• Whether Kathy Felten demonstrated good faith and probable cause sufficient to avoid forfeiture under the no-contest clause in Rex Felten’s will.

Rex Felten executed his final will in July 2021, approximately three weeks before his death. The will contained a no-contest clause providing that any beneficiary who contested the will would be disinherited. Rex’s daughter Kathy contested the will, alleging undue influence by her sister Karen, lack of testamentary capacity, and intentional interference with inheritance. A jury rejected Kathy’s claims. Karen, as executor, sought to enforce the no-contest clause and disinherit Kathy. The district court enforced the clause, finding that Rex intended to enforce harmony among his heirs and punish any heir who disobeyed.

The Supreme Court affirmed. The Court clarified that Iowa follows an intermediate approach to no-contest clauses, enforcing them unless the challenger acted with good faith and probable cause. The challenger bears the burden of proof on both elements. Good faith requires subjective honesty, while probable cause requires objective reasonableness — meaning that a reasonable person, knowing the facts known to the challenger, would believe there was a substantial likelihood of success. Relevant factors include whether the challenger relied on informed advice of counsel and whether the challenger conducted a presuit investigation. Here, the record lacked critical evidence of Kathy’s good faith and probable cause. Neither Kathy nor her counsel testified about legal advice received before filing, and Kathy offered no evidence of presuit investigation. Had Kathy investigated, she presumably would have discovered that Rex’s attorney had arranged for cognitive testing confirming Rex was mentally competent when he executed his final will. Justice Waterman authored the opinion of the Court, joined by Justice Oxley.

Justice May wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment, joined by Justice McDonald. Justice May argued that the Court should consider strictly enforcing no-contest clauses.

Justice McDermott dissented, joined by Chief Justice Christensen, arguing that Kathy filed her case in good faith and with probable cause based on evidence of Rex’s health challenges, Karen’s ill-will toward Kathy, and Rex’s death within three weeks of changing his will. Justice Mansfield did not participate.

Tags: Iowa Supreme Court 2025-26