UPDATES & ANALYSIS

11.06

October 2024 Opinion Roundup

by Matt McGuire | November 6, 2024

The Iowa Supreme Court entered opinions in eight cases in October 2024. Rox Laird’s analysis of State of Iowa v. William Noble Chaiden Miller and Katherine Avenarius and Paul Avenarius v. State of Iowa is available at the preceding links. The remaining opinions from October are summarized below:

 

Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Joel E. Fenton, No. 24-0538

Opinion Date: October 4, 2024

On review from the report of the Iowa Supreme Court Grievance Commission

Issues:

• Whether an attorney violated ethical standards under the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct by neglecting clients and failing to meet professional obligations.
• Whether an attorney’s breach of a deferral agreement with the Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board constitutes additional grounds for disciplinary action.
• Whether an attorney’s mental health history and pro bono work mitigate the appropriate sanction for repeated ethical violations.

Joel E. Fenton, a sole practitioner licensed in Iowa since 1996, has a history of disciplinary actions linked to neglecting client cases and failure to communicate. In 2020, he consented to a sixty-day suspension for multiple client-related misconduct issues, followed by a deferral agreement in 2022 in response to new complaints. During the deferral period, Fenton was again found to neglect client obligations, missing court deadlines and failing to attend hearings, leading the Grievance Commission to recommend a ninety-day suspension. The case was brought before the Iowa Supreme Court for final review and disposition.

The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the findings and recommendations of the Grievance Commission, concluding that Fenton’s conduct violated several rules of professional conduct, including neglect of client matters and failure to communicate. The Court considered aggravating factors such as Fenton’s disciplinary history, the violation of the deferral agreement, and the impact on vulnerable clients. Mitigating factors, including Fenton’s mental health struggles and his history of pro bono work, were acknowledged but did not outweigh the need for a suspension. The Court imposed a ninety-day suspension, with a requirement for a mental health evaluation before possible reinstatement. Justice Waterman authored the opinion of a unanimous Court.

 

Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board v. Rebecca C. Sharpe, No. 24-0424

Opinion Date: October 4, 2024

On review from the report of the Iowa Supreme Court Grievance Commission

Issues:

• Whether an attorney violated ethical standards by misappropriating client funds and commingling client funds with personal assets.
• Whether an attorney’s concealment of a client bequest and failure to communicate the bequest to the beneficiary constituted additional ethical violations.
• Whether repeated failures to maintain accurate financial records, including monthly reconciliations, violated rules on client trust account management.
• Whether revocation of the attorney’s license to practice law was an appropriate sanction.

Rebecca C. Sharpe was admitted to the Iowa Bar in 2009. Appointed as the attorney for the estate of Evelyn Haack, Sharpe failed to promptly file estate taxes, concealed a substantial bequest intended for a church, and converted over $65,000 from the estate without court authorization. An audit of Sharpe’s client trust account revealed failures to conduct monthly reconciliations, commingling of funds, and overdrafts. The Grievance Commission recommended revocation of her license based on multiple rule violations, including neglect, misrepresentation to the court, and unauthorized withdrawals. Sharpe’s cooperation was limited throughout the proceedings, and her attorney eventually withdrew.

The Iowa Supreme Court agreed with the Commission’s findings, ruling that Sharpe’s misconduct constituted serious ethical breaches. The Court found that Sharpe’s actions, including intentional misrepresentation and conversion of client funds, violated rules of professional conduct related to client trust accounts and attorney honesty. Her attempt to withhold the bequest to the church and her misuse of estate funds demonstrated a pattern of intentional deceit and harm to her client and third parties. The Court upheld the revocation of Sharpe’s license to practice law. The Court noted that mitigating factors are not relevant in cases of misappropriation without a future claim. Chief Justice Christensen authored the opinion of a unanimous Court, except for Justice Waterman, who did not participate.

 

State of Iowa v. Eric Lamont Harris, No. 23-1285

Opinion Date: October 4, 2024

On appeal from Iowa District Court for Johnson County

Issues:

• Whether the district court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss criminal charges for violation of Iowa’s speedy-indictment rule.
• Whether the correct event to start the 45-day speedy-indictment period under the pre-amendment rule was Harris’s arrest date or his initial appearance date.

Eric Lamont Harris was arrested on suspicion of arson and other crimes at 11:58 p.m. on March 25, 2023, and appeared before a magistrate the following day. The version Iowa’s Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33(2)(a) in force prior to an amendment taking effect July 1, 2023, mandates a 45-day deadline to file an indictment or trial information after an arrest, which, according to Harris, began on his arrest date. The state, however, filed the trial information on May 10, the 46th day after the arrest but the 45th day after Harris’s initial appearance. Harris moved to dismiss for violation of the speedy-indictment rule, arguing that the state exceeded the 45-day limit. The district court denied the motion, interpreting the 45-day period as beginning with Harris’s initial appearance, not his arrest. Harris sought discretionary review, which the Iowa Supreme Court granted.

The Iowa Supreme Court held that the district court erred in denying Harris’s motion to dismiss. Under the pre-amendment version of Iowa Rule 2.33, the Court clarified that the 45-day period begins at the time of arrest, consistent with prior decisions in State v. Williams (2017) and State v. Watson (2019), which ruled that the indictment timeline starts with the arrest date, not the initial appearance. The Court rejected the state’s argument that Watson should apply only to citation cases, confirming that arrests and citations trigger the same 45-day countdown under the pre-amendment rule. The Court also declined the state’s suggestion to reinterpret the pre-amendment rule in line with the amended rule that starts the countdown at the initial appearance. Since the trial information was filed 46 days after Harris’s arrest, the indictment was untimely, warranting dismissal. Justice May authored the opinion of a unanimous Court,

 

Linn County Auditor Joel Miller v. Iowa Voter Registration Commission, No. 23-0661

Opinion Date: October 11, 2024

On appeal from Iowa District Court for Polk County

Issues:

• Whether a county auditor has standing to challenge the Secretary of State’s compliance with the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) on grounds relating to the security and integrity of the statewide voter registration database.
• Whether the Iowa Voter Registration Commission improperly dismissed the auditor’s complaint without an evidentiary hearing on the alleged database vulnerabilities.

Joel Miller, the Linn County Auditor and chief election official for Linn County, filed a complaint with the Iowa Voter Registration Commission, alleging that Iowa’s voter registration database, I-Voters, lacked adequate security and maintenance measures required by HAVA. Miller claimed that this lack of security posed risks of unauthorized access and erroneous removal of eligible voters, compromising election integrity. The Secretary of State filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the system’s security met federal standards and that Miller’s complaint was speculative. The Commission granted the Secretary of State’s motion. Miller then filed for judicial review, arguing that his position as county auditor gave him standing to address these concerns and that the Commission erred by dismissing his complaint without an evidentiary hearing. The district court denied Miller’s petition for judicial review, finding that he lacked standing.

The Iowa Supreme Court held that Miller had standing to challenge the security of the voter registration system due to his official role overseeing local elections, which requires reliance on I-Voters for accurate and secure voter data. The Court found that Miller’s concerns about potential security flaws in I-Voters affected his duties directly, granting him the required “specific, personal, and legal interest” in the dispute. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the Commission improperly dismissed Miller’s complaint. The Court held that the Commission improperly relied on the Secretary of State’s factual assertions regarding the adequacy of the security and maintenance measures implemented in connection with the I-Voters database in dismissing Miller’s complaint. Issues of fact, the Court held, cannot be resolved at the motion to dismiss stage. The Court reversed the district court’s dismissal, remanding for further proceedings to allow the VRC to conduct an evidentiary hearing on Miller’s claims. Justice Mansfield authored the opinion of a unanimous Court.

 

Bryan Norris v. Trudy Paulson, No. 23-0217

Opinion Date: October 11, 2024

On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issues:

• Whether the Supreme Court’s 2023 ruling in Burnett v. Smith precludes Norris’s claim for unreasonable seizure and excessive force under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution.
• Whether genuine issues of material fact exist regarding Paulson’s justification defense to Norris’s common law assault claim.

Bryan Norris filed a lawsuit against the City of Des Moines and one of its police officers, Trudy Paulson, following a 2019 incident where Paulson shot Norris at a homeless encampment. Norris asserted a claim for unreasonable seizure under the Iowa Constitution and a claim for common law assault. The defendants sought summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity and justification as to the assault claim. The district court denied the defendants’ motion. Paulson appealed, arguing that new language added to Iowa Code § 670.4A(4) in 2022 allowed interlocutory appeal on qualified-immunity grounds.

While Paulson’s appeal was pending, the Iowa Supreme Court issued its decision in Burnett, limiting constitutional claims for monetary damages. Paulson then argued that Burnett required dismissal Norris’s constitutional claims, while maintaining her appeal on the justification defense. The Court of Appeals upheld the denial of summary judgment on the assault claim, but held that Burnett precluded Norris’s constitutional claim. Norris sought further review.

The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the Court of Appeals’ ruling. The Iowa Supreme Court held because the enactment of the statutory right of appeal in Iowa Code § 670.4A(4) “did not apply retroactively to conduct that predated its enactment,” and that as a result, Paulson was not entitled to an interlocutory appeal as a matter of right. The Supreme Court held that the constitutional question regarding application of Burnett should be decided in the first instance by the district court. The Supreme Court, per curiam, affirmed the district court’s order denying summary judgment.

 

State of Iowa v. Sarah Rae Berg, No. 23-0819

Opinion Date: October 18, 2024

On further review from the Iowa Court of Appeals

Issues:

• Whether the failure to indict within 45 days for the initial charge of fourth-degree theft precluded the state from filing a subsequent charge for unauthorized use of a credit card under Iowa’s speedy-indictment rule.
• Whether the two charges—of fourth-degree theft and of unauthorized use of a credit card—constituted the same offense for speedy-indictment purposes.

Sarah Berg, a Casey’s General Store employee, activated and used several gift cards without payment, leading to her arrest for fourth-degree theft. Although Iowa law requires an indictment or trial information within 45 days after arrest, the state missed this deadline for the theft charge. Instead, it filed a new charge—unauthorized use of a credit card. Berg moved to dismiss, arguing that the state violated her speedy-indictment rights by changing charges after the deadline. The district court denied her motion, finding that the charges were legally distinct. Berg was later convicted of unauthorized use of a credit card. The Iowa Court of Appeals upheld her conviction, and Berg sought further review.

The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that fourth-degree theft and unauthorized use of a credit card are not the same offense for speedy-indictment purposes. The Court emphasized that the charges were based on distinct statutory provisions and required different facts: fourth-degree theft required proof of taking property worth over $300, while unauthorized use of a credit card required evidence of using a credit card to obtain goods. Since the offenses were factually and legally separate, the state was not barred from charging Berg with unauthorized use of a credit card after the initial speedy-indictment period for the theft charge elapsed. Justice Oxley authored the opinion of a unanimous Court.

Tags: Iowa Supreme Court 2024-25